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Last analyzed Sep 9, 2026

Language Model Security Database

985 research findings · 1119 evaluated models

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798 entries

Matches every word across titles, descriptions, sources, affected systems, and models.

TeleLLM Safety Degradation

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Safety alignment degradation occurs in Large Language Models (LLMs) such as Llama-2, Llama-3, and Qwen-2 when subjected to Supervised Fine-Tuning (SFT) or Continual Pre-Training (CPT) on telecommunications domain datasets (TeleQnA, TeleData, TSpecLLM). The vulnerability arises because benign telecom data—characterized by structured tabular entries, long standardization reports, and complex mathematical formulas—shares gradient update directions with harmful data types. This results in…

SafeCOMM: What about Safety Alignment in Fine-Tuned Telecom Large Language Models?
Evaluated models: Llama 2 7B, Llama 3 8B, Llama 3.1 8B+2 more
  • Llama 2 7B
  • Llama 3 8B
  • Llama 3.1 8B
  • Qwen 2 7B
  • Gemma 2 2B

VLM Navigation Object Fusion

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

The Vision-Language Model (VLM) perception module in Vision-and-Language Navigation (VLN) agents is vulnerable to adversarial 3D object injection via the Adversarial Object Fusion (AdvOF) framework. An attacker can generate physically plausible 3D objects with adversarial perturbations capable of deceiving the agent's VLM across multiple viewing angles and distances. The vulnerability exists due to a misalignment between 3D physical manipulations and the agent's 2D image perception, combined…

Disrupting Vision-Language Model-Driven Navigation Services via Adversarial Object Fusion
Evaluated models: Not reported

DNA Model Pathogen Synthesis

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

DNA language models, such as the Evo series, are vulnerable to jailbreak attacks that coerce the generation of DNA sequences with high homology to known human pathogens. The GeneBreaker framework demonstrates this by using a combination of carefully crafted prompts leveraging high-homology non-pathogenic sequences and a beam search guided by pathogenicity prediction models (e.g., PathoLM) and log-probability heuristics. This allows bypassing safety mechanisms and generating sequences exceeding…

GeneBreaker: Jailbreak Attacks against DNA Language Models with Pathogenicity Guidance
Evaluated models: Evo1 7B, Evo2 1B, Evo2 7B+2 more
  • Evo1 7B
  • Evo2 1B
  • Evo2 7B
  • Evo2 40B
  • PathoLM

Hybrid Agent Prompt Injection

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Computer-Use Agents (CUAs) powered by Large Language Models (LLMs) operating in hybrid Web-OS environments are vulnerable to indirect prompt injection. Attackers can embed malicious natural language or code instructions within legitimate web content (e.g., social media forums, chat applications, shared cloud documents) that the agent processes during benign task execution. Due to the agent's inability to distinguish between trusted user instructions and untrusted environmental data, the CUA…

RedTeamCUA: Realistic Adversarial Testing of Computer-Use Agents in Hybrid Web-OS Environments
Evaluated models: Claude 3.5 Sonnet, Claude 3.7 Sonnet, GPT-4o

Expanded Strategy Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to jailbreak attacks that exploit the model's inherent persuasive nature. A novel attack framework, CL-GSO, decomposes jailbreak strategies into four components (Role, Content Support, Context, Communication Skills), creating a significantly expanded strategy space compared to prior methods. This expanded space allows for the generation of prompts that bypass safety protocols with a success rate exceeding 90% on models previously considered…

Breaking the Ceiling: Exploring the Potential of Jailbreak Attacks through Expanding Strategy Space
Evaluated models: Claude 3.5 Sonnet, GPT-3.5 Turbo, GPT-4o+2 more
  • Claude 3.5 Sonnet
  • GPT-3.5 Turbo
  • GPT-4o
  • Llama 3 8B
  • Qwen 2.5 7B

Distilled Jailbreak Attacks

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A vulnerability in Large Language Models (LLMs) allows adversarial prompt distillation from a large language model (LLM) to a smaller language model (SLM), enabling efficient and stealthy jailbreak attacks. The attack leverages knowledge distillation techniques, reinforcement learning, and dynamic temperature control to transfer the LLM's ability to bypass safety mechanisms to a smaller, more easily deployable SLM. This allows for lower computational cost attacks with a potentially high…

Efficient and Stealthy Jailbreak Attacks via Adversarial Prompt Distillation from LLMs to SLMs
Evaluated models: BERT Base, Gemma 2 27B, Gemma 2 2B+8 more
  • BERT Base
  • Gemma 2 27B
  • Gemma 2 2B
  • GPT-3.5 Turbo
  • GPT-4
  • GPT-4o
  • Llama 2 13B
  • Llama 2 7B
  • Llama 3.2 1B
  • Vicuna 13B
  • Vicuna 7B

VLM Latent Boundary Crossing

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Vision-Language Models (VLMs) contain a vulnerability in their multimodal fusion layers where safety-relevant information is linearly separable in the latent space. This allows for a "JailBound" attack, which exploits the implicit internal safety decision boundary. The attack proceeds in two stages: (1) Safety Boundary Probing, where attackers approximate the internal decision hyperplane by training layer-wise logistic regression classifiers on the fusion representations of safe versus unsafe…

JailBound: Jailbreaking Internal Safety Boundaries of Vision-Language Models
Evaluated models: Llama 3.2 11B Vision Instruct, Qwen 2.5 VL 7B Instruct, MiniGPT-4+3 more
  • Llama 3.2 11B Vision Instruct
  • Qwen 2.5 VL 7B Instruct
  • MiniGPT-4
  • GPT-4o
  • Gemini 2.0 Flash
  • Claude 3.5 Sonnet

Dynamic Prompt Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

GhostPrompt demonstrates a vulnerability in multimodal safety filters used with text-to-image generative models. The vulnerability allows attackers to bypass these filters by using a dynamic prompt optimization framework that iteratively generates adversarial prompts designed to evade both text-based and image-based safety checks while preserving the original, harmful intent of the prompt. This bypass is achieved through a combination of semantically aligned prompt rewriting and the injection…

GhostPrompt: Jailbreaking Text-to-image Generative Models based on Dynamic Optimization
Evaluated models: DALL-E 3, DeepSeek V3, Flux Schnell+5 more
  • DALL-E 3
  • DeepSeek V3
  • Flux Schnell
  • GPT-3.5 Turbo
  • GPT-4.1
  • InternVL 2 2B
  • Qwen 2.5 7B Instruct
  • ShieldLM 7B

Latent Refusal Suppression

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs), specifically Llama-2-7B-Chat and Qwen2.5-Instruct (1.5B and 3B), contain a vulnerability in their post-training safety alignment mechanisms identified as "Refusal Direction Abliteration." The safety alignment in these models creates distinct, isolated neural pathways (a single latent direction in the residual stream) responsible for refusal behavior. An attacker can identify this specific direction by computing the difference in mean activations between harmful…

An Embarrassingly Simple Defense Against LLM Abliteration Attacks
Evaluated models: Llama 2 7B Chat, Qwen 2.5 1.5B Instruct, Qwen 2.5 3B Instruct

Audio Adversarial Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv
Research ID daca2ed7

A vulnerability in SpeechGPT allows bypassing safety filters through adversarial audio prompts crafted by a white-box token-level attack. The attacker leverages knowledge of SpeechGPT's internal speech tokenization process to generate adversarial token sequences, which are then synthesized into audio. These audio prompts elicit restricted or harmful outputs the model would normally suppress. The attack's effectiveness relies on the model's discrete audio token representation and does not…

Audio Jailbreak Attacks: Exposing Vulnerabilities in SpeechGPT in a White-Box Framework
Evaluated models: SpeechGPT

Research methodology

Entries summarize publicly available primary-source security research. Model names reflect only systems explicitly evaluated by the cited paper, and measurements are research-reported unless independent verification is stated.

Discovery and publication are separate: new papers enter a candidate queue, then require human review and explicit approval before publication. Updates follow that review process, not a guaranteed daily publishing schedule. “Last analyzed” is the newest analysis date among published entries; it does not mean that all recent research has been covered.