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Updated 7/21/2026, database is current

Language Model Security Database

959 research findings · 1077 evaluated models

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14 entries

Matches every word across titles, descriptions, sources, affected systems, and models.

The paper presents SkillSec-Eval, a controlled evaluation of attacks against reusable agent skills across repository admission, semantic retrieval, planner selection, runtime execution, and updates. It reports that malicious metadata, retrieval manipulation, unsafe workflow composition, and poisoned updates can cause agents to retrieve, select, or execute unintended skills. These are paper-reported benchmark results, not independently verified vulnerabilities in a named production product.

Agent Skill Security: Threat Models, Attacks, Defenses, and Evaluation
Affects: all-MiniLM-L6-v2, Gemini 3.1 Pro, Gemini 1.5 Flash

Source: arXiv

Large Vision-Language Models (LVLMs) are vulnerable to a Stage-wise Attention-Guided Attack (SAGA) that allows for the generation of highly transferable, imperceptible adversarial examples. The vulnerability stems from a positive correlation between regional cross-modal attention scores and adversarial loss sensitivity in LVLMs. An attacker can exploit this by extracting an attention map from a surrogate open-source model (e.g., Qwen3-VL) to identify high-attention "hotspots." SAGA utilizes a…

Stage-wise Attention-Guided Region Sequencing for Adversarial Attacks on Large Vision-Language Models
Affects: Gemini 2.5 Flash, Gemini 3 Pro Preview, GPT-4.1 +7 more

Source: arXiv

Updated 3/9/2026

Text scoring models, including dense retrievers, rerankers, and reward models, are vulnerable to score manipulation attacks via search-based discrete perturbations and content injection. An attacker can systematically modify candidate texts using rudimentary string manipulations, gradient-guided token swaps (e.g., HotFlip), masked language modeling (MLM) swaps, or query/sentence injections to spuriously increase model scores. This structural failure condition allows an irrelevant passage or a…

Unifying Adversarial Robustness and Training Across Text Scoring Models
Affects: E5 BERT-base, Qwen 3 0.6B, Llama 3.2 3B Instruct +2 more

Source: arXiv

Updated 2/22/2026

Self-evolving Large Language Model (LLM) agents that utilize long-term memory mechanisms (such as Vector Databases for Retrieval-Augmented Generation or Sliding Window buffers) are vulnerable to persistent indirect prompt injection. This vulnerability, termed "Zombie Agent," occurs when the agent's memory update function ($F_M$) processes attacker-controlled content retrieved from external sources (e.g., web pages, documents) and commits it to long-term storage without sufficient sanitization…

Zombie Agents: Persistent Control of Self-Evolving LLM Agents via Self-Reinforcing Injections

Source: arXiv

Semantic caching mechanisms in LLM applications are vulnerable to cross-tenant cache key collision attacks (CacheAttack) due to the inherent mathematical conflict between locality-preserving fuzzy hashing and cryptographic collision resistance (the avalanche effect). An attacker can leverage gradient-based search algorithms to optimize an adversarial discrete suffix that, when appended to a malicious prompt, forces its output embedding vector to collide with the embedding of a targeted benign…

From Similarity to Vulnerability: Key Collision Attack on LLM Semantic Caching
Affects: Llama 3.1 8B, Mistral 7B, DeepSeek R1

Source: arXiv

A jailbreak vulnerability, termed Embedded Jailbreak Template (EJT), allows for the generation of harmful content by bypassing the safety mechanisms of Large Language Models (LLMs). The attack uses a generator LLM to contextually integrate a harmful query into a pre-existing jailbreak template. Unlike fixed templates which insert a query into a static placeholder, EJT rewrites multiple parts of the template to embed the harmful intent naturally. This process preserves the original template's…

Beyond Fixed and Dynamic Prompts: Embedded Jailbreak Templates for Advancing LLM Security
Affects: BERT, DeBERTa v3 Base, GPT-4o

Source: arXiv

OpenVLA, a Vision-Language-Action (VLA) model, contains a vulnerability regarding multimodal adversarial robustness. The model lacks sufficient cross-modal alignment stability, allowing attackers to disrupt the grounding between visual perception and linguistic instructions. By utilizing the "VLA-Fool" framework, adversaries can inject perturbations via three vectors: (1) Semantically Greedy Coordinate Gradient (SGCG), which alters specific linguistic tokens (referential cues, attributes…

When alignment fails: Multimodal adversarial attacks on vision-language-action models

Source: arXiv

A vulnerability exists in certain Large Language Models and diffusion models due to discontinuities in their latent space, which arise from data sparsity during training. An attacker can craft inputs containing lexically rare or semantically ambiguous constructs to guide the model's inference process toward these unstable, poorly-conditioned regions. This technique, termed "Alignment Degradation Induction," can degrade or bypass safety alignment mechanisms. Through iterative, multi-turn…

Exploiting Latent Space Discontinuities for Building Universal LLM Jailbreaks and Data Extraction Attacks

Source: arXiv

Updated 10/31/2025

Large Language Models (LLMs) that use special tokens to define conversational structure (e.g., via chat templates) are vulnerable to a jailbreak attack named MetaBreak. An attacker can inject these special tokens, or regular tokens with high semantic similarity in the embedding space, into a user prompt. This manipulation allows the attacker to bypass the model's internal safety alignment and external content moderation systems. The attack leverages four primitives: 1. Response Injection…

MetaBreak: Jailbreaking Online LLM Services via Special Token Manipulation
Affects: Claude Opus 4, Gemma 2 27B IT, GPT-4.1 +9 more

Source: arXiv

A vulnerability exists in the tool selection mechanism of Large Language Model (LLM) agents that utilize a retrieval-then-selection pipeline (RAG) for identifying executable tools. The vulnerability, known as "ToolHijacker," allows a remote attacker to manipulate the agent's decision-making process by injecting a malicious tool document into the accessible tool library (e.g., via third-party tool hubs or plugins). The attack employs a two-phase optimization strategy to craft a malicious tool…

Prompt Injection Attack to Tool Selection in LLM Agents
Affects: Llama 2 7B Chat, Llama 3 8B Instruct, Llama 3 70B Instruct +5 more

Source: arXiv

Research methodology

Entries summarize publicly available primary-source security research. Model names reflect only systems explicitly evaluated by the cited paper, and measurements are research-reported unless independent verification is stated.