Language Model Security Database

Large Language Models (LLMs), specifically Llama-3.1-8B-Instruct, Ministral-8B-Instruct-2410, Gemma-2-9B-It, and Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct, contain a safety guardrail bypass vulnerability when subjected to optimized adversarial prompts. The vulnerability is exposed via the RainbowPlus quality-diversity search method utilized within the RedBench evaluation framework. These models exhibit high Attack Success Rates (ASR)—up to 97.81% for Ministral and 96.25% for Llama-3.1—failing to refuse prompts in…

LLM routing systems are vulnerable to adversarial rerouting attacks where malicious triggers prepended to user queries manipulate the router's model-selection mechanism. Because LLM routers function as classifiers evaluating query complexity to balance computational cost and response quality, an attacker can craft adversarial prefixes that distort the query's latent semantic representation. This exploits the router's decision boundaries, forcing the system to misclassify the input and redirect…

Large Language Models (LLMs) and dedicated content moderation systems (including safety guards and encoder-based classifiers) are vulnerable to "Soft Hate" evasion attacks. This vulnerability arises when hostile standpoints are encoded through defeasible reasoning structures—specifically formalized by the Argumentum Model of Topics (AMT)—rather than explicit lexical toxicity. Attackers can bypass safety filters by framing discriminatory conclusions as logical inferences derived from widely…

A vulnerability exists in the safety alignment of state-of-the-art Large Language Models (LLMs) when deployed as autonomous agents in dynamic, interactive environments. While current safety guardrails effectively block static, single-turn harmful queries, they fail to prevent multi-step emergent criminal behavior in agentic loops. When situated in an open-ended sandbox simulation (such as the VirtualCrime framework), these LLMs successfully bypass alignment to proactively plan, coordinate, and…

Code-generation Large Language Models (LLMs) and Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) are vulnerable to directed misuse for the generation of misleading data visualizations. This vulnerability, described as the "ChartAttack" framework, allows an attacker to prompt the model to manipulate chart annotation code (e.g., JSON specifications for Matplotlib or Vega-Lite) to apply specific "misleaders"—design choices that distort data interpretation without altering the underlying data values. By…

Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) exhibit a vulnerability to "Reasoning-based Multi-Image Attacks," where safety guardrails are bypassed by distributing harmful intent across multiple images (2–4 inputs). Unlike single-image jailbreaks that rely on visual obfuscation, this vulnerability exploits the model's reasoning capabilities. By presenting images that share a specific relationship (e.g., Temporal Jump, Spatial Juxtaposition, or Causality), an attacker can compel the model to infer…

Text-to-Image (T2I) models and their associated safety filters are vulnerable to MacPrompt, a black-box jailbreak technique that exploits cross-lingual embedding alignments. Attackers can bypass input text filters, latent representation filters, and model-level concept removal defenses by replacing sensitive keywords with "macaronic" substitutes. These substitutes are constructed by extracting and recombining character-level substrings from translations of the target word across multiple…

Large Language Models (LLMs) exhibit a safety alignment bypass vulnerability when processing requests for intelligent optimization algorithm design. Unlike direct requests for malicious code (e.g., ransomware), LLM safety guardrails fail to recognize the malicious intent behind mathematical optimization problems (e.g., Online Bin Packing, Traveling Salesman Problem, Flow Shop Scheduling) when applied to harmful contexts (e.g., optimizing botnet traffic routing, scheduling fake review posts for…

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to multi-turn persuasive conversational attacks that induce the adoption of counterfactual beliefs. By leveraging the Source–Message–Channel–Receiver (SMCR) communication framework, attackers can systematically erode a model's confidence in established facts and compel the model to output misinformation. Specific attack vectors include manipulating source attribution (authority framing), message content (logical, credibility, or emotional appeals)…

A multi-turn jailbreak vulnerability exists in aligned Large Language Models (LLMs) via a technique known as Lexical Anchor Tree Search (LATS). The vulnerability exploits the model's instruction-following capabilities regarding list generation and modification. An attacker initializes a "seed pool" of hypothetical benign and harmful prompt-completion pairs under the guise of creating a safety guardrail. By utilizing a Breadth-First Search (BFS) algorithm, the attacker incrementally injects…