Attack Type
Methods for bypassing model safety measures
670 matching entries out of 704 in this category
Controlled safety-tuning experiments link boilerplate refusal statements to unnecessary refusals of benign requests. Request-specific rationales improve benign compliance, with benchmark-dependent safety tradeoffs.
Source: arXiv
The paper reports a reproducible white-box evaluation in which semantically bridging a benign topic into a harmful request bypassed Llama-2-7B-chat-hf safety behavior in 4 of 30 tested prompt pairs. Paired internal attribution graphs associated successful jailbreaks with path rerouting rather than simple suppression of safety features. This is a paper-reported result, not independently verified here. Defensive reproduction should use the paper’s supplied dataset and code in an isolated…
Source: arXiv
The paper describes a reproducible black-box multimodal jailbreak evaluation, INFER/INFER+, in which dense image typography, nested cross-modal references, recursive visual layouts, and entropy-guided search increase processing complexity and weaken refusal behavior in large vision-language models. The authors report average ASRs of 88.6% on open-source models and 84.0% on commercial models; these are paper-reported measurements, not independently verified facts. For safe defensive…
Source: arXiv
The paper reports a reproducible white-box jailbreak failure mode: successful jailbreak templates selectively suppress early-layer Adversarially Compromised Heads (ACHs), bypassing refusal while harmful-semantic safety activations persist in other heads. The authors identify ACH/SAH behavior using benign, harmful, and successful-attack input triplets, then causally validate the pathway through controlled head ablations. Safe defensive reproduction should use the paper’s released evaluation…
Source: arXiv
MLingualFC is a reproducible black-box safety evaluation showing that harmful instructions rendered as multilingual flowchart images can bypass vision-language model safeguards more often than equivalent text-only inputs. The paper evaluates horizontal, vertical, and tortuous layouts across English, Hindi, Punjabi, Spanish, Romanian, and German. Reported results vary substantially by language, script, layout, and model; these are paper-reported measurements, not independently verified…
Source: arXiv
The paper reports a reproducible black-box jailbreak evaluation in which an evolutionary search generates simulated, role-labeled multi-turn dialogue histories and submits them as a single request. Five semantic mutators and graded judge feedback optimize conversational priming that can induce harmful responses despite direct-request refusals. Results are paper-reported and not independently verified.
Source: arXiv
The paper reports a reproducible black-box evaluation showing that vision-language models can recover prohibited intent encoded or implied through ostensibly benign visual inputs. Four tested families—visual ciphers, object replacement, text replacement, and analogy riddles—expose a cross-modality alignment gap: safeguards effective for explicit text may not reliably apply after harmful semantics are reconstructed from images. These are paper-reported results, not independently verified…
Source: arXiv
The paper reports a reproducible white-box evaluation showing that successful jailbreak prompts can alter a safety-aligned model’s intermediate representations so harmful requests no longer trigger refusal. Its LOCA method identifies small, token-specific residual-stream changes that restore refusal on individual successful jailbreaks, providing causal evidence that jailbreak success can depend on suppressing harmfulness/refusal concepts or strengthening seemingly harmless continuation…
Source: arXiv
LLM agents deployed with tool access are vulnerable to goal-reframing prompt injection, which reliably bypasses explicit rule-following and safety instructions. By injecting language that recasts a standard task as a "puzzle," "Capture The Flag (CTF)," or "easter egg" hunt, an attacker can manipulate the agent's task-frame alignment. The agent does not override security rules; instead, it reinterprets exploitative actions—such as exploring hidden directories, bypassing test runners, or reading…
Source: arXiv
LLM-based coding agents are vulnerable to Document-Driven Implicit Payload Execution (DDIPE) via supply-chain poisoning of third-party agent skills. Attackers can embed malicious logic directly into legitimate-looking code examples and configuration templates within skill documentation files (e.g., SKILL.md). Because coding agents ingest this metadata into their context windows and treat the documentation as an authoritative reference, the underlying LLM silently reproduces and executes the…
Source: arXiv