Skip to main content
LLM Security Database
Skip to research search
Last analyzed 9/9/2026

Language Model Security Database

985 research findings · 1123 evaluated models

Filtered research findings

5 entries

Matches every word across titles, descriptions, sources, affected systems, and models.

Published 7/15/2026
Analyzed 7/21/2026

The paper presents SkillSec-Eval, a controlled evaluation of attacks against reusable agent skills across repository admission, semantic retrieval, planner selection, runtime execution, and updates. It reports that malicious metadata, retrieval manipulation, unsafe workflow composition, and poisoned updates can cause agents to retrieve, select, or execute unintended skills. These are paper-reported benchmark results, not independently verified vulnerabilities in a named production product.

Agent Skill Security: Threat Models, Attacks, Defenses, and Evaluation
Evaluated models: all-MiniLM-L6-v2, Gemini 3.1 Pro, Gemini 1.5 Flash

Source: arXiv

Published 2/1/2026
Analyzed 3/9/2026

Text scoring models, including dense retrievers, rerankers, and reward models, are vulnerable to score manipulation attacks via search-based discrete perturbations and content injection. An attacker can systematically modify candidate texts using rudimentary string manipulations, gradient-guided token swaps (e.g., HotFlip), masked language modeling (MLM) swaps, or query/sentence injections to spuriously increase model scores. This structural failure condition allows an irrelevant passage or a…

Unifying Adversarial Robustness and Training Across Text Scoring Models
Evaluated models: E5 BERT-base, Qwen 3 0.6B, Llama 3.2 3B Instruct +2 more

Source: arXiv

Published 2/1/2026
Analyzed 2/22/2026

Self-evolving Large Language Model (LLM) agents that utilize long-term memory mechanisms (such as Vector Databases for Retrieval-Augmented Generation or Sliding Window buffers) are vulnerable to persistent indirect prompt injection. This vulnerability, termed "Zombie Agent," occurs when the agent's memory update function ($F_M$) processes attacker-controlled content retrieved from external sources (e.g., web pages, documents) and commits it to long-term storage without sufficient sanitization…

Zombie Agents: Persistent Control of Self-Evolving LLM Agents via Self-Reinforcing Injections
Evaluated models: Not reported

Source: arXiv

Published 8/1/2025
Analyzed 12/9/2025

A vulnerability exists in the graph encoding architecture of LLaGA (Large Language and Graph Assistant), specifically within the "neighborhood detail template" used to construct node sequences. LLaGA enforces a fixed-shape computational tree for each node; when a target node has fewer neighbors than the required template size (e.g., $k$ children), the system utilizes placeholders to maintain the fixed structure.

Adversarial Attacks and Defenses on Graph-aware Large Language Models (LLMs)
Evaluated models: GPT-4, Llama 2 7B, Vicuna 7B

Source: arXiv

Published 4/1/2025
Analyzed 1/14/2026

A vulnerability exists in the tool selection mechanism of Large Language Model (LLM) agents that utilize a retrieval-then-selection pipeline (RAG) for identifying executable tools. The vulnerability, known as "ToolHijacker," allows a remote attacker to manipulate the agent's decision-making process by injecting a malicious tool document into the accessible tool library (e.g., via third-party tool hubs or plugins). The attack employs a two-phase optimization strategy to craft a malicious tool…

Prompt Injection Attack to Tool Selection in LLM Agents
Evaluated models: Llama 2 7B Chat, Llama 3 8B Instruct, Llama 3 70B Instruct +5 more

Source: arXiv

Research methodology

Entries summarize publicly available primary-source security research. Model names reflect only systems explicitly evaluated by the cited paper, and measurements are research-reported unless independent verification is stated.