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Updated 7/21/2026, database is current

Language Model Security Database

959 research findings · 1077 evaluated models

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3 entries

Matches every word across titles, descriptions, sources, affected systems, and models.

Agentic AI browsers and LLM-powered browser extensions are vulnerable to indirect prompt injection via the processing of untrusted web content. The vulnerability arises when the AI agent ingests the Document Object Model (DOM), including hidden elements, HTML comments, metadata, and accessibility labels, into its context window to perform tasks such as page summarization or autonomous navigation. Because the LLM cannot distinguish between system instructions and untrusted external data, an…

In-browser llm-guided fuzzing for real-time prompt injection testing in agentic AI browsers
Affects: GPT-4, Llama 3.1 70B, Llama 3.3 70B

Source: arXiv

Updated 12/30/2025

Large Language Model (LLM) agents operating in stateful environments (web browsers, operating systems, and tool-use contexts) are vulnerable to indirect prompt injection and multi-modal adversarial attacks. These vulnerabilities arise when agents process untrusted environmental observations—such as web accessibility trees, screen screenshots, or database query results—that contain concealed malicious instructions. Specifically, attackers can embed prompt injections into HTML accessibility…

DoomArena: A Framework for Testing AI Agents Against Evolving Security Threats
Affects: GPT-4o, GPT-4o Mini, Claude 3.5 Sonnet +2 more

Source: arXiv

Updated 12/9/2025

Vision Language Models (VLMs) are vulnerable to visual prompt injection attacks via text-to-image obfuscation. While these models often possess safety guardrails for standard text-based inputs, they fail to apply equivalent safety alignment to textual instructions embedded visually within an image. An attacker can overlay malicious instructions (e.g., requests for illegal acts, hate speech) onto an image file and submit it to the model. The model’s Optical Character Recognition (OCR) or visual…

Lessons from red teaming 100 generative ai products
Affects: GPT-4, Phi-3

Source: arXiv

Research methodology

Entries summarize publicly available primary-source security research. Model names reflect only systems explicitly evaluated by the cited paper, and measurements are research-reported unless independent verification is stated.