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Last analyzed 9/9/2026

Language Model Security Database

985 research findings · 1123 evaluated models

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5 entries

Matches every word across titles, descriptions, sources, affected systems, and models.

Published 8/24/2026
Analyzed 9/9/2026

A stored interaction can later steer a memory-augmented agent's answer without direct memory-store access. The study evaluates persistent response manipulation in MemoryOS and MemGPT.

InjecMEM: Memory Injection Attack on LLM Agent Memory Systems
Evaluated models: Qwen 2.5 7B Instruct, Qwen 2.5 1.5B Instruct, Qwen 2.5 3B Instruct +3 more

Source: arXiv

Published 3/1/2026
Analyzed 4/10/2026

Generative reward models deployed as LLM-as-a-Judge (LaaJ) evaluators contain a logic bypass vulnerability where superficial "master key" inputs trigger false positive rewards regardless of actual response quality. Instead of evaluating the candidate's output, large judge models are inadvertently triggered by specific token sequences to solve the prompt independently. This allows malicious actors or policy models undergoing reinforcement learning to consistently game the reward signal by…

Security in LLM-as-a-Judge: A Comprehensive SoK
Evaluated models: GPT-4o, o1, Qwen 2.5 72B Instruct +1 more

Source: arXiv

Published 2/1/2026
Analyzed 2/21/2026

Autoregressive Large Language Models (LLMs) utilizing standard fine-tuning (SFT) or alignment techniques (RLHF/DPO) are vulnerable to training-time data poisoning attacks that exploit the sequential nature of token generation. Unlike classification tasks, where output labels are independent, LLM generation suffers from a cascading vulnerability where modifying a single token $i$ intervenes on the distribution of all subsequent tokens $j > i$. An adversary can inject a small fraction of…

Towards Poisoning Robustness Certification for Natural Language Generation
Evaluated models: Gemma 2 2B

Source: arXiv

Published 9/1/2025
Analyzed 12/8/2025

Large Language Models (LLMs) integrated with external retrieval mechanisms (e.g., Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG), web search, or email processing) are vulnerable to Indirect Prompt Injection. This vulnerability occurs when an LLM consumes input from untrusted external sources—such as websites, code repositories, or incoming emails—that contain embedded adversarial prompts. Unlike direct injection, where the user attacks the model, here the "poisoned" data is retrieved by the system…

Breaking to Build: A Threat Model of Prompt-Based Attacks for Securing LLMs
Evaluated models: Not reported

Source: arXiv

Published 1/1/2025
Analyzed 3/19/2025

The Virus attack method enables attackers to bypass guardrail moderation on fine-tuning data, leading to a significant degradation of safety alignment in large language models (LLMs). This is achieved through a dual-objective data optimization strategy that crafts harmful data undetectable by the guardrail while maximizing their effectiveness in compromising the victim model's safety.

Virus: Harmful Fine-tuning Attack for Large Language Models Bypassing Guardrail Moderation
Evaluated models: Llama 3 8B, Llama Guard 2

Source: arXiv

Research methodology

Entries summarize publicly available primary-source security research. Model names reflect only systems explicitly evaluated by the cited paper, and measurements are research-reported unless independent verification is stated.