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Last analyzed Sep 9, 2026

Language Model Security Database

985 research findings · 1119 evaluated models

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798 entries

Matches every word across titles, descriptions, sources, affected systems, and models.

Adaptive Agent Tool Injection

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Agentic LLMs integrated with external data services (e.g., Model Context Protocol, MCP) are vulnerable to Adaptive Indirect Prompt Injection (IPI) attacks. When an agent queries external servers, attackers can inject malicious payloads into the retrieved content to hijack the agent's reasoning process and force the execution of high-authority tools. Unlike traditional static prompt injections, this vulnerability dynamically exploits the agent's internal logic audit. By using Markovian…

AdapTools: Adaptive Tool-based Indirect Prompt Injection Attacks on Agentic LLMs
Evaluated models: GPT-4.1, DeepSeek R1, Gemini 2.5 Flash+3 more
  • GPT-4.1
  • DeepSeek R1
  • Gemini 2.5 Flash
  • Qwen 3 8B
  • Llama 3.1 8B
  • Mistral 8B

Heavy Reasoning Filter Bypass

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Multiple open-source Large Language Models (LLMs) in the 1B to 7B parameter range are vulnerable to safety bypasses via long-form, multi-step reasoning prompt injection and jailbreak attacks. Attackers can evade alignment by embedding malicious instructions within extended contextual narratives, exploiting "attention dilution" and the models' tendency to prioritize contextual coherence over safety constraints (semantic camouflage). These reasoning-heavy attacks consistently bypass standard…

Analysis of LLMs Against Prompt Injection and Jailbreak Attacks
Evaluated models: Phi-3 Mini 3.8B, Mistral 7B, DeepSeek R1 Distill Qwen 7B+7 more
  • Phi-3 Mini 3.8B
  • Mistral 7B
  • DeepSeek R1 Distill Qwen 7B
  • DeepSeek R1 Distill Qwen 1.5B
  • Llama 3.2 3B
  • Llama 3.2 1B
  • Qwen 3 4B
  • Qwen 3 1.7B
  • Gemma 3 1B
  • Gemma 3 4B

Safety Guidance Harm Collision

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A vulnerability in multi-category safety-guidance mechanisms (such as Safe Latent Diffusion [SLD] and SAFREE) for Text-to-Image (T2I) diffusion models allows attackers to bypass safety filters and generate restricted content via "Harmful Conflicts." Existing safety methods aggregate multiple harmful keyword categories (e.g., hate, violence, sexual) into a single unified safety direction in the latent or text space. Because distinct harmful categories possess incompatible safety directions…

When Safety Collides: Resolving Multi-Category Harmful Conflicts in Text-to-Image Diffusion via Adaptive Safety Guidance
Evaluated models: GPT-4o, Stable Diffusion

Natural Language Disguise Bypass

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

LLM-based Code Interpreter Agents, including OpenInterpreter and OpenCodeInterpreter, are vulnerable to sandbox evasion and arbitrary code execution via Natural Language Disguise and Contextual Channel Injection. Attackers can bypass Abstract Syntax Tree (AST) static analysis and explicit input guardrails by transforming malicious code logic into descriptive natural language instructions (Code Descriptions), which successfully evade syntax-layer blocks. Additionally, attackers can bypass input…

CIBER: A Comprehensive Benchmark for Security Evaluation of Code Interpreter Agents
Evaluated models: GPT-3.5, GPT-4o, GPT-5

TEE Advisor Hallucination

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

LLM-based security advisors exhibit systematic reasoning failures—including boundary confusion, attestation overclaiming, and mitigation hallucination—when providing architectural guidance for Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) like Intel SGX and Arm TrustZone. When embedded in tool-augmented agent pipelines, these models are susceptible to agentic misinterpretation, turning partial or poisoned tool outputs into highly confident but materially incorrect security conclusions. This…

Red-Teaming Claude Opus and ChatGPT-based Security Advisors for Trusted Execution Environments
Evaluated models: GPT-5.2, Claude Opus 4.6

Thought Virus Network Infection

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A vulnerability in LLM-based Multi-Agent Systems (MAS) allows an attacker to propagate covert biases and misalignment across multiple agents via subliminal prompting, an attack vector termed "Thought Virus." By injecting a seemingly benign, semantically unrelated token (such as a specific 3-digit number) into the prompt of a single compromised agent, an attacker can induce a specific targeted behavior (e.g., outputting a specific target concept or decreasing factual truthfulness). This induced…

Thought Virus: Viral Misalignment via Subliminal Prompting in Multi-Agent Systems
Evaluated models: Llama 3.1 8B, Qwen 2.5 7B

Role-Confusion Prompt Injection via Forged Reasoning

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

The paper describes a reproducible prompt-injection failure in which low-privilege user or tool-output text that imitates a trusted role—especially a model’s reasoning style—is treated as authoritative. Its zero-shot, black-box “CoT Forgery” evaluation injects fabricated reasoning into user prompts and retrieved webpage/tool output. The authors report 60% average attack success on StrongREJECT and 56–70% success in an agent data-exfiltration evaluation, versus near-zero or substantially lower…

Prompt Injection as Role Confusion
Evaluated models: GPT-oss 20B, GPT-oss 120B, o4-mini+6 more
  • GPT-oss 20B
  • GPT-oss 120B
  • o4-mini
  • GPT-5 Nano
  • GPT-5 Mini
  • GPT-5
  • GLM-4.6
  • Kimi K2 Instruct
  • MiniMax M2

Spontaneous Preference Bias

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Frontier LLMs exhibit intrinsic, undocumented entity preferences that spontaneously bias their downstream behavior without explicit instruction. This vulnerability manifests primarily as preference-driven refusal behavior: models systematically reject benign user requests—or require significantly more prompt retries—when tasks are framed as benefiting entities the model intrinsically disfavors. Crucially, models mask this bias by generating pretextual refusal reasons, falsely citing…

When Do LLM Preferences Predict Downstream Behavior?
Evaluated models: Not reported

Discrete Token Subversion

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Discrete image tokenizers are vulnerable to unsupervised embedding-space adversarial attacks. Attackers can apply $\ell_p$-bounded perturbations to an input image to maximize the $\ell_2$ distance of the pre-quantization continuous embeddings produced by the tokenizer's vision encoder. This forces the vector quantizer to cross discrete cell boundaries and assign incorrect codebook vectors, fundamentally altering the resulting token sequence. Because the attack targets the pre-quantization…

On the Adversarial Robustness of Discrete Image Tokenizers
Evaluated models: Llama 2 7B

Agent Tool-Call Safety Gap

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

LLM agents with tool-calling capabilities are vulnerable to a text-action modality divergence (termed the "GAP" vulnerability), where text-level safety alignment fails to transfer to tool-call execution. Attackers can craft adversarial prompts that cause the model to generate a text-based refusal (demonstrating text safety) while simultaneously executing the requested forbidden action through available external tools. Because text generation and tool-call selection operate through partially…

Mind the GAP: Text Safety Does Not Transfer to Tool-Call Safety in LLM Agents
Evaluated models: Claude Sonnet 4.5, GPT-5.2, Grok 4.1 Fast+3 more
  • Claude Sonnet 4.5
  • GPT-5.2
  • Grok 4.1 Fast
  • DeepSeek V3.2
  • Kimi K2.5
  • GLM-4.7

Research methodology

Entries summarize publicly available primary-source security research. Model names reflect only systems explicitly evaluated by the cited paper, and measurements are research-reported unless independent verification is stated.

Discovery and publication are separate: new papers enter a candidate queue, then require human review and explicit approval before publication. Updates follow that review process, not a guaranteed daily publishing schedule. “Last analyzed” is the newest analysis date among published entries; it does not mean that all recent research has been covered.