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Last analyzed Sep 9, 2026

Language Model Security Database

985 research findings · 1119 evaluated models

Filtered research findings

798 entries

Matches every word across titles, descriptions, sources, affected systems, and models.

LLM Latent Safety Neglect

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

LLM-based autonomous agents are vulnerable to implicit regulatory compliance failures during tool invocation. When initialized with unstructured regulatory policies and given goal-oriented user instructions that do not explicitly state safety requirements, LLMs frequently prioritize functional task completion over mandatory safety constraints. This leads to an "Unsafe Success" execution state, where the agent successfully achieves the user's business goal but silently bypasses critical…

Evaluating Implicit Regulatory Compliance in LLM Tool Invocation via Logic-Guided Synthesis
Evaluated models: GPT-5, GPT-5 Mini, Gemini 2.5 Pro+3 more
  • GPT-5
  • GPT-5 Mini
  • Gemini 2.5 Pro
  • Gemini 2.5 Flash
  • Llama 3.1 8B
  • DeepSeek R1 Distill Qwen 14B

Plaintext Output Overflow

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) contain a resource consumption vulnerability termed "Overflow," wherein specific non-adversarial, plain-text prompts trigger excessive text generation that saturates the model's output token budget. This vulnerability exploits the model's alignment towards helpfulness and exhaustiveness, alongside tokenizer inefficiencies (e.g., zero-width characters), to force the generation of maximum-length responses (often exceeding 5,000 tokens) from short inputs. This differs…

BenchOverflow: Measuring Overflow in Large Language Models via Plain-Text Prompts
Evaluated models: GPT-5, Llama 3.1 8B Instruct, Llama 3.2 3B Instruct+5 more
  • GPT-5
  • Llama 3.1 8B Instruct
  • Llama 3.2 3B Instruct
  • Gemini 2.5 Flash
  • Qwen 3 4B Instruct 2507
  • Qwen 3 8B Instruct
  • Gemma 2 9B IT
  • Gemma 3 4B IT

Distractor Inverse Scaling

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Reasoning-capable Large Language Models (LLMs) and agentic AI systems exhibit a critical vulnerability to contextual distractors, resulting in catastrophic performance degradation (up to 80% drop in accuracy) and emergent misalignment. When the input context contains noise—specifically random documents, irrelevant chat history, or task-specific "hard negative" distractors—the models fail to filter this information. Instead of ignoring the noise, the models disproportionately attend to…

Lost in the Noise: How Reasoning Models Fail with Contextual Distractors
Evaluated models: Gemini 2.5 Pro, Gemini 2.5 Flash, DeepSeek R1 0528+4 more
  • Gemini 2.5 Pro
  • Gemini 2.5 Flash
  • DeepSeek R1 0528
  • GPT-oss 120B
  • Qwen 3 4B Thinking 2507
  • DeepSeek R1 Distill Llama 8B
  • Qwen 3 30B-A3B Thinking 2507

LLM Emoticon Confusion

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A vulnerability in Large Language Models (LLMs) and autonomous agent frameworks, termed "Emoticon Semantic Confusion," allows for the generation and execution of unintended, potentially destructive code. Because ASCII-based emoticons (e.g., ~, *, !(^^)!) heavily overlap with the symbol space of programming operators, shell wildcards, and file paths, LLMs frequently misinterpret these affective, non-verbal cues as executable directives. When processing user instructions in code-generation or…

False Friends in the Shell: Unveiling the Emoticon Semantic Confusion in Large Language Models
Evaluated models: Claude Haiku 4.5, Gemini 2.5 Flash, GPT-4.1 Mini+3 more
  • Claude Haiku 4.5
  • Gemini 2.5 Flash
  • GPT-4.1 Mini
  • DeepSeek V3.2
  • Qwen3-Coder
  • GLM-4.6

Macaronic T2I Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Text-to-Image (T2I) models and their associated safety filters are vulnerable to MacPrompt, a black-box jailbreak technique that exploits cross-lingual embedding alignments. Attackers can bypass input text filters, latent representation filters, and model-level concept removal defenses by replacing sensitive keywords with "macaronic" substitutes. These substitutes are constructed by extracting and recombining character-level substrings from translations of the target word across multiple…

MacPrompt: Maraconic-guided Jailbreak against Text-to-Image Models
Evaluated models: DALL-E, Stable Diffusion

Strategic Abstention Failure

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A "risk-invariance" vulnerability exists in Large Language Models (LLMs) wherein the model's decision-making policy is functionally decoupled from its verbalized confidence and externally defined error penalties. Despite generating calibrated confidence estimates (internal epistemic uncertainty), affected models fail to adjust their abstention thresholds when presented with high-penalty incentives (e.g., negative utility for incorrect answers). This results in "utility collapse," where models…

Are LLM Decisions Faithful to Verbal Confidence?
Evaluated models: GPT-5 Mini, GPT-5 Nano, GPT-4.1 Mini+7 more
  • GPT-5 Mini
  • GPT-5 Nano
  • GPT-4.1 Mini
  • Gemini 3 Flash
  • Gemini 2.5 Flash
  • Llama 4 Maverick
  • Gemma 3n E4B
  • DeepSeek V3.2
  • DeepSeek V3.2 Thinking
  • Qwen 3 Next 80B-A3B Thinking

Uninvoked Tool Metadata Hijack

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Model (LLM) agents implementing the Model Context Protocol (MCP) are vulnerable to Implicit Tool Poisoning (ITP). This vulnerability allows an attacker to manipulate agent behavior by embedding malicious instructions within the metadata (specifically the natural language description) of a third-party tool. Unlike explicit tool poisoning, where the agent is tricked into invoking a malicious tool, ITP exploits the agent's contextual reasoning to force the invocation of a distinct…

MCP-ITP: An Automated Framework for Implicit Tool Poisoning in MCP
Evaluated models: GPT-3.5 Turbo, GPT-4o Mini, o1-mini+9 more
  • GPT-3.5 Turbo
  • GPT-4o Mini
  • o1-mini
  • Gemini 2.5 Flash
  • DeepSeek R1
  • DeepSeek V3
  • Qwen 3 8B
  • Qwen 3 8B Thinking
  • Qwen 3 32B
  • Qwen 3 32B Thinking
  • Qwen 3 235B-A22B
  • Qwen 3 235B-A22B Thinking

Adversarial Prompts Defeat Code Defenses

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

State-of-the-art secure code generation methods (Sven, SafeCoder, and PromSec) are vulnerable to adversarial prompt perturbations during inference, allowing for the bypass of security alignment mechanisms. The vulnerability stems from the models' reliance on surface-level textual pattern matching rather than semantic security reasoning. By employing simple prompt manipulations—such as Cue Inversion (flipping security directives), Naturalness Reframing (rewriting comments as novice questions)…

How Secure is Secure Code Generation? Adversarial Prompts Put LLM Defenses to the Test
Evaluated models: GPT-3.5, GPT-4o, Mistral 7B

Point Cloud Adversarial Attack

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Point-based 3D Vision-Language Models (VLMs), specifically PointLLM and GPT4Point, are vulnerable to white-box, gradient-based adversarial attacks. The vulnerability exists in the model's processing of 3D point cloud data, where an attacker can optimize imperceptible geometric perturbations ($\delta$) on the input point cloud ($x$) to manipulate the model's textual output. The paper identifies two specific attack vectors: 1. Vision Attack: Directly perturbs the high-dimensional visual token…

On the Adversarial Robustness of 3D Large Vision-Language Models
Evaluated models: Vicuna 7B

Adaptive Tool-Disguised Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) supporting function calling (tool use) are vulnerable to a jailbreak attack known as iMIST (interactive Multi-step Progressive Tool-disguised Jailbreak Attack). The vulnerability stems from a disparity in alignment training: while models are heavily aligned to refuse harmful natural language generation, they lack sufficient alignment regarding the generation of harmful content within structured data (JSON) used for tool parameters.

Jailbreaking Large Language Models through Iterative Tool-Disguised Attacks via Reinforcement Learning
Evaluated models: Llama 3.1 8B, DeepSeek-V3 671B

Research methodology

Entries summarize publicly available primary-source security research. Model names reflect only systems explicitly evaluated by the cited paper, and measurements are research-reported unless independent verification is stated.

Discovery and publication are separate: new papers enter a candidate queue, then require human review and explicit approval before publication. Updates follow that review process, not a guaranteed daily publishing schedule. “Last analyzed” is the newest analysis date among published entries; it does not mean that all recent research has been covered.