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LMVD-ID: 607997da
Paper published February 1, 2024
Entry analyzed December 28, 2024
Paper-reported evidence
Confidence: Source-linked

The LMVD-ID is an internal research identifier, not an official CVE identifier.

Stealthy LLM Cold Attack

The COLD-Attack framework allows for the generation of stealthy and controllable adversarial prompts that can bypass safety mechanisms in various Large Language Models (LLMs). The attack leverages an energy-based…

BibTeX citation

Paper-evaluated models(9)

GPT-3.5 Turbo, GPT-4, Guanaco 13B +6 more
  • GPT-3.5 Turbo
  • GPT-4
  • Guanaco 13B
  • Guanaco-7B-hf
  • Llama 2 7B Chat
  • Llama 2-13B-chat-hf
  • Mistral 7B Instruct v0.2
  • Vicuna 13B v1.5
  • Vicuna 7B v1.5

Description

The COLD-Attack framework allows for the generation of stealthy and controllable adversarial prompts that can bypass safety mechanisms in various Large Language Models (LLMs). The attack leverages an energy-based constrained decoding method to generate fluent and contextually coherent prompts designed to elicit harmful or unintended responses from the targeted LLM, even under constraints like specific sentiment or phrasing. This allows attacks to evade detection mechanisms solely relying on prompt fluency or keyword filtering.

Examples

See https://github.com/Yu-Fangxu/COLD-Attack (opens in a new tab) for the code and examples provided by the research paper. Specific examples included in the paper demonstrate attacks with continuation constraints, paraphrasing constraints, and position constraints, showcasing the framework's versatility in evading various defense mechanisms.

Impact

Successful exploitation of this vulnerability can lead to LLMs generating harmful, biased, or otherwise undesired outputs, including:

  • Circumvention of safety filters and content moderation: The stealthy nature of the generated prompts allows bypass of security measures based on prompt analysis.
  • Elicitation of malicious behaviors: Adversarial prompts can trick LLMs into performing actions outside their intended design, such as generating harmful content or revealing sensitive information.
  • Misinformation generation and spread: The ability to control the content and style of generated text enables creation of convincing yet deceptive information.

Affected Systems

Various LLMs, including (but not limited to) Llama-2, Mistral, Vicuna, Guanaco, GPT-3.5, and GPT-4. The vulnerability is demonstrably transferable across different model architectures and sizes.

Mitigation Steps

  • Robust prompt filtering: Implement more sophisticated filtering mechanisms that go beyond simple keyword matching or perplexity checks, incorporating semantic analysis and potentially adversarial training techniques.
  • Adversarial training: Train LLMs on adversarial examples generated by techniques like COLD-Attack to improve their robustness against these types of attacks.
  • Output filtering & monitoring: Implement additional measures to filter and monitor LLM outputs for potentially harmful content, even if the input prompt appears innocuous.
  • Regular updates and patching: Stay up-to-date with security advisories and patches released by LLM providers to address newly discovered vulnerabilities.
  • Diverse safety mechanism integration: Implement multiple layers of security, combining input filtering, output analysis and runtime monitoring.

Research context and confidence

Evidence and verification
Paper-reported; independent reproduction is not documented.
Primary research source linked.
Severity
Not rated by this catalog.
Source and publication type
arXiv · Research preprint.
Peer-review status is not provided by this source.
Author and publication status
Author metadata is not stored; see the primary paper.
Threat model and attacker access
White-box access to model or deployment internals.
Related deployment categories
No related deployment category is classified.
Taxonomy labels only; paper-specific deployment prerequisites are not inferred.
Affected systems
Various LLMs, including (but not limited to) Llama-2, Mistral, Vicuna, Guanaco, GPT-3.5, and GPT-4. The vulnerability is demonstrably transferable across different model architectures and sizes.

Research Paper

Cold-attack: Jailbreaking llms with stealthiness and controllability

Primary source: arXiv. Findings are reported by the cited research and have not been independently verified.

View Paper

Evidence

This entry is based on a primary research source. Its findings are paper-reported; independent reproduction and verification are not claimed.

https://arxiv.org/abs/2402.08679