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Last analyzed Sep 9, 2026

Language Model Security Database

985 research findings · 1119 evaluated models

Filtered research findings

798 entries

Matches every word across titles, descriptions, sources, affected systems, and models.

Tag-Along Agent Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A vulnerability exists in tool-augmented Large Language Model (LLM) agents characterized as "Tag-Along Attacks," where an unprivileged external user (or adversarial agent) coerces a safety-aligned Operator agent into executing prohibited tool calls. Unlike Indirect Prompt Injection, this attack targets the direct conversational interface using a technique termed "Imperative Overloading." By mimicking system prompt syntax and utilizing high-priority imperative commands (e.g., "Strict adherence…

David vs. Goliath: Verifiable Agent-to-Agent Jailbreaking via Reinforcement Learning
Evaluated models: Qwen 2.5 32B Instruct AWQ, DeepSeek V3.1, Gemini 2.5 Flash+9 more
  • Qwen 2.5 32B Instruct AWQ
  • DeepSeek V3.1
  • Gemini 2.5 Flash
  • Qwen 2.5 7B Instruct
  • Meta-SecAlign 8B
  • Qwen 2.5 14B Instruct
  • Qwen 2.5 72B Instruct AWQ
  • Llama 3.1 8B Instruct
  • Llama 3.1 70B Instruct AWQ
  • Llama 4 Maverick
  • GPT-5 Nano
  • Claude 3 Haiku

SS-Neuron Cross-Lingual Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) exhibit a cross-lingual safety vulnerability driven by a dependency on a sparse subset of "Shared Safety Neurons" (SS-Neurons) anchored in high-resource (HR) languages, typically English. Non-high-resource (NHR) languages lack autonomous safety mechanisms and rely on projecting inputs onto this English-aligned safety manifold to trigger refusals. Because this projection is imperfect, safety guardrails can be bypassed by translating malicious prompts into NHR…

Who Transfers Safety? Identifying and Targeting Cross-Lingual Shared Safety Neurons
Evaluated models: Llama 3.1 8B Instruct, Qwen 3 8B, Gemma 2 9B IT

UltraBreak Universal VLM Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Vision-Language Models (VLMs) are vulnerable to a universal and transferable adversarial attack dubbed "UltraBreak." This vulnerability allows remote attackers to bypass safety alignment filters and elicit harmful responses (e.g., hate speech, dangerous instructions) by supplying a single, specifically crafted adversarial image alongside a text query. Unlike traditional gradient-based attacks that optimize for specific token sequences (cross-entropy loss) and result in brittle…

Toward Universal and Transferable Jailbreak Attacks on Vision-Language Models
Evaluated models: Qwen VL Chat, Qwen2-VL 7B Instruct, Qwen 2.5 VL 7B Instruct+6 more
  • Qwen VL Chat
  • Qwen2-VL 7B Instruct
  • Qwen 2.5 VL 7B Instruct
  • LLaVA v1.6 Mistral 7B
  • Kimi VL A3B Instruct
  • GLM-4.1V 9B Thinking
  • GPT-4.1 Nano
  • Gemini 2.5 Flash-Lite
  • Claude 3 Haiku

Activation Delta Detector Evasion

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Activation-delta-based linear probes used for detecting task drift and prompt injections in Large Language Models (LLMs) can be bypassed using universal adversarial suffixes. By utilizing the Greedy Coordinate Gradient (GCG) algorithm, an attacker can generate a single, optimized suffix that simultaneously fools multiple logistic regression classifiers attached to different hidden layers of the LLM. The attack jointly optimizes the suffix tokens by accumulating gradients from the losses of all…

Bypassing Prompt Injection Detectors through Evasive Injections
Evaluated models: Llama 3 8B, Phi-3 8B

Adversarial Claim Search Deception

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Search-enabled Large Language Model (LLM) fact-checking systems are vulnerable to adversarial claim attacks that exploit the pipeline's reliance on claim interpretation, query formulation, and dynamic evidence retrieval. By manipulating the linguistic structure of an input claim while preserving its semantic factual intent, an attacker can induce systematic verification failures. This vulnerability stems from three specific attack surfaces: 1. Search Engine Misguidance: Altering lexical…

DECEIVE-AFC: Adversarial Claim Attacks against Search-Enabled LLM-based Fact-Checking Systems
Evaluated models: GPT-4o

Causal Driver Jailbreak Enhancement

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs), including Qwen2.5, LLaMA-3, and Baichuan2, are vulnerable to causally optimized adversarial attacks where specific interpretable prompt features are manipulated to bypass safety alignment. Research utilizing a "Causal Analyst" framework reveals that specific prompt attributes—specifically "Number of Task Steps" (increasing procedural complexity), "Positive Character" (enforcing specific personas), and "Command Tone"—act as direct causal drivers for "Answer…

A Causal Perspective for Enhancing Jailbreak Attack and Defense
Evaluated models: GPT-4o, Qwen 2.5 7B

Gradient Shift Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) and Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) are vulnerable to an inference-time jailbreak attack known as "Hybrid Gradient Shift." This vulnerability exploits the statistical discrepancy between an aligned model's output distribution and a pre-alignment reference distribution. By treating safety alignment as a form of miscalibration, an attacker can aggregate the logits of a target model (aligned), a helper model (unaligned/weak), and a predictor model to reconstruct the…

Jailbreaking LLMs via Calibration
Evaluated models: GPT-oss 120B, Llama 3.3 70B Instruct

OCR Image Distraction Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Vision-Language Models (LVLMs) possessing Optical Character Recognition (OCR) capabilities are vulnerable to a "Text Distraction Jailbreaking" (Text-DJ) attack. The vulnerability exploits a gap between the model's visual text extraction and its safety alignment mechanisms. By converting a decomposed harmful textual query into images and embedding these images within a grid of semantically irrelevant "distraction" text images, an attacker can bypass safety filters. The model's OCR…

Text is All You Need for Vision-Language Model Jailbreaking
Evaluated models: GPT-4o Mini, GPT-4.1 Mini, Gemini 2.5 Flash+3 more
  • GPT-4o Mini
  • GPT-4.1 Mini
  • Gemini 2.5 Flash
  • Qwen3-VL 4B Instruct
  • Qwen3-VL 8B Instruct
  • Qwen3-VL 30B-A3B Instruct

Unified Robustness Gap

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Text scoring models, including dense retrievers, rerankers, and reward models, are vulnerable to score manipulation attacks via search-based discrete perturbations and content injection. An attacker can systematically modify candidate texts using rudimentary string manipulations, gradient-guided token swaps (e.g., HotFlip), masked language modeling (MLM) swaps, or query/sentence injections to spuriously increase model scores. This structural failure condition allows an irrelevant passage or a…

Unifying Adversarial Robustness and Training Across Text Scoring Models
Evaluated models: E5 BERT-base, Qwen 3 0.6B, Llama 3.2 3B Instruct+2 more
  • E5 BERT-base
  • Qwen 3 0.6B
  • Llama 3.2 3B Instruct
  • Llama 3.1 8B Instruct
  • Skywork Reward V2

Alignment Curse Jailbreak Transfer

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

End-to-end multimodal large language models (omni-models) that utilize a shared representation space for text and audio are vulnerable to cross-modality jailbreak transfer, a phenomenon termed the "alignment curse." Because these models are trained to strongly align audio and text embeddings in their mid-to-late layers, an attacker can reliably bypass audio-specific safety mechanisms by converting mature, text-based jailbreak prompts into audio using standard Text-to-Speech (TTS) tools. When…

The Alignment Curse: Cross-Modality Jailbreak Transfer in Omni-Models
Evaluated models: GPT-4o, Qwen 2.5 3B

Research methodology

Entries summarize publicly available primary-source security research. Model names reflect only systems explicitly evaluated by the cited paper, and measurements are research-reported unless independent verification is stated.

Discovery and publication are separate: new papers enter a candidate queue, then require human review and explicit approval before publication. Updates follow that review process, not a guaranteed daily publishing schedule. “Last analyzed” is the newest analysis date among published entries; it does not mean that all recent research has been covered.