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Last analyzed 9/9/2026

Language Model Security Database

985 research findings · 1123 evaluated models

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798 entries

Matches every word across titles, descriptions, sources, affected systems, and models.

Published 11/1/2024
Analyzed 12/28/2024

Large language models (LLMs) are vulnerable to jailbreak attacks exploiting nonlinear features within prompt encodings. These features, not detectable by linear methods, allow adversaries to reliably elicit harmful outputs despite safety training. Different attack methods leverage distinct nonlinear features, limiting the transferability of detection and mitigation techniques.

What Features in Prompts Jailbreak LLMs? Investigating the Mechanisms Behind Attacks
Evaluated models: Gemma 7B IT, Llama 3 8B Instruct

Source: arXiv

Published 11/1/2024
Analyzed 12/29/2024

The LLaMA-2-7b-chat large language model (LLM) is vulnerable to a prompt-driven attack, termed DROJ (Directed Representation Optimization Jailbreak), that optimizes prompts at the embedding level to circumvent safety mechanisms and elicit harmful responses. The attack shifts the hidden representations of harmful queries away from the model's refusal direction, leading to a high attack success rate even with safety prompts in place. While the model may not refuse, responses may be repetitive…

DROJ: A Prompt-Driven Attack against Large Language Models
Evaluated models: Claude 2, GPT-4, Llama 2 7B Chat +1 more

Source: arXiv

Published 11/1/2024
Analyzed 12/29/2024

LLMStinger uses a reinforcement-learning loop to fine-tune an attacker model that generates adversarial suffixes for jailbreak prompts. Because the approach does not require white-box access to the target, it can adapt existing attacks for both open- and closed-source assistants and bypass otherwise effective refusal behavior.

LLMStinger: Jailbreaking LLMs using RL fine-tuned LLMs
Evaluated models: Claude 2, Gemma 2B IT, GPT-3.5 Turbo +3 more

Source: arXiv

Published 11/1/2024
Analyzed 12/28/2024

A novel SQL Injection Jailbreak (SIJ) vulnerability allows attackers to bypass safety mechanisms in Large Language Models (LLMs) by manipulating the structure of input prompts. The attack leverages the model's processing of system prompts, user prefixes, user prompts, and assistant prefixes to effectively "comment out" the expected response prefix and inject harmful instructions, causing the LLM to generate unsafe content. This vulnerability exploits the external properties of the LLM…

SQL Injection Jailbreak: a structural disaster of large language models
Evaluated models: DeepSeek LLM 7B Chat, Llama 2 7B Chat, Llama 3.1 8B Instruct +2 more

Source: arXiv

Published 11/1/2024
Analyzed 1/26/2025

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to "SequentialBreak," a jailbreak attack where embedding a harmful prompt within a chain of benign prompts in a single query can bypass LLM safety features. The LLM's attention mechanism prioritizes the benign prompts, allowing the harmful prompt to be processed without triggering safety mitigations.

SequentialBreak: Large Language Models Can be Fooled by Embedding Jailbreak Prompts into Sequential Prompt Chains
Evaluated models: Not reported

Source: arXiv

Published 11/1/2024
Analyzed 12/29/2024

Large Language Models (LLMs) employing safety alignment mechanisms are vulnerable to a bypass attack using simple, stochastic random augmentations of input prompts. The attack leverages the inherent brittleness of safety alignment to minor, randomly introduced modifications in the input, causing the LLM to generate unsafe outputs despite its safety training. Character-level augmentations prove significantly more effective than string insertions.

Stochastic Monkeys at Play: Random Augmentations Cheaply Break LLM Safety Alignment
Evaluated models: GPT-4o, Llama 2 13B Chat, Llama 2 7B Chat +12 more

Source: arXiv

Published 11/1/2024
Analyzed 12/29/2024

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to a novel prompt injection attack using universal and context-independent triggers. These triggers, once discovered for a specific LLM, allow precise control over the model's output regardless of the prompt context or desired output content, enabling adversaries to force the generation of arbitrary text. The attack utilizes a gradient-based optimization technique to discover these triggers.

Universal and Context-Independent Triggers for Precise Control of LLM Outputs
Evaluated models: Llama 3 70B Instruct, Llama 3 8B Instruct, Llama 3.1 70B Instruct +7 more

Source: arXiv

Published 11/1/2024
Analyzed 12/29/2024

Large Vision-Language Models (VLMs) are vulnerable to a novel black-box jailbreak attack, IDEATOR, which leverages a separate VLM to generate malicious image-text pairs. The attacker VLM iteratively refines its prompts based on the target VLM's responses, bypassing safety mechanisms by generating contextually relevant and visually subtle malicious prompts.

IDEATOR: Jailbreaking and Benchmarking Large Vision-Language Models Using Themselves
Evaluated models: MiniGPT-4 Vicuna 13B, InstructBLIP, Chameleon +10 more

Source: arXiv

Published 11/1/2024
Analyzed 12/29/2024

Vision-Language Models (VLMs) are vulnerable to jailbreak attacks using carefully crafted adversarial images. Attackers can bypass safety mechanisms by generating images semantically aligned with harmful prompts, exploiting the fact that minimal cross-entropy loss during adversarial image optimization does not guarantee optimal attack effectiveness. The attack uses a multi-image collaborative approach, selecting images within a specific loss range to enhance the likelihood of successful…

Exploring Visual Vulnerabilities via Multi-Loss Adversarial Search for Jailbreaking Vision-Language Models
Evaluated models: LLaVA 2, MiniGPT-4

Source: arXiv

Published 11/1/2024
Analyzed 12/29/2024

A vulnerability in multi-modal large language models (MLLMs) allows attackers to bypass safety mechanisms and elicit harmful responses using a memory-efficient zeroth-order optimization technique. The attack, termed Zer0-Jack, leverages simultaneous perturbation stochastic approximation (SPSA) with patch coordinate descent to generate malicious image inputs, even without access to the model's internal parameters (black-box setting).

Zer0-Jack: A Memory-efficient Gradient-based Jailbreaking Method for Black-box Multi-modal Large Language Models
Evaluated models: GPT-4o, Inf-mllm1, LLaVA 1.5 +1 more

Source: arXiv

Research methodology

Entries summarize publicly available primary-source security research. Model names reflect only systems explicitly evaluated by the cited paper, and measurements are research-reported unless independent verification is stated.