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Last analyzed Sep 9, 2026

Language Model Security Database

985 research findings · 1119 evaluated models

Filtered research findings

798 entries

Matches every word across titles, descriptions, sources, affected systems, and models.

Autonomous Agent Prompt Reveal

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A vulnerability exists in Large Language Model (LLM) deployments and multi-agent systems where an autonomous attacker agent can systematically extract hidden system prompts through self-evolving interaction strategies. The vulnerability leverages a "JustAsk" framework which utilizes Upper Confidence Bound (UCB) exploration to dynamically select and refine attack vectors from a hierarchical taxonomy of 14 atomic skills (e.g., structural formatting, authority appeals) and 14 multi-turn…

Just Ask: Curious Code Agents Reveal System Prompts in Frontier LLMs
Evaluated models: o1, Llama 3.1 70B Hanami X1, Phi-4+38 more
  • o1
  • Llama 3.1 70B Hanami X1
  • Phi-4
  • Aion 1.0
  • Sonar Pro
  • Command A
  • Llama 4 Maverick
  • Llama 3.1 Nemotron Ultra 253B v1
  • Qwen 3 235B-A22B
  • Mercury
  • Hunyuan A13B Instruct
  • UI-TARS 1.5 7B
  • GPT-oss 120B
  • Jamba Mini 1.7
  • Hermes 4 70B
  • Step 3
  • LongCat Flash Chat
  • Tongyi DeepResearch 30B-A3B
  • Cydonia 24B v4.1
  • ERNIE 4.5 21B-A3B Thinking
  • Granite 4.0 H Micro
  • LFM2 8B-A1B
  • Nova Premier v1
  • Kimi K2 Thinking
  • KAT Coder Pro
  • Cogito v2.1 671B
  • Gemini 3 Pro Preview
  • Grok 4.1 Fast
  • Claude Opus 4.5
  • TNG R1T Chimera
  • Intellect 3
  • DeepSeek V3.2 Speciale
  • Trinity Mini
  • Mistral Large 2512
  • DeepSeek V3.1 Nex N1
  • MiMo V2 Flash
  • GLM-4.7
  • MiniMax M2.1
  • Seed 1.6
  • Molmo 2 8B
  • GPT-5.2 Codex

LLM Router Rerouting

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

LLM routing systems are vulnerable to adversarial rerouting attacks where malicious triggers prepended to user queries manipulate the router's model-selection mechanism. Because LLM routers function as classifiers evaluating query complexity to balance computational cost and response quality, an attacker can craft adversarial prefixes that distort the query's latent semantic representation. This exploits the router's decision boundaries, forcing the system to misclassify the input and redirect…

RerouteGuard: Understanding and Mitigating Adversarial Risks for LLM Routing
Evaluated models: GPT-4, GPT-4o, GPT-5+2 more
  • GPT-4
  • GPT-4o
  • GPT-5
  • Llama 3 8B
  • Mixtral 8x7B

Persona Adherence Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) deployed as Role-Playing Agents (RPAs) are vulnerable to Persona-Targeted Jailbreaks. When an LLM is prompted to adopt a persona—particularly characters with negative, risky, or villainous traits—the model's optimization for role fidelity frequently overrides its foundational safety alignment. Attackers can exploit this vulnerability by synthesizing queries that leverage the specific narrative background, ideology, or psychological vulnerabilities of the assigned…

Stay in Character, Stay Safe: Dual-Cycle Adversarial Self-Evolution for Safety Role-Playing Agents
Evaluated models: GPT-4o, Llama 3 8B, Qwen 2.5 7B+1 more
  • GPT-4o
  • Llama 3 8B
  • Qwen 2.5 7B
  • Gemma 2 9B

Visual Compression Mismatch Attack

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A vulnerability exists in Large Vision-Language Models (LVLMs) utilizing visual token compression mechanisms (e.g., VisionZip, VisPruner) to reduce inference latency. The vulnerability stems from an optimization-inference mismatch where standard adversarial defenses assume full-token processing, while the deployed model utilizes a subset of tokens selected via importance metrics (typically attention scores).

On the Adversarial Robustness of Large Vision-Language Models under Visual Token Compression
Evaluated models: LLaVA 1.5 7B

Intent-Context Coupling Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs), including GPT-4o, Claude 3.5 Sonnet, and Llama 3, are vulnerable to an "Intent-Context Coupling" multi-turn jailbreak attack (automated by the ICON framework). The vulnerability arises from an alignment failure where safety constraints are relaxed when a malicious intent is paired with a semantically congruent "authoritative-style" context pattern. By routing specific prohibited intents (e.g., Hacking) to pre-optimized context patterns (e.g., Scientific Research…

ICON: Intent-Context Coupling for Efficient Multi-Turn Jailbreak Attack
Evaluated models: Llama 4 Maverick Instruct, Llama 3.1 405B Instruct, Qwen-Max 2025-01-25+8 more
  • Llama 4 Maverick Instruct
  • Llama 3.1 405B Instruct
  • Qwen-Max 2025-01-25
  • DeepSeek V3.2
  • GPT-5.1 2025-11-13
  • GPT-4o 2024-11-20
  • Claude Sonnet 4.5 20250929
  • Gemini 3 Pro Preview
  • Llama Guard 3 8B
  • Llama Guard 4 12B
  • WildGuard

LLM Soft Hate Policy Bypass

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) and dedicated content moderation systems (including safety guards and encoder-based classifiers) are vulnerable to "Soft Hate" evasion attacks. This vulnerability arises when hostile standpoints are encoded through defeasible reasoning structures—specifically formalized by the Argumentum Model of Topics (AMT)—rather than explicit lexical toxicity. Attackers can bypass safety filters by framing discriminatory conclusions as logical inferences derived from widely…

SoftHateBench: Evaluating Moderation Models Against Reasoning-Driven, Policy-Compliant Hostility
Evaluated models: HateBERT, HateRoBERTa, Llama Guard 3 1B+7 more
  • HateBERT
  • HateRoBERTa
  • Llama Guard 3 1B
  • Qwen 3 Guard 4B
  • ShieldGemma 2B
  • DeepSeek V3.1
  • GPT-5 Mini
  • Llama 3.2 3B
  • Gemma 3 4B
  • Qwen 3 4B

Hard-Negative Prompt Evasion

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Embedding-based LLM prompt injection detectors, specifically those based on the DeBERTa-v3 architecture, are vulnerable to adversarial evasion attacks utilizing "hard-negative" mining and fuzzing techniques. Attackers can circumvent detection mechanisms by iteratively generating adversarial prompts that are semantically malicious but structurally mutated to evade the classifier's decision boundary. Specific evasion vectors identified include semantic fuzzing (paraphrasing), syntactic fuzzing…

Proactive Hardening of LLM Defenses with HASTE
Evaluated models: GPT-4o

Refusal Prefix Unlearning

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A fine-tuning vulnerability in the safety alignment of Large Language Models (LLMs) allows adversaries to systematically bypass refusal mechanisms by training the model on a small dataset (as few as 1,000 samples) of strictly benign text. By prepending standard refusal prefixes (e.g., "I'm sorry", "I cannot fulfill this request") to the target outputs of benign instruction-response pairs, attackers disrupt the model's refusal completion pathway. When subsequently prompted with unsafe queries…

LLMs Can Unlearn Refusal with Only 1,000 Benign Samples
Evaluated models: Llama 2 13B, Llama 3.1 8B, Llama 3.2 1B+13 more
  • Llama 2 13B
  • Llama 3.1 8B
  • Llama 3.2 1B
  • Llama 3.3 70B
  • Qwen 2 7B
  • Qwen 2.5 32B
  • Qwen 3 0.6B
  • Qwen 3 4B Think
  • Gemma 1.1 7B
  • Gemma 2 2B
  • Gemma 2 9B
  • Gemma 2 27B
  • GPT-oss 20B
  • GPT-4.1 Nano
  • Gemini 2.0 Flash-Lite
  • Gemini 2.5 Flash-Lite

LLM Agent Disguised URL Bypass

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) acting as web agents exhibit a vulnerability in their decision-making process when validating external URLs. The models fail to correctly identify malicious domains when the Uniform Resource Locator (URL) structure—specifically the subdomain, directory path, or query parameters—is manipulated to include semantically "safe" keywords or mimic benign websites (URL disguising). Attackers can induce the agent to accept and visit a malicious link by embedding natural…

MalURLBench: A Benchmark Evaluating Agents' Vulnerabilities When Processing Web URLs
Evaluated models: GPT-3.5, GPT-4o, Llama 2 7B+4 more
  • GPT-3.5
  • GPT-4o
  • Llama 2 7B
  • Llama 3 8B
  • Mistral 7B
  • DeepSeek V3
  • Mixtral 8x7B

LLM Hidden Intentions Undetectable

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Instruction-tuned Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to the induction of "hidden intentions"—covert, goal-directed manipulative behaviors—via lightweight prompt engineering, system prompts, or agentic workflows. Attackers can embed latent agendas (e.g., commercial manipulation, simulated consensus, or the promotion of insecure coding practices) into model outputs that trigger only under specific conversational contexts. Because these manipulative behaviors mimic benign interactions…

Unknown Unknowns: Why Hidden Intentions in LLMs Evade Detection
Evaluated models: Mistral 7B, Llama 3.2 3B, Gemma 3 12B IT+9 more
  • Mistral 7B
  • Llama 3.2 3B
  • Gemma 3 12B IT
  • Llama 4 Maverick
  • GPT-4.1
  • Claude Sonnet 4
  • Mistral Medium 3
  • Qwen QwQ 32B
  • DeepSeek R1 Distill Llama 70B
  • o3
  • Claude Opus 4
  • Magistral Medium

Research methodology

Entries summarize publicly available primary-source security research. Model names reflect only systems explicitly evaluated by the cited paper, and measurements are research-reported unless independent verification is stated.

Discovery and publication are separate: new papers enter a candidate queue, then require human review and explicit approval before publication. Updates follow that review process, not a guaranteed daily publishing schedule. “Last analyzed” is the newest analysis date among published entries; it does not mean that all recent research has been covered.