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Last analyzed Sep 9, 2026

Language Model Security Database

985 research findings · 1119 evaluated models

Filtered research findings

337 entries

Matches every word across titles, descriptions, sources, affected systems, and models.

AI Browser Indirect Injection

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Agentic AI browsers and LLM-powered browser extensions are vulnerable to indirect prompt injection via the processing of untrusted web content. The vulnerability arises when the AI agent ingests the Document Object Model (DOM), including hidden elements, HTML comments, metadata, and accessibility labels, into its context window to perform tasks such as page summarization or autonomous navigation. Because the LLM cannot distinguish between system instructions and untrusted external data, an…

In-browser llm-guided fuzzing for real-time prompt injection testing in agentic AI browsers
Evaluated models: GPT-4, Llama 3.1 70B, Llama 3.3 70B

Personalized Disinformation Jailbreak Escalation

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Appending simple demographic persona details to prompts requesting policy-violating content can bypass the safety mechanisms of Large Language Models. This technique, referred to as persona-targeted prompting, adds details such as country, generation, and political orientation to a request for a harmful narrative (e.g., disinformation). This systematically increases the jailbreak rate across most tested models and languages, in some cases by over 10 percentage points, enabling the generation…

A Multilingual, Large-Scale Study of the Interplay between LLM Safeguards, Personalisation, and Disinformation
Evaluated models: Claude 3.5 Sonnet, Gemma 2 9B IT, GPT-4o+5 more
  • Claude 3.5 Sonnet
  • Gemma 2 9B IT
  • GPT-4o
  • Grok 2
  • Llama 3 8B Instruct
  • Mistral Nemo Instruct
  • Qwen 2.5 7B Instruct
  • Vicuna 7B v1.5

Agent Plan And Intent Hijack

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Deep Research (DR) agents, specifically those utilizing the "think-search-draft" architecture such as the WebThinker framework, contain a logic vulnerability in their recursive planning and information retrieval workflows. While the underlying Large Language Model (LLM) may possess alignment safeguards to reject harmful queries, the agentic framework creates a bypass vector. When a user submits a harmful query using specific adversarial strategies—specifically "Plan Injection" (manipulating…

Deep Research Brings Deeper Harm
Evaluated models: QwQ 32B, Qwen 3 32B, DeepSeek R1 Distill Llama 70B+3 more
  • QwQ 32B
  • Qwen 3 32B
  • DeepSeek R1 Distill Llama 70B
  • Qwen 2.5 72B Instruct
  • DeepResearcher 7B
  • Qwen 2.5 7B Instruct

Distributed Backdoor in Multi-Agent Systems

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A distributed backdoor vulnerability, named "Collaborative Shadows", exists in LLM-based Multi-Agent Systems (MAS) that rely on external or modifiable tools. An attacker can poison multiple agent tools by embedding inert, encrypted "attack primitives" within them. These primitives are fragments of a larger malicious payload. A carefully crafted user instruction acts as both a trigger and a decryption key. The instruction steers the agents to collaborate in a specific sequence, causing them to…

Collaborative Shadows: Distributed Backdoor Attacks in LLM-Based Multi-Agent Systems
Evaluated models: Gemini 2.5 Pro, GLM 4.5, GPT-4.1+2 more
  • Gemini 2.5 Pro
  • GLM 4.5
  • GPT-4.1
  • Kimi K2 Instruct
  • Qwen 3 30B-A3B

Special Token Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) that use special tokens to define conversational structure (e.g., via chat templates) are vulnerable to a jailbreak attack named MetaBreak. An attacker can inject these special tokens, or regular tokens with high semantic similarity in the embedding space, into a user prompt. This manipulation allows the attacker to bypass the model's internal safety alignment and external content moderation systems. The attack leverages four primitives: 1. Response Injection…

MetaBreak: Jailbreaking Online LLM Services via Special Token Manipulation
Evaluated models: Claude Opus 4, Gemma 2 27B IT, GPT-4.1+9 more
  • Claude Opus 4
  • Gemma 2 27B IT
  • GPT-4.1
  • Llama 3.1 405B
  • Llama 3.1 8B
  • Llama 3.3 70B Instruct
  • Llama Guard
  • Llama Guard 3 8B
  • Phi-4
  • Prompt Guard
  • Qwen 2.5 72B Instruct
  • ShieldGemma 2 27B

Adaptive Monitor Injection

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

AI control protocols utilizing Large Language Models (LLMs) as "trusted monitors" to oversee stronger "untrusted" models are vulnerable to adaptive prompt injection attacks. An adversarial untrusted model, possessing knowledge of the monitor's system prompt and scoring logic (Kerckhoffs's principle), can embed specific text artifacts—such as fake system calibration logs or XML metadata—within its output. These injections exploit the monitor's inability to distinguish between data (the agent's…

Adaptive Attacks on Trusted Monitors Subvert AI Control Protocols
Evaluated models: GPT-4o, GPT-4o Mini, GPT-4.1+3 more
  • GPT-4o
  • GPT-4o Mini
  • GPT-4.1
  • GPT-5
  • Claude Sonnet 4
  • DeepSeek Chat

Touch-Guided Mobile Agent Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Vision-Language Model (LVLM) driven mobile agents, such as Mobile-Agent-E, are vulnerable to a touch-guided visual prompt injection attack. This vulnerability allows an attacker to hijack the agent's execution flow via a malicious Android application interface without requiring system-level privileges. The attack leverages "Non-privileged Perception Compromise," where a visual payload is embedded in the application UI and conditionally rendered only during agent-specific interaction…

Practical and Stealthy Touch-Guided Jailbreak Attacks on Deployed Mobile Vision-Language Agents
Evaluated models: GPT-4o, Gemini 2.0 Pro Exp 0205, Claude 3.5 Sonnet+3 more
  • GPT-4o
  • Gemini 2.0 Pro Exp 0205
  • Claude 3.5 Sonnet
  • Qwen VL Max
  • DeepSeek-VL2
  • LLaVA-OneVision

Underestimated LLM Security Flaws

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Mamba-2 and hybrid Transformer-Mamba-2 distilled Large Language Model (LLM) architectures exhibit a distinct architectural susceptibility to Latent Injection and ANSI Escape sequence prompt injection attacks. Comparative analysis reveals that models incorporating Mamba state-space components (specifically distilled variants like Llamba-3B and base Mamba models) fail to maintain adversarial robustness levels comparable to pure Transformer baselines (such as Llama-3.2) when subjected to indirect…

Towards reliable and practical LLM security evaluations via Bayesian modelling
Evaluated models: Llama 3.2 3B, Falcon 7B

Invisible Unicode Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to imperceptible jailbreaking attacks and prompt injection via the exploitation of Unicode variation selectors. This vulnerability arises from a discrepancy between text rendering and tokenizer processing. Attackers can append long sequences of invisible variation selectors (specifically from ranges U+FE00–U+FE0F and U+E0100–U+E01EF) to malicious prompts. While these characters are visually rendered as zero-width or ignored by standard user…

Imperceptible Jailbreaking against Large Language Models
Evaluated models: Llama 2 7B, Llama 3.1 8B, Mistral 7B+1 more
  • Llama 2 7B
  • Llama 3.1 8B
  • Mistral 7B
  • Vicuna 13B

RL-Hammer Autonomous Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A vulnerability exists in Large Language Model (LLM) agentic systems where automated reinforcement learning (RL) techniques can bypass advanced prompt injection defenses, including Instruction Hierarchy and SecAlign. The specific attack methodology, dubbed "RL-Hammer," utilizes Group Relative Policy Optimization (GRPO) to train an attacker model from scratch without warm-up data. The vulnerability exploits the reward sparsity in robust models by employing a "bag of tricks": removing KL…

RL Is a Hammer and LLMs Are Nails: A Simple Reinforcement Learning Recipe for Strong Prompt Injection
Evaluated models: Llama 3.1 8B Instruct, Meta-SecAlign 8B, Meta-SecAlign 70B+7 more
  • Llama 3.1 8B Instruct
  • Meta-SecAlign 8B
  • Meta-SecAlign 70B
  • GPT-4o Mini
  • GPT-4o
  • GPT-5 Mini
  • GPT-5
  • Gemini 2.5 Flash
  • Claude 3.5 Sonnet
  • Claude Sonnet 4

Research methodology

Entries summarize publicly available primary-source security research. Model names reflect only systems explicitly evaluated by the cited paper, and measurements are research-reported unless independent verification is stated.

Discovery and publication are separate: new papers enter a candidate queue, then require human review and explicit approval before publication. Updates follow that review process, not a guaranteed daily publishing schedule. “Last analyzed” is the newest analysis date among published entries; it does not mean that all recent research has been covered.