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Last analyzed Sep 9, 2026

Language Model Security Database

985 research findings · 1119 evaluated models

Research findings

985 entries

Matches every word across titles, descriptions, sources, affected systems, and models.

Schema Exploitation Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A vulnerability exists in Large Language Models where their strong adherence to processing structured data schemas can be exploited to bypass safety mechanisms. The attack, named BreakFun, uses a multi-component prompt that combines an innocent framing, a Chain-of-Thought (CoT) instruction, and a core "Trojan Schema." This schema is an adversarially designed data structure (e.g., a Python class definition) that embeds a harmful user request. By instructing the model to simulate the…

BreakFun: Jailbreaking LLMs via Schema Exploitation
Evaluated models: Claude 3 Haiku, Claude 3.5 Sonnet, DeepSeek R1+11 more
  • Claude 3 Haiku
  • Claude 3.5 Sonnet
  • DeepSeek R1
  • ERNIE 4.5
  • Gemini 2.5 Flash
  • Gemma 3 12B
  • GPT-4.1 Mini
  • GPT-oss 20B
  • Kimi K2
  • Llama 3.1 8B
  • Mistral 7B
  • Qwen 3 8B
  • Qwen 3 Max
  • Zephyr 7B

Agent Harassment Escalation

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Model (LLM) agents powered by LLaMA-3.1-8B-Instruct and Gemini-2.0-flash are vulnerable to multi-turn adversarial exploitation that bypasses safety alignment through toxic memory injection, planning scaffolds (Chain-of-Thought/ReAct), and jailbreak fine-tuning. Unlike single-turn jailbreaks, this vulnerability exploits the agentic nature of the system—specifically memory retention and reasoning capabilities—to sustain and escalate harassment over prolonged interactions. When…

Echoes of Human Malice in Agents: Benchmarking LLMs for Multi-Turn Online Harassment Attacks
Evaluated models: Llama 3.1 8B Instruct, Gemini 2.0 Flash 001

AI Browser Indirect Injection

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Agentic AI browsers and LLM-powered browser extensions are vulnerable to indirect prompt injection via the processing of untrusted web content. The vulnerability arises when the AI agent ingests the Document Object Model (DOM), including hidden elements, HTML comments, metadata, and accessibility labels, into its context window to perform tasks such as page summarization or autonomous navigation. Because the LLM cannot distinguish between system instructions and untrusted external data, an…

In-browser llm-guided fuzzing for real-time prompt injection testing in agentic AI browsers
Evaluated models: GPT-4, Llama 3.1 70B, Llama 3.3 70B

Graph-LLM Semantic Attack

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Graph-LLMs (Graph Neural Networks integrated with Large Language Models) utilized for representation learning on Text-Attributed Graphs (TAGs) are vulnerable to the Interpretable Multi-Dimensional Graph Attack (IMDGA). This vulnerability exists due to the non-decoupled nature of text encoding and graph message passing mechanisms. A black-box attacker can manipulate node classification predictions by executing a three-stage attack: (1) utilizing a word-level Topological SHAP module to identify…

Unveiling the Vulnerability of Graph-LLMs: An Interpretable Multi-Dimensional Adversarial Attack on TAGs
Evaluated models: Not reported

Personalized Disinformation Jailbreak Escalation

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Appending simple demographic persona details to prompts requesting policy-violating content can bypass the safety mechanisms of Large Language Models. This technique, referred to as persona-targeted prompting, adds details such as country, generation, and political orientation to a request for a harmful narrative (e.g., disinformation). This systematically increases the jailbreak rate across most tested models and languages, in some cases by over 10 percentage points, enabling the generation…

A Multilingual, Large-Scale Study of the Interplay between LLM Safeguards, Personalisation, and Disinformation
Evaluated models: Claude 3.5 Sonnet, Gemma 2 9B IT, GPT-4o+5 more
  • Claude 3.5 Sonnet
  • Gemma 2 9B IT
  • GPT-4o
  • Grok 2
  • Llama 3 8B Instruct
  • Mistral Nemo Instruct
  • Qwen 2.5 7B Instruct
  • Vicuna 7B v1.5

Refusal-Aware Embedding Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs), specifically open-weights models such as Llama-2, Mistral, and Vicuna, are vulnerable to a white-box adversarial attack framework termed RAID (Refusal-Aware and Integrated Decoding). The vulnerability exists because the model's safety alignment relies on specific activation patterns ("refusal directions") in the intermediate embedding space. Attackers can exploit this by optimizing a continuous "relaxed" suffix in the embedding space using a triplet loss…

RAID: Refusal-Aware and Integrated Decoding for Jailbreaking LLMs
Evaluated models: Llama 2 7B, Mistral 7B, Vicuna 7B

Agent Plan And Intent Hijack

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Deep Research (DR) agents, specifically those utilizing the "think-search-draft" architecture such as the WebThinker framework, contain a logic vulnerability in their recursive planning and information retrieval workflows. While the underlying Large Language Model (LLM) may possess alignment safeguards to reject harmful queries, the agentic framework creates a bypass vector. When a user submits a harmful query using specific adversarial strategies—specifically "Plan Injection" (manipulating…

Deep Research Brings Deeper Harm
Evaluated models: QwQ 32B, Qwen 3 32B, DeepSeek R1 Distill Llama 70B+3 more
  • QwQ 32B
  • Qwen 3 32B
  • DeepSeek R1 Distill Llama 70B
  • Qwen 2.5 72B Instruct
  • DeepResearcher 7B
  • Qwen 2.5 7B Instruct

Distributed Backdoor in Multi-Agent Systems

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A distributed backdoor vulnerability, named "Collaborative Shadows", exists in LLM-based Multi-Agent Systems (MAS) that rely on external or modifiable tools. An attacker can poison multiple agent tools by embedding inert, encrypted "attack primitives" within them. These primitives are fragments of a larger malicious payload. A carefully crafted user instruction acts as both a trigger and a decryption key. The instruction steers the agents to collaborate in a specific sequence, causing them to…

Collaborative Shadows: Distributed Backdoor Attacks in LLM-Based Multi-Agent Systems
Evaluated models: Gemini 2.5 Pro, GLM 4.5, GPT-4.1+2 more
  • Gemini 2.5 Pro
  • GLM 4.5
  • GPT-4.1
  • Kimi K2 Instruct
  • Qwen 3 30B-A3B

Special Token Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) that use special tokens to define conversational structure (e.g., via chat templates) are vulnerable to a jailbreak attack named MetaBreak. An attacker can inject these special tokens, or regular tokens with high semantic similarity in the embedding space, into a user prompt. This manipulation allows the attacker to bypass the model's internal safety alignment and external content moderation systems. The attack leverages four primitives: 1. Response Injection…

MetaBreak: Jailbreaking Online LLM Services via Special Token Manipulation
Evaluated models: Claude Opus 4, Gemma 2 27B IT, GPT-4.1+9 more
  • Claude Opus 4
  • Gemma 2 27B IT
  • GPT-4.1
  • Llama 3.1 405B
  • Llama 3.1 8B
  • Llama 3.3 70B Instruct
  • Llama Guard
  • Llama Guard 3 8B
  • Phi-4
  • Prompt Guard
  • Qwen 2.5 72B Instruct
  • ShieldGemma 2 27B

Adaptive Monitor Injection

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

AI control protocols utilizing Large Language Models (LLMs) as "trusted monitors" to oversee stronger "untrusted" models are vulnerable to adaptive prompt injection attacks. An adversarial untrusted model, possessing knowledge of the monitor's system prompt and scoring logic (Kerckhoffs's principle), can embed specific text artifacts—such as fake system calibration logs or XML metadata—within its output. These injections exploit the monitor's inability to distinguish between data (the agent's…

Adaptive Attacks on Trusted Monitors Subvert AI Control Protocols
Evaluated models: GPT-4o, GPT-4o Mini, GPT-4.1+3 more
  • GPT-4o
  • GPT-4o Mini
  • GPT-4.1
  • GPT-5
  • Claude Sonnet 4
  • DeepSeek Chat

Research methodology

Entries summarize publicly available primary-source security research. Model names reflect only systems explicitly evaluated by the cited paper, and measurements are research-reported unless independent verification is stated.

Discovery and publication are separate: new papers enter a candidate queue, then require human review and explicit approval before publication. Updates follow that review process, not a guaranteed daily publishing schedule. “Last analyzed” is the newest analysis date among published entries; it does not mean that all recent research has been covered.