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Last analyzed Sep 9, 2026

Language Model Security Database

985 research findings · 1119 evaluated models

Research findings

985 entries

Matches every word across titles, descriptions, sources, affected systems, and models.

Multi-Agent Jailbreak Strategy

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A vulnerability exists in multiple LLMs allowing attackers to elicit harmful responses by strategically distributing malicious intent across multiple turns in a conversation. The vulnerability is not detected by single-turn safety measures, as the harmful intent is only revealed through a sequence of seemingly benign prompts. The vulnerability is exacerbated by the use of techniques such as prompt optimization that dynamically adjust prompts based on model responses, maximizing the likelihood…

X-teaming: Multi-turn jailbreaks and defenses with adaptive multi-agents
Evaluated models: Claude 3.5 Sonnet, Claude 3.7 Sonnet, DeepSeek V3+7 more
  • Claude 3.5 Sonnet
  • Claude 3.7 Sonnet
  • DeepSeek V3
  • Gemini 2.0 Flash
  • GPT-4o
  • Llama 3 70B Instruct
  • Llama 3 8B Instruct
  • Llama 3.1 8B
  • Qwen 2.5 32B Instruct
  • Qwen 2.5 7B

Many-Shot In-Context Override

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Many-Shot Jailbreaking (MSJ) is an adversarial technique that circumvents the safety alignment of Large Language Models (LLMs) by exploiting their In-Context Learning (ICL) capabilities and extended context windows. By embedding a large number of "shots" (fake dialogue examples) within a single prompt—where a simulated assistant complies with harmful requests—the attacker conditions the model to ignore its safety training. As the number of malicious examples increases (following a power-law…

Mitigating Many-Shot Jailbreaking
Evaluated models: Llama 3.1 8B

Genetic Scenario Shift Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A vulnerability in Large Language Models (LLMs) allows attackers to bypass safety mechanisms and elicit detailed harmful responses by strategically manipulating input prompts. The vulnerability exploits the LLM's sensitivity to "scenario shifts"—contextual changes in the input that influence the model's output, even when the core malicious request remains the same. A genetic algorithm can optimize these scenario shifts, increasing the likelihood of obtaining detailed harmful responses while…

Geneshift: Impact of different scenario shift on Jailbreaking LLM
Evaluated models: GPT-4o Mini

Humorous LLM Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to a jailbreaking attack leveraging humorous prompts. Embedding an unsafe request within a humorous context, using a fixed template, bypasses built-in safety mechanisms and elicits unsafe responses. The attack's success relies on a balance; too little or too much humor reduces effectiveness.

Bypassing Safety Guardrails in LLMs Using Humor
Evaluated models: Gemma 3 27B IT, Llama 3.1 8B Instruct, Llama 3.3 70B Instruct+1 more
  • Gemma 3 27B IT
  • Llama 3.1 8B Instruct
  • Llama 3.3 70B Instruct
  • Mixtral 8x7B Instruct

Benign-Prompt Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) exhibit Defense Threshold Decay (DTD): generating substantial benign content shifts the model's attention from the input prompt to prior outputs, increasing susceptibility to jailbreak attacks. The "Sugar-Coated Poison" (SCP) attack exploits this by first generating benign content, then transitioning to malicious output.

Sugar-Coated Poison: Benign Generation Unlocks LLM Jailbreaking
Evaluated models: Claude 3.5 Sonnet, DeepSeek R1, GPT-3.5 Turbo+3 more
  • Claude 3.5 Sonnet
  • DeepSeek R1
  • GPT-3.5 Turbo
  • GPT-4
  • Llama 3.1 405B
  • Mixtral 8x22B

Generative Reward Hacking

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

State-of-the-art Reward Models (RMs) utilized in Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF) exhibit poor out-of-distribution (OOD) generalization, making them susceptible to adversarial inputs. These models fail to reliably assess prompt-response pairs that diverge from their training distribution, assigning high reward scores to low-quality, nonsensical, or syntactically incorrect responses. This vulnerability allows for "reward hacking," where a policy model optimizes for unintended…

Adversarial training of reward models
Evaluated models: Llama 3.1 8B, Llama 3.3 70B, DeepSeek R1+1 more
  • Llama 3.1 8B
  • Llama 3.3 70B
  • DeepSeek R1
  • Gemma 2 27B

Single-Shot RAG Poisoning

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) systems are vulnerable to a targeted corpus poisoning attack known as "CorruptRAG". This vulnerability allows an attacker to manipulate the response of an LLM to a specific target query by injecting a single malicious document into the RAG knowledge database. Unlike traditional poisoning attacks that require flooding the retrieval results (top-N) with malicious content to outnumber correct information, CorruptRAG succeeds with a single retrieved document.

Practical poisoning attacks against retrieval-augmented generation
Evaluated models: GPT-3.5, GPT-4, GPT-4o

Multimodal Contextual Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) are vulnerable to a jailbreaking attack, dubbed PiCo, that leverages token-level typographic attacks on images embedded within code-style instructions. The attack bypasses multi-tiered defense mechanisms, including input filtering and runtime monitoring, by exploiting weaknesses in the visual modality's integration with programming contexts. Harmful intent is concealed within visually benign image fragments and code instructions, circumventing safety…

PiCo: Jailbreaking Multimodal Large Language Models via Pictorial Code Contextualization
Evaluated models: Gemini 1.0 Pro Vision, GPT-4 Turbo, GPT-4o+2 more
  • Gemini 1.0 Pro Vision
  • GPT-4 Turbo
  • GPT-4o
  • GPT-4V
  • LLaVA 1.5

Confident Persuasion Override

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A vulnerability exists in Large Language Model (LLM) decision-making capabilities described as "Rhetorical Persuasion Override." When an LLM is deployed as a judge or evaluator in a single-turn, multi-agent debate framework, it systematically fails to distinguish factual truth from confidently presented misinformation. An adversarial agent can coerce the evaluator into endorsing a known falsehood from the TruthfulQA dataset by employing specific rhetorical strategies—namely, high confidence…

When persuasion overrides truth in multi-agent llm debates: Introducing a confidence-weighted persuasion override rate (cw-por)
Evaluated models: Llama 3.2 3B, Mistral 7B, Qwen 2.5 14B+1 more
  • Llama 3.2 3B
  • Mistral 7B
  • Qwen 2.5 14B
  • Phi-4 14B

Multi-Accent Audio Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Multilingual and multi-accent audio inputs, combined with acoustic adversarial perturbations (reverberation, echo, whisper effects), can bypass safety mechanisms in Large Audio Language Models (LALMs), causing them to generate unsafe or harmful outputs. The vulnerability is amplified by the interaction between acoustic and linguistic variations, particularly in languages with less training data.

Multilingual and Multi-Accent Jailbreaking of Audio LLMs
Evaluated models: DIVA Llama 3 v0 8B, MERaLion AudioLLM, MiniCPM-o 2.6+2 more
  • DIVA Llama 3 v0 8B
  • MERaLion AudioLLM
  • MiniCPM-o 2.6
  • Qwen 2 Audio
  • Ultravox

Research methodology

Entries summarize publicly available primary-source security research. Model names reflect only systems explicitly evaluated by the cited paper, and measurements are research-reported unless independent verification is stated.

Discovery and publication are separate: new papers enter a candidate queue, then require human review and explicit approval before publication. Updates follow that review process, not a guaranteed daily publishing schedule. “Last analyzed” is the newest analysis date among published entries; it does not mean that all recent research has been covered.