The LMVD-ID is an internal research identifier, not an official CVE identifier.
Typographic VLM Jailbreak
Large Vision-Language Models (VLMs) are vulnerable to jailbreaking attacks via typographically rendered visual prompts. The vulnerability stems from the VLM's ability to process and interpret image-based text…
Paper-evaluated models(7)
Cogvlm-chat-v1.1, GPT-4V, Llava-v1.5-vicuna-v1.5-13B +4 more
- Cogvlm-chat-v1.1
- GPT-4V
- Llava-v1.5-vicuna-v1.5-13B
- Llava-v1.5-vicuna-v1.5-7B
- Minigpt4-llama-2-chat-7B
- MiniGPT-4 Vicuna 13B
- Minigpt4-vicuna-7B
Description
Large Vision-Language Models (VLMs) are vulnerable to jailbreaking attacks via typographically rendered visual prompts. The vulnerability stems from the VLM's ability to process and interpret image-based text, bypassing safety mechanisms designed for text-only prompts. Malicious actors can encode harmful instructions into images, which are then processed by the VLM's visual module and subsequently interpreted by the language model, resulting in the generation of unsafe and policy-violating responses.
Examples
See the paper "Figstep: Jailbreaking large vision-language models via typographic visual prompts (opens in a new tab)" for multiple examples. The attack involves generating images with harmful instructions rendered typographically. These images, paired with a benign text prompt, are input to the VLM. The VLM then generates text that fulfills the harmful instructions encoded in the image. Specific examples are shown in Figures 4, 6, and 10 of the paper.
Impact
Successful exploitation allows malicious actors to bypass safety filters and elicit unsafe responses from VLMs, including but not limited to generation of harmful content, instructions for illegal activities, dissemination of misinformation, and bypassing content moderation systems.
Affected Systems
Various open-source and closed-source VLMs, including but not limited to LLaVA-v1.5, MiniGPT-4, CogVLM, and GPT-4V are susceptible to this attack method. The vulnerability is not limited to specific model architectures.
Mitigation Steps
- Implement robust cross-modal safety alignment mechanisms.
- Develop and deploy more sophisticated content filtering techniques that analyze both textual and visual inputs.
- Research and implement defenses that detect and mitigate typographic attacks.
- Employ multiple layers of security, including pre-processing of visual inputs to detect and neutralize harmful content.
- Regularly update and fine-tune models to improve their resistance to novel attacks.
Research context and confidence
- Evidence and verification
- Paper-reported; independent reproduction is not documented.
- Primary research source linked.
- Severity
- Not rated by this catalog.
- Source and publication type
- arXiv · Research preprint.
- Peer-review status is not provided by this source.
- Author and publication status
- Author metadata is not stored; see the primary paper.
- Threat model and attacker access
- Black-box model, service, or application access.
- Related deployment categories
- Vision-language models
- Taxonomy labels only; paper-specific deployment prerequisites are not inferred.
- Affected systems
- Various open-source and closed-source VLMs, including but not limited to LLaVA-v1.5, MiniGPT-4, CogVLM, and GPT-4V are susceptible to this attack method. The vulnerability is not limited to specific model architectures.
Research Paper
Figstep: Jailbreaking large vision-language models via typographic visual prompts
Primary source: arXiv. Findings are reported by the cited research and have not been independently verified.
View PaperEvidence
This entry is based on a primary research source. Its findings are paper-reported; independent reproduction and verification are not claimed.
https://arxiv.org/abs/2311.05608Related research
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