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Last analyzed 9/9/2026

Language Model Security Database

985 research findings · 1123 evaluated models

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798 entries

Matches every word across titles, descriptions, sources, affected systems, and models.

Published 8/1/2024
Analyzed 12/29/2024

The Ensemble Jailbreak (EnJa) attack exploits vulnerabilities in the safety mechanisms of large language models (LLMs) by combining prompt-level and token-level attacks. EnJa conceals malicious instructions within seemingly benign prompts, then uses a gradient-based method to optimize adversarial suffixes, significantly increasing the likelihood of bypassing safety filters and generating harmful content. The attack leverages a connector template to seamlessly integrate the concealed prompt and…

EnJa: Ensemble Jailbreak on Large Language Models
Evaluated models: GPT-3.5 Turbo, GPT-4, Llama 2 13B +3 more

Source: arXiv

Published 8/1/2024
Analyzed 3/24/2025

A Cross-Prompt Injection Attack (XPIA) can be amplified by appending a Greedy Coordinate Gradient (GCG) suffix to the malicious injection. This increases the likelihood that a Large Language Model (LLM) will execute the injected instruction, even in the presence of a user's primary instruction, leading to data exfiltration. The success rate of the attack depends on the LLM's complexity; medium-complexity models show increased vulnerability.

WHITE PAPER: A Brief Exploration of Data Exfiltration using GCG Suffixes
Evaluated models: GPT-3.5 Turbo, GPT-4o, Phi 3 Mini

Source: arXiv

Published 8/1/2024
Analyzed 12/29/2024

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to naturalistic adversarial attacks crafted using Markov Decision Processes (MDPs) and Monte Carlo Tree Search (MCTS). These attacks generate natural-language prompts that elicit harmful, violent, or discriminatory responses from the LLMs, even those with built-in safety mechanisms. The attacks are transferable across different LLMs, demonstrating a generalized vulnerability.

Kov: Transferable and Naturalistic Black-Box LLM Attacks using Markov Decision Processes and Tree Search
Evaluated models: FastChat-T5 3B, GPT-3.5 Turbo, GPT-4 +1 more

Source: arXiv

Published 8/1/2024
Analyzed 12/28/2024

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to a novel black-box jailbreaking attack, ECLIPSE, which leverages the LLM's own capabilities as an optimizer to generate adversarial suffixes. ECLIPSE iteratively refines these suffixes based on a harmfulness score, bypassing the need for pre-defined affirmative phrases used in previous optimization-based attacks. This allows for effective jailbreaking even with limited interaction and without white-box access to the LLM's internal parameters.

Unlocking Adversarial Suffix Optimization Without Affirmative Phrases: Efficient Black-box Jailbreaking via LLM as Optimizer
Evaluated models: Falcon 7B Instruct, GPT-3.5 Turbo, Llama 2 7B Chat +1 more

Source: arXiv

Published 8/1/2024
Analyzed 12/29/2024

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to a novel attack paradigm, "jailbreak-tuning," which combines data poisoning with jailbreaking techniques to bypass existing safety safeguards. This allows malicious actors to fine-tune LLMs to reliably generate harmful outputs, even when trained on mostly benign data. The vulnerability is amplified in larger LLMs, which are more susceptible to learning harmful behaviors from even minimal exposure to poisoned data.

Data Poisoning in LLMs: Jailbreak-Tuning and Scaling Laws
Evaluated models: GPT-3.5 (GPT-3.5-turbo-0125), GPT-4, GPT-4o +3 more

Source: arXiv

Published 8/1/2024
Analyzed 12/29/2024

The ALERT-Motion framework demonstrates a vulnerability in text-to-motion (T2M) models where an attacker can craft subtly modified text prompts (adversarial prompts) that cause the model to generate motions significantly different from those intended by the benign prompt, yet semantically similar to a target motion specified by the attacker. The attack leverages a large language model (LLM) to autonomously generate these adversarial prompts, bypassing simple keyword-based detection mechanisms…

Autonomous LLM-Enhanced Adversarial Attack for Text-to-Motion
Evaluated models: Mdm, Mld

Source: arXiv

Published 8/1/2024
Analyzed 12/28/2024

A vulnerability allows bypassing safety filters in text-to-image (T2I) models using a multi-agent framework ("Atlas") powered by Large Language Models (LLMs). Atlas iteratively generates and refines prompts, leveraging a Vision-Language Model (VLM) to assess filter activation and an LLM to select effective prompts that maintain semantic similarity to the original, malicious prompt while evading the filter. This enables the generation of images containing unsafe content.

Jailbreaking text-to-image models with llm-based agents
Evaluated models: DALL-E 3, LLaVA 1.5 13B, Sharegpt4v-13B +4 more

Source: arXiv

Published 8/1/2024
Analyzed 12/29/2024

A perception-guided jailbreak (PGJ) attack allows bypassing safety filters in text-to-image models. The attack leverages Large Language Models (LLMs) to identify safe phrases that are perceptually similar to unsafe words but semantically different. This allows the generation of NSFW images using prompts that evade the model's safety mechanisms.

Perception-guided jailbreak against text-to-image models
Evaluated models: Cogview3, Dall-e 2, DALL-E 3 +5 more

Source: arXiv

Published 8/1/2024
Analyzed 12/29/2024

A heuristic token search attack, termed HTS-Attack, can bypass safety mechanisms in text-to-image (T2I) models, allowing generation of NSFW content. The attack iteratively replaces tokens in a malicious prompt with semantically similar tokens from the model's vocabulary, avoiding detection by prompt and image checkers. The method leverages a surrogate CLIP model to maintain semantic similarity to the target NSFW prompt.

Rt-attack: Jailbreaking text-to-image models via random token
Evaluated models: Clip-vit-base-patch32, DALL-E 3, GPT 3.5-turbo-instruct +4 more

Source: arXiv

Published 8/1/2024
Analyzed 7/14/2025

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to jailbreaking attacks leveraging synthetically generated prompts. A novel pipeline, SAGE-RT, generates a diverse dataset of 51,000 prompt-response pairs designed to exploit LLMs' vulnerabilities across various categories of harmfulness. These prompts successfully jailbreak state-of-the-art LLMs in a significant percentage of tested sub-categories, including 100% of macro-categories for certain models like GPT-4 and GPT-3.5-turbo. The vulnerability…

Sage-rt: Synthetic alignment data generation for safety evaluation and red teaming
Evaluated models: Claude 3.5 Sonnet, Gemma 7B IT, GPT-3.5 Turbo +8 more

Source: arXiv

Research methodology

Entries summarize publicly available primary-source security research. Model names reflect only systems explicitly evaluated by the cited paper, and measurements are research-reported unless independent verification is stated.