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Last analyzed Sep 9, 2026

Language Model Security Database

985 research findings · 1119 evaluated models

Research findings

985 entries

Matches every word across titles, descriptions, sources, affected systems, and models.

Universal MLLM Target Matching

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Closed-source Multi-modal Large Language Models (MLLMs) are vulnerable to Universal Targeted Transferable Adversarial Attacks (UTTAA). An attacker can generate a single, image-agnostic adversarial perturbation ($\delta$) that, when added to any arbitrary source image, steers the victim model to output a description or classification matching a specific target image chosen by the attacker. This vulnerability exploits the transferability of adversarial features from open-source surrogate vision…

Universal Adversarial Attacks against Closed-Source MLLMs via Target-View Routed Meta Optimization
Evaluated models: GPT-4o, Claude Sonnet 4.5, GPT-5+2 more
  • GPT-4o
  • Claude Sonnet 4.5
  • GPT-5
  • GPT-5.2
  • Claude Opus 4.5

Adaptive Multimodal Reasoning Jailbreaks

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

The paper reports a black-box jailbreak evaluation in which a ReAct-style loop adaptively rewrites unsafe text prompts and selectively applies blur, DCT filtering, or recoloring to image regions identified as safety-sensitive. The combined cross-modal strategy is intended to make harmful image-text requests appear less objectionable to a vision-language model while preserving enough semantics to elicit an answer. This is a specific, security-relevant evaluation, although the reported results…

Jailbreaks on Vision Language Model via Multimodal Reasoning
Evaluated models: Gemini 2.0 Flash

Agent Missing-Tool Hallucination

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Multi-turn Large Language Model (LLM) agents deployed in safety-critical domains (specifically automotive assistants) exhibit a "completion-compliance tension" vulnerability. When agents encounter missing tools, incomplete environment observations, or ambiguous user requests, they prioritize satisfying the user's intent over adhering to defined domain safety policies. This results in two distinct failure modes: (1) Premature Action Execution, where agents execute physical state changes based…

CAR-bench: Evaluating the Consistency and Limit-Awareness of LLM Agents under Real-World Uncertainty
Evaluated models: GPT-5, GPT-5.2, Claude Opus 4.5+7 more
  • GPT-5
  • GPT-5.2
  • Claude Opus 4.5
  • Claude Sonnet 4
  • Gemini 2.5 Flash
  • Gemini 2.5 Pro
  • GPT-4.1
  • Qwen 3 32B
  • GPT-oss 120B
  • xLAM 2 32B

Autonomous Agent Prompt Reveal

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A vulnerability exists in Large Language Model (LLM) deployments and multi-agent systems where an autonomous attacker agent can systematically extract hidden system prompts through self-evolving interaction strategies. The vulnerability leverages a "JustAsk" framework which utilizes Upper Confidence Bound (UCB) exploration to dynamically select and refine attack vectors from a hierarchical taxonomy of 14 atomic skills (e.g., structural formatting, authority appeals) and 14 multi-turn…

Just Ask: Curious Code Agents Reveal System Prompts in Frontier LLMs
Evaluated models: o1, Llama 3.1 70B Hanami X1, Phi-4+38 more
  • o1
  • Llama 3.1 70B Hanami X1
  • Phi-4
  • Aion 1.0
  • Sonar Pro
  • Command A
  • Llama 4 Maverick
  • Llama 3.1 Nemotron Ultra 253B v1
  • Qwen 3 235B-A22B
  • Mercury
  • Hunyuan A13B Instruct
  • UI-TARS 1.5 7B
  • GPT-oss 120B
  • Jamba Mini 1.7
  • Hermes 4 70B
  • Step 3
  • LongCat Flash Chat
  • Tongyi DeepResearch 30B-A3B
  • Cydonia 24B v4.1
  • ERNIE 4.5 21B-A3B Thinking
  • Granite 4.0 H Micro
  • LFM2 8B-A1B
  • Nova Premier v1
  • Kimi K2 Thinking
  • KAT Coder Pro
  • Cogito v2.1 671B
  • Gemini 3 Pro Preview
  • Grok 4.1 Fast
  • Claude Opus 4.5
  • TNG R1T Chimera
  • Intellect 3
  • DeepSeek V3.2 Speciale
  • Trinity Mini
  • Mistral Large 2512
  • DeepSeek V3.1 Nex N1
  • MiMo V2 Flash
  • GLM-4.7
  • MiniMax M2.1
  • Seed 1.6
  • Molmo 2 8B
  • GPT-5.2 Codex

Cross-Image Contagion

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Multi-modal Large Language Models (MLLMs) capable of processing interleaved image-text sequences are vulnerable to a universal adversarial perturbation (UAP) attack known as LAMP. This vulnerability allows an attacker to generate a single, noise-based perturbation pattern using a surrogate model (e.g., Mantis-CLIP) that transfers effectively to black-box target models. The attack leverages two novel loss functions during perturbation learning: a "contagious" objective that manipulates…

LAMP: Learning Universal Adversarial Perturbations for Multi-Image Tasks via Pre-trained Models
Evaluated models: Mantis-CLIP, Mantis-SIGLIP, Mantis-Idefics2+4 more
  • Mantis-CLIP
  • Mantis-SIGLIP
  • Mantis-Idefics2
  • VILA 1.5
  • LLaVA 1.6
  • Qwen VL Chat
  • MiniGPT-4

Evaluator Consensus Manipulation

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A vulnerability exists in the "Adaptive Trust Weighting" mechanism of the Cost-Aware Proof of Quality (PoQ) protocol for decentralized LLM inference. The protocol updates evaluator trust weights based on the deviation of a submitted score from the consensus score of the current round. Because the consensus score is derived from the very scores being evaluated (a self-referential feedback loop), the mechanism fails to distinguish between honest and coordinated malicious evaluators…

Adaptive and Robust Cost-Aware Proof of Quality for Decentralized LLM Inference Networks
Evaluated models: Not reported

LLM Grading Compliance Paradox

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) employed as automated code evaluators ("Universal Graders") are vulnerable to Semantic-Instruction Decoupling, a form of adversarial prompt injection that exploits the "Syntax-Semantics Gap." Attackers can embed adversarial directives into syntactically inert regions of the Abstract Syntax Tree (AST)—specifically comments, docstrings, variable names, and whitespace. While these regions are discarded by compilers (trivia nodes) or treated as arbitrary symbols…

The Compliance Paradox: Semantic-Instruction Decoupling in Automated Academic Code Evaluation
Evaluated models: GPT-5, Llama 3.1 8B, DeepSeek V3

LLM Router Rerouting

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

LLM routing systems are vulnerable to adversarial rerouting attacks where malicious triggers prepended to user queries manipulate the router's model-selection mechanism. Because LLM routers function as classifiers evaluating query complexity to balance computational cost and response quality, an attacker can craft adversarial prefixes that distort the query's latent semantic representation. This exploits the router's decision boundaries, forcing the system to misclassify the input and redirect…

RerouteGuard: Understanding and Mitigating Adversarial Risks for LLM Routing
Evaluated models: GPT-4, GPT-4o, GPT-5+2 more
  • GPT-4
  • GPT-4o
  • GPT-5
  • Llama 3 8B
  • Mixtral 8x7B

Pathological Reasoning DoS

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A vulnerability in Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) allows attackers to perform Prompt-Induced Inference-Time Denial-of-Service (PI-DoS) attacks by submitting short, semantically coherent adversarial prompts. These prompts, which often take the form of complex logic puzzles with nested dependencies or contradictory constraints, exploit the adaptive computation mechanism of LRMs to force the model into pathologically long, nearly non-terminating intermediate reasoning traces (e.g., generating…

ReasoningBomb: A Stealthy Denial-of-Service Attack by Inducing Pathologically Long Reasoning in Large Reasoning Models
Evaluated models: DeepSeek V3, Kimi K2 Instruct, DeepSeek R1+8 more
  • DeepSeek V3
  • Kimi K2 Instruct
  • DeepSeek R1
  • DeepSeek R1 Distill Qwen 32B
  • MiniMax M2
  • Nemotron 3 Nano 30B-A3B
  • Qwen 3 30B-A3B Thinking
  • Qwen 3 32B
  • Claude Sonnet 4.5
  • GPT-5
  • Gemini 3 Pro Preview

Persona Adherence Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) deployed as Role-Playing Agents (RPAs) are vulnerable to Persona-Targeted Jailbreaks. When an LLM is prompted to adopt a persona—particularly characters with negative, risky, or villainous traits—the model's optimization for role fidelity frequently overrides its foundational safety alignment. Attackers can exploit this vulnerability by synthesizing queries that leverage the specific narrative background, ideology, or psychological vulnerabilities of the assigned…

Stay in Character, Stay Safe: Dual-Cycle Adversarial Self-Evolution for Safety Role-Playing Agents
Evaluated models: GPT-4o, Llama 3 8B, Qwen 2.5 7B+1 more
  • GPT-4o
  • Llama 3 8B
  • Qwen 2.5 7B
  • Gemma 2 9B

Research methodology

Entries summarize publicly available primary-source security research. Model names reflect only systems explicitly evaluated by the cited paper, and measurements are research-reported unless independent verification is stated.

Discovery and publication are separate: new papers enter a candidate queue, then require human review and explicit approval before publication. Updates follow that review process, not a guaranteed daily publishing schedule. “Last analyzed” is the newest analysis date among published entries; it does not mean that all recent research has been covered.