Attack Type

Extraction Vulnerabilities

Techniques for extracting sensitive information from models

40 matching entries out of 97 in this category

Extraction research results

40 entries

Agent Lifecycle Compound Threats

Updated 4/10/2026

OpenClaw is vulnerable to persistent memory poisoning, allowing an attacker to manipulate the agent's long-term memory store (MEMORY.md) via prompt injection. Because the autonomous agent continuously integrates this memory file as context for all subsequent reasoning and task planning, injected payloads act as durable behavioral constraints. This allows an attacker to persistently alter the agent's core policy, manipulate tool selection, and hijack future sessions without any further…

Taming openclaw: Security analysis and mitigation of autonomous llm agent threats

Source: arXiv

Arbitrary Agent Topology Breach

Updated 4/10/2026

A vulnerability in LLM-based Multi-Agent Systems (LLM-MAS) allows an attacker who controls a single arbitrary agent to map and extract the system's entire confidential communication topology. Unlike prior attacks that rely on direct identity queries and administrative privileges, this attack infers topology stealthily purely from contextual and linguistic signals (stylometry, role-specific syntax), bypassing standard keyword-based and identity-filtering defenses. The exploit relies on a…

WebWeaver: Breaking Topology Confidentiality in LLM Multi-Agent Systems with Stealthy Context-Based Inference

Affects: Llama 3 70B, Llama 3.1 8B, Mistral Large 12B +3 more

Source: arXiv

Stage-Sequential Agent Escalation

Updated 4/10/2026

Agentic Large Language Model (LLM) systems utilizing persistent memory, Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) pipelines, and external tool connectors are vulnerable to Logic-layer Prompt Control Injection (LPCI). An attacker can inject obfuscated (e.g., encoded, structurally nested, or semantically reframed) payloads into external memory stores or RAG documents. These payloads bypass conventional inference-time plaintext content filters, persist across session boundaries, and remain dormant…

LAAF: Logic-layer Automated Attack Framework A Systematic Red-Teaming Methodology for LPCI Vulnerabilities in Agentic Large Language Model Systems

Affects: GPT-4o Mini, Claude 3 Haiku, Llama 3.1 70B Instruct +2 more

Source: arXiv

Adaptive Web Agent Prompt Injection

Updated 2/21/2026

Large Language Model (LLM) based web agents (such as those built using the BrowserUse scaffold) are vulnerable to Indirect Prompt Injection (IPI) attacks when autonomously navigating and processing untrusted web content. Unlike standard Cross-Site Scripting (XSS), this vulnerability occurs when the LLM orchestrator consumes the DOM or visual screenshots of a webpage containing concealed or contextually disguised adversarial instructions. The LLM interprets these embedded text strings as…

MUZZLE: Adaptive Agentic Red-Teaming of Web Agents Against Indirect Prompt Injection Attacks

Affects: GPT-4.1, GPT-4o, Qwen3-VL 32B Instruct

Source: arXiv

Agent Skill Supply Chain Attack

Updated 3/9/2026

LLM agent frameworks that rely on external or marketplace-distributed skills are vulnerable to supply-chain payload execution and confused deputy attacks. Attackers can inject malicious skills into agent registries by exploiting the fundamental skill architecture (applicability conditions, policies, and interfaces). By manipulating skill metadata and applicability predicates, attackers force the agent to retrieve and activate the malicious skill across broad task categories. Malicious…

SoK: Agentic Skills--Beyond Tool Use in LLM Agents

Source: arXiv

Inter-Agent Privacy Leakage

Updated 3/9/2026

Multi-agent Large Language Model (LLM) architectures are vulnerable to internal-channel data leakage due to the absence of access controls and data minimization in inter-agent communication and shared memory. Frameworks such as LangChain, CrewAI, AutoGPT, and MetaGPT propagate complete task contexts—including unredacted sensitive data—between specialized agents during task delegation. Because traditional LLM security guardrails only filter final user-facing outputs, attackers or benign…

AgentLeak: A Benchmark for Internal-Channel Privacy Leakage in Multi-Agent LLM Systems

Affects: GPT-4o, GPT-4o Mini, Claude 3.5 Sonnet +2 more

Source: arXiv

LLM Guardrail Benchmark Lies

Updated 3/8/2026

Architectural limitations in Meta's Llama-Prompt-Guard-2-86M and Llama-Guard-3-8B cause them to fail at detecting indirect prompt injections and agentic tool-use attacks, with detection rates dropping as low as 7-37%. Llama-Guard-3-8B enforces strict user/assistant message alternation and lacks support for tool-use roles; attempting to process messages with role: "tool" or role: "ipython" causes the chat template to raise an error, preventing evaluation entirely. PromptGuard 2 operates…

When Benchmarks Lie: Evaluating Malicious Prompt Classifiers Under True Distribution Shift

Affects: Llama 3 8B, Llama 3.1 8B

Source: arXiv

Personalized Agent Double Agent

Updated 3/9/2026

OpenClaw is vulnerable to Indirect Prompt Injection (IPI), Tool-Return Manipulation, and Persistent Memory Poisoning. The agent incorporates untrusted external content (e.g., fetched web pages) and external tool outputs directly into its observation stream without sufficient isolation. An attacker can embed malicious payloads into these external channels to hijack the agent's planning and execution trace. This allows the attacker to silently trigger high-privilege actions via OpenClaw's Skills…

From Assistant to Double Agent: Formalizing and Benchmarking Attacks on OpenClaw for Personalized Local AI Agent

Affects: GPT-4o, Llama 3.1 70B, Qwen 2.5 7B

Source: arXiv

RAG Knowledgebase Exfiltration

Updated 2/21/2026

Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) systems are vulnerable to iterative knowledge-extraction attacks designed to reconstruct the underlying private knowledge base. The vulnerability exists due to the decoupled optimization of the retrieval and generation phases. Attackers can craft adversarial queries consisting of two distinct components: an "Information" component (optimized via gradient descent or random sampling to steer embeddings toward specific, diverse regions of the vector space) and…

Benchmarking Knowledge-Extraction Attack and Defense on Retrieval-Augmented Generation

Affects: GPT-4o, Llama 3 8B, Qwen 2.5 7B

Source: arXiv

Voice Agent Behavioral Bypass

Updated 2/21/2026

Audio Large Language Models (ALLMs) integrated into voice agent systems for high-stakes domains (banking, IT support, logistics) are vulnerable to multimodal adversarial attacks via spoken interaction. Adversaries can exploit the model's inherent compliance and contextual awareness through multi-turn dialogue to bypass authentication safeguards, escalate privileges (e.g., unauthorized credit limit increases), exfiltrate sensitive Personally Identifiable Information (PII), and poison…

Aegis: Towards Governance, Integrity, and Security of AI Voice Agents

Affects: GPT-4o, GPT-4o Mini, Gemini 1.5 Pro +4 more

Source: arXiv

Related research categories