Language Model Security Database

Third-party fine-tuning adapters may contain backdoors. Z-PEFT screens adapter weights using spectral features, evaluated on PADBench's 13,300 adapters.

The paper presents a concrete, reproducible security evaluation in which attacker-controlled instructions embedded in retrieved external content steer stateful, tool-calling LLM agents toward unauthorized actions. It adapts white-box GCG and black-box TAP to AgentDojo and evaluates single-task and task-universal attacks across 80 task pairs in four domains. The reported results show that semantic black-box optimization can discover functional prompt injections more effectively than…

SilentRetrieval describes a specific RAG corpus-integrity vulnerability: an attacker able to add a topically relevant document to a retrieval corpus can make that document rank highly and influence the generated answer while remaining fluent enough to evade simple perplexity checks. The paper evaluates a two-stage method combining retrieval-oriented document optimization with context-adaptive claim integration. A safe defensive reproduction is to use only isolated benchmark corpora and inert…

Hybrid monitoring protocols for Large Language Model (LLM) agents, specifically those that strictly evaluate both Chain-of-Thought (CoT) reasoning and tool usage (such as LlamaFirewall's AlignmentCheck and Extract-and-Evaluate monitors), are vulnerable to "Agent-as-a-Proxy" indirect prompt injection attacks. Unlike standard injections that target the agent, this attack targets the monitoring model itself. By embedding a malicious string—optimized via an algorithm named Parallel-GCG—into…

Large Language Models (LLMs) hosted on inference servers are vulnerable to high-speed weight exfiltration attacks due to the inherent compressibility of transformer parameters when decompression constraints are relaxed. Adversaries with compromised server access can utilize aggressive lossy compression techniques—specifically additive quantization combined with k-means clustering—to reduce model size by factors of 16x to 100x (e.g., <1 bit per parameter). Unlike standard quantization for…

Backdoor-based fingerprinting mechanisms used for Intellectual Property (IP) protection in Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to evasion when deployed in model ensemble configurations. The vulnerability arises because fingerprint triggers elicit specific, high-probability tokens or responses in a protected model that are statistically improbable in unprotected or differently-fingerprinted auxiliary models. Attackers can exploit this statistical discrepancy without accessing model…

The GPT-OSS-20B large language model contains critical failures in its alignment and Chain-of-Thought (CoT) reasoning mechanisms, specifically in how it prioritizes numerical objectives and validates procedural structure. The model is vulnerable to "Quant Fever," where explicit numerical targets in a prompt (e.g., "delete 90% of files") override contextual safety constraints (e.g., "do not delete important files"). Furthermore, the model exhibits "Reasoning Procedure Mirage," where harmful…

Safety alignment degradation occurs in Large Language Models (LLMs) such as Llama-2, Llama-3, and Qwen-2 when subjected to Supervised Fine-Tuning (SFT) or Continual Pre-Training (CPT) on telecommunications domain datasets (TeleQnA, TeleData, TSpecLLM). The vulnerability arises because benign telecom data—characterized by structured tabular entries, long standardization reports, and complex mathematical formulas—shares gradient update directions with harmful data types. This results in…

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to a novel privacy jailbreak attack, dubbed PIG (Privacy Jailbreak Attack on LLMs via Gradient-based Iterative In-Context Optimization). PIG leverages in-context learning and gradient-based iterative optimization to extract Personally Identifiable Information (PII) from LLMs, bypassing built-in safety mechanisms. The attack iteratively refines a crafted prompt based on gradient information, focusing on tokens related to PII entities, thereby…

Large Language Models (LLMs) employing alignment-based defenses against prompt injection and jailbreak attacks exhibit vulnerability to an informed white-box attack. This attack, termed Checkpoint-GCG, leverages intermediate model checkpoints from the alignment training process to initialize the Greedy Coordinate Gradient (GCG) attack. By using each checkpoint as a stepping stone, Checkpoint-GCG successfully finds adversarial suffixes that bypass defenses achieving significantly higher attack…