The LMVD-ID is an internal research identifier, not an official CVE identifier.
Sequential Prompt Jailbreak
Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to "SequentialBreak," a jailbreak attack where embedding a harmful prompt within a chain of benign prompts in a single query can bypass LLM safety features. The LLM's…
Paper-evaluated models
No paper-evaluated models are recorded for this entry.
Description
Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to "SequentialBreak," a jailbreak attack where embedding a harmful prompt within a chain of benign prompts in a single query can bypass LLM safety features. The LLM's attention mechanism prioritizes the benign prompts, allowing the harmful prompt to be processed without triggering safety mitigations.
Examples
See the GitHub repository https://anonymous.4open.science/r/JailBreakAttack-4F3B/ (opens in a new tab) for detailed examples of "Question Bank," "Dialog Completion," and "Game Environment" attack scenarios, including specific prompt chains and resulting harmful outputs.
Impact
Successful exploitation allows attackers to bypass LLM safety mechanisms and elicit harmful or malicious responses, including but not limited to instructions for creating harmful devices, generating hate speech, or providing guidance on illegal activities. This undermines the intended safety features of LLMs and poses significant risks to users and society.
Affected Systems
All LLMs that utilize an attention mechanism and rely on current safety features are potentially vulnerable. This includes both open-source (e.g., Llama 2, Llama 3, Gemma 2, Vicuna) and closed-source (e.g., GPT-3.5, GPT-4) models.
Mitigation Steps
- Implement more robust prompt filtering mechanisms capable of detecting harmful content within complex sequential prompts.
- Develop improved attention mechanisms that can better identify and prioritize potentially harmful prompts regardless of surrounding context.
- Enhance LLM safety training data to include examples of sequential jailbreak attempts, improving the model's ability to recognize and reject such attacks.
- Explore the use of multiple independent safety checks on the same prompt, each with different methods to detect harmful content.
Research context and confidence
- Evidence and verification
- Paper-reported; independent reproduction is not documented.
- Primary research source linked.
- Severity
- Not rated by this catalog.
- Source and publication type
- arXiv · Research preprint.
- Peer-review status is not provided by this source.
- Author and publication status
- Author metadata is not stored; see the primary paper.
- Threat model and attacker access
- Black-box model, service, or application access.
- Related deployment categories
- No related deployment category is classified.
- Taxonomy labels only; paper-specific deployment prerequisites are not inferred.
- Affected systems
- All LLMs that utilize an attention mechanism and rely on current safety features are potentially vulnerable. This includes both open-source (e.g., Llama 2, Llama 3, Gemma 2, Vicuna) and closed-source (e.g., GPT-3.5…
Research Paper
SequentialBreak: Large Language Models Can be Fooled by Embedding Jailbreak Prompts into Sequential Prompt Chains
Primary source: arXiv. Findings are reported by the cited research and have not been independently verified.
View PaperEvidence
This entry is based on a primary research source. Its findings are paper-reported; independent reproduction and verification are not claimed.
https://arxiv.org/abs/2411.06426Related research
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