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Last analyzed Sep 9, 2026

Language Model Security Database

985 research findings · 1119 evaluated models

Filtered research findings

337 entries

Matches every word across titles, descriptions, sources, affected systems, and models.

LLM-Driven Motion Adversarial Attack

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

The ALERT-Motion framework demonstrates a vulnerability in text-to-motion (T2M) models where an attacker can craft subtly modified text prompts (adversarial prompts) that cause the model to generate motions significantly different from those intended by the benign prompt, yet semantically similar to a target motion specified by the attacker. The attack leverages a large language model (LLM) to autonomously generate these adversarial prompts, bypassing simple keyword-based detection mechanisms…

Autonomous LLM-Enhanced Adversarial Attack for Text-to-Motion
Evaluated models: Mdm, Mld

LLM Editing Attacks

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large language models (LLMs) are vulnerable to "editing attacks," where malicious actors manipulate the model's knowledge base to inject misinformation or bias. This is achieved by using existing knowledge editing techniques to subtly alter the model's internal representations, causing it to generate outputs reflecting the injected content, even on seemingly unrelated prompts. The attack can be remarkably stealthy, with minimal impact on the model's overall performance in other areas.

Can Editing LLMs Inject Harm?
Evaluated models: Alpaca 7B, Llama 3 8B, Mistral 7B+2 more
  • Alpaca 7B
  • Llama 3 8B
  • Mistral 7B
  • Mistral 7B v0.2
  • Vicuna 7B

Hidden-Intent LLM Evasion

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to adversarial attacks that employ conversation strategies to elicit harmful information through seemingly benign dialogues. The attack, termed "Imposter.AI," leverages three key strategies: (1) decomposing malicious questions into innocuous sub-questions; (2) rephrasing overtly malicious questions into benign-sounding alternatives; and (3) enhancing the harmfulness of responses by prompting the LLM for illustrative examples. This allows attackers to…

Imposter. ai: Adversarial attacks with hidden intentions towards aligned large language models
Evaluated models: GPT-3.5 Turbo, GPT-4, Llama 2 13B+1 more
  • GPT-3.5 Turbo
  • GPT-4
  • Llama 2 13B
  • WizardLM 13B

Continuous Embedding Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A vulnerability in large language models (LLMs) allows attackers to generate harmful content by manipulating the continuous input embeddings without appending suffixes or using specific questions. The attack leverages gradient descent to optimize the input vector, causing the model to produce a predefined malicious output. Mitigation strategies, such as input clipping, help reduce the effectiveness but do not fully eliminate the threat.

Continuous Embedding Attacks via Clipped Inputs in Jailbreaking Large Language Models
Evaluated models: Llama 7B

Embodied LLM Misaligned Actions

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Embodied Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to manipulation via voice-based interactions, leading to the execution of harmful physical actions. Attacks exploit three vulnerabilities: (1) cascading LLM jailbreaks resulting in malicious robotic commands; (2) misalignment between linguistic outputs (verbal refusal) and physical actions (command execution); and (3) conceptual deception, where seemingly benign instructions lead to harmful outcomes due to incomplete world knowledge within…

BadRobot: Manipulating Embodied LLMs in the Physical World
Evaluated models: BERT, GPT-3.5 Turbo, GPT-4 Turbo+2 more
  • BERT
  • GPT-3.5 Turbo
  • GPT-4 Turbo
  • GPT-4o
  • LLaVA 1.5 7B

Low-Perplexity LLM Attack

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to adversarial attacks that utilize low-perplexity prompts to elicit unsafe content. These prompts, while statistically likely to occur in normal conversation, can trigger the generation of harmful or toxic outputs that evade standard safety filters. The vulnerability stems from the model's inability to reliably distinguish between benign and malicious intents within the statistical distribution of natural language.

ASTPrompter: Weakly Supervised Automated Language Model Red-Teaming to Identify Low-Perplexity Toxic Prompts
Evaluated models: Llama 3.1 8B, Mistral 7B, Qwen 7B+1 more
  • Llama 3.1 8B
  • Mistral 7B
  • Qwen 7B
  • TinyLlama 1.1

Malicious Prompt Injection Attack

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) used for code generation are vulnerable to Malicious Programming Prompts (MaPP), where an attacker injects a short string (under 500 bytes) into the prompt, causing the LLM to generate code containing vulnerabilities while maintaining functional correctness. The attack exploits the LLM's ability to follow instructions, even those inserted maliciously, to embed unintended behaviors. The injected code can range from general vulnerabilities (e.g., setting a…

MaPPing Your Model: Assessing the Impact of Adversarial Attacks on LLM-based Programming Assistants
Evaluated models: Claude 3 Haiku, Claude 3 Opus, Claude 3 Sonnet+4 more
  • Claude 3 Haiku
  • Claude 3 Opus
  • Claude 3 Sonnet
  • GPT-3.5 Turbo
  • GPT-4o
  • Llama 3 70B
  • Llama 3 8B

Soft Prompt Model Hijack

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A training-time attack against open-source LLMs that injects adversarial embeddings into the model's token embeddings without modifying model weights. This allows an attacker to introduce backdoors, jailbreaks, or prompt stealing capabilities by simply modifying specific token embeddings within the model file, maintaining model utility for non-triggered inputs. The attack leverages soft prompt tuning to optimize adversarial embeddings, which are then assigned to chosen trigger tokens.

Sos! soft prompt attack against open-source large language models
Evaluated models: Llama 2 7B Chat, Llama 7B, Mistral 7B Instruct+2 more
  • Llama 2 7B Chat
  • Llama 7B
  • Mistral 7B Instruct
  • Vicuna 13B
  • Vicuna 7B

Space-Induced LLM Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Appending a single whitespace character (space) or certain punctuation marks to the end of an LLM's input template can bypass safety mechanisms and cause the model to generate unsafe, biased, or factually incorrect outputs, even if the original prompt was benign. This vulnerability is due to the statistical properties of single-character tokens in the model's training data, causing unintended behavior in the model's token prediction.

Single character perturbations break llm alignment
Evaluated models: Not reported

Covert LLM Backdoor Finetuning

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A vulnerability in LLM finetuning APIs allows covert malicious finetuning. Attackers can create a dataset where individual data points appear innocuous but, when used for finetuning, teach the LLM to respond to encoded harmful requests with encoded harmful responses. This bypasses existing safety checks and evaluations because the training data appears benign.

Covert malicious finetuning: Challenges in safeguarding llm adaptation
Evaluated models: GPT-3.5 Turbo, GPT-4, Llama 2 70B

Research methodology

Entries summarize publicly available primary-source security research. Model names reflect only systems explicitly evaluated by the cited paper, and measurements are research-reported unless independent verification is stated.

Discovery and publication are separate: new papers enter a candidate queue, then require human review and explicit approval before publication. Updates follow that review process, not a guaranteed daily publishing schedule. “Last analyzed” is the newest analysis date among published entries; it does not mean that all recent research has been covered.