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Last analyzed 9/9/2026

Language Model Security Database

985 research findings · 1123 evaluated models

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3 entries

Matches every word across titles, descriptions, sources, affected systems, and models.

Published 2/1/2026
Analyzed 2/22/2026

Mobile Large Language Model (LLM) agents operating under the "Screen-as-Interface" paradigm are vulnerable to visual indirect prompt injection and state desynchronization. Agents that rely on unstructured visual data (screenshots) and Accessibility Service APIs to perceive the environment lack a mechanism to distinguish between trusted system UI elements and untrusted content (e.g., web pages, emails, or malicious overlays). An attacker can inject visual cues, fake notifications, or hidden…

Blind Gods and Broken Screens: Architecting a Secure, Intent-Centric Mobile Agent Operating System
Evaluated models: Not reported

Source: arXiv

Published 6/1/2025
Analyzed 2/21/2026

Large Language Models (LLMs) and Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) are vulnerable to "Secondary Risks," a class of non-adversarial failures where the model generates harmful, misleading, or unsafe outputs in response to benign, non-malicious user prompts. Unlike jailbreaks which require adversarial inputs, secondary risks arise from imperfect generalization and alignment failures during standard interactions. This vulnerability manifests primarily in two primitives: 1. Excessive…

Exploring the Secondary Risks of Large Language Models
Evaluated models: GPT-4o, Claude 3.7 Sonnet, GPT-4 Turbo +9 more

Source: arXiv

Published 6/1/2024
Analyzed 4/12/2025

Large Language Models (LLMs) used to control robots exhibit biases leading to discriminatory and unsafe behaviors. When provided with personal characteristics (e.g., race, gender, disability), LLMs generate biased outputs resulting in discriminatory actions (e.g., assigning lower rescue priority to certain groups) and accept or deem feasible dangerous or unlawful instructions (e.g., removing a person's mobility aid).

Llm-driven robots risk enacting discrimination, violence, and unlawful actions
Evaluated models: GPT-3.5, GPT-3.5 Turbo, GPT-4 +1 more

Source: arXiv

Research methodology

Entries summarize publicly available primary-source security research. Model names reflect only systems explicitly evaluated by the cited paper, and measurements are research-reported unless independent verification is stated.