The LMVD-ID is an internal research identifier, not an official CVE identifier.
Self-Tuning LLM Jailbreak
Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to a novel iterative self-tuning attack (ADV-LLM) that crafts adversarial suffixes. This attack significantly reduces the computational cost of generating effective…
Paper-evaluated models(7)
GPT-3.5 Turbo, GPT-4, Guanaco 7B +4 more
- GPT-3.5 Turbo
- GPT-4
- Guanaco 7B
- Llama 2 7B Chat
- Llama 3 8B Instruct
- Mistral 7B Instruct v0.2
- Vicuna 7B v1.5
Description
Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to a novel iterative self-tuning attack (ADV-LLM) that crafts adversarial suffixes. This attack significantly reduces the computational cost of generating effective jailbreaks compared to prior methods, achieving near 100% success rate against various open-source LLMs and high success rates (e.g., 99% against GPT-3.5, 49% against GPT-4) against closed-source models. The attack leverages iterative self-tuning to improve the LLM's ability to generate adversarial suffixes, bypassing safety mechanisms and eliciting unintended harmful responses. The attack's effectiveness stems from refined target phrases and optimized initial suffix templates tailored to individual LLMs.
Examples
See the paper's appendix for detailed examples of adversarial suffixes generated by ADV-LLM against various LLMs. The examples demonstrate the effectiveness of the attack in eliciting harmful responses in a range of scenarios. (Specific examples are omitted due to their potential for misuse, but are available in the linked paper). See arXiv:2410.18469 (opens in a new tab)
Impact
Successful exploitation of this vulnerability leads to bypassing LLM safety mechanisms. Attackers can elicit harmful, unethical, or illegal responses from affected LLMs, potentially causing harm to individuals or society. The high success rate and low computational cost of ADV-LLM present a significant threat to the security and reliability of LLMs.
Affected Systems
Various open-source and closed-source LLMs, including (but not limited to) Vicuna-7b-v1.5, Guanaco-7B, Mistral-7B-Instruct-v0.2, Llama-2-7b-chat, Llama-3-8B-Instruct, GPT-3.5, and GPT-4.
Mitigation Steps
- Improve safety mechanisms: Enhance LLM safety mechanisms to better detect and prevent the generation of harmful responses, considering the adversarial suffix generation techniques used in the ADV-LLM attack.
- Refine prompt engineering: Develop more robust prompt engineering techniques to reduce the susceptibility to adversarial suffixes.
- Implement content filtering: Employ robust content filtering mechanisms to detect and block harmful outputs, even if generated by jailbroken LLMs.
- Regular security auditing: Conduct regular security audits of LLMs to identify and address vulnerabilities.
- Diverse training data: Train LLMs on diverse and robust datasets including adversarial examples to improve their resilience.
Research context and confidence
- Evidence and verification
- Paper-reported; independent reproduction is not documented.
- Primary research source linked.
- Severity
- Not rated by this catalog.
- Source and publication type
- arXiv · Research preprint.
- Peer-review status is not provided by this source.
- Author and publication status
- Author metadata is not stored; see the primary paper.
- Threat model and attacker access
- White-box access to model or deployment internals.
- Related deployment categories
- No related deployment category is classified.
- Taxonomy labels only; paper-specific deployment prerequisites are not inferred.
- Affected systems
- Various open-source and closed-source LLMs, including (but not limited to) Vicuna-7b-v1.5, Guanaco-7B, Mistral-7B-Instruct-v0.2, Llama-2-7b-chat, Llama-3-8B-Instruct, GPT-3.5, and GPT-4.
Research Paper
Iterative Self-Tuning LLMs for Enhanced Jailbreaking Capabilities
Primary source: arXiv. Findings are reported by the cited research and have not been independently verified.
View PaperEvidence
This entry is based on a primary research source. Its findings are paper-reported; independent reproduction and verification are not claimed.
https://arxiv.org/abs/2410.18469Related research
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