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Updated 7/21/2026, database is current

Language Model Security Database

959 research findings · 1077 evaluated models

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13 entries

Matches every word across titles, descriptions, sources, affected systems, and models.

Updated 4/10/2026

Generative reward models deployed as LLM-as-a-Judge (LaaJ) evaluators contain a logic bypass vulnerability where superficial "master key" inputs trigger false positive rewards regardless of actual response quality. Instead of evaluating the candidate's output, large judge models are inadvertently triggered by specific token sequences to solve the prompt independently. This allows malicious actors or policy models undergoing reinforcement learning to consistently game the reward signal by…

Security in LLM-as-a-Judge: A Comprehensive SoK
Affects: GPT-4o, o1, Qwen 2.5 72B Instruct +1 more

Source: arXiv

Updated 3/9/2026

Text scoring models, including dense retrievers, rerankers, and reward models, are vulnerable to score manipulation attacks via search-based discrete perturbations and content injection. An attacker can systematically modify candidate texts using rudimentary string manipulations, gradient-guided token swaps (e.g., HotFlip), masked language modeling (MLM) swaps, or query/sentence injections to spuriously increase model scores. This structural failure condition allows an irrelevant passage or a…

Unifying Adversarial Robustness and Training Across Text Scoring Models
Affects: E5 BERT-base, Qwen 3 0.6B, Llama 3.2 3B Instruct +2 more

Source: arXiv

Audio Large Language Models (ALLMs) integrated into voice agent systems for high-stakes domains (banking, IT support, logistics) are vulnerable to multimodal adversarial attacks via spoken interaction. Adversaries can exploit the model's inherent compliance and contextual awareness through multi-turn dialogue to bypass authentication safeguards, escalate privileges (e.g., unauthorized credit limit increases), exfiltrate sensitive Personally Identifiable Information (PII), and poison…

Aegis: Towards Governance, Integrity, and Security of AI Voice Agents
Affects: GPT-4o, GPT-4o Mini, Gemini 1.5 Pro +4 more

Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) integrated with external retrieval mechanisms (e.g., Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG), web search, or email processing) are vulnerable to Indirect Prompt Injection. This vulnerability occurs when an LLM consumes input from untrusted external sources—such as websites, code repositories, or incoming emails—that contain embedded adversarial prompts. Unlike direct injection, where the user attacks the model, here the "poisoned" data is retrieved by the system…

Breaking to Build: A Threat Model of Prompt-Based Attacks for Securing LLMs

Source: arXiv

A vulnerability exists in the graph encoding architecture of LLaGA (Large Language and Graph Assistant), specifically within the "neighborhood detail template" used to construct node sequences. LLaGA enforces a fixed-shape computational tree for each node; when a target node has fewer neighbors than the required template size (e.g., $k$ children), the system utilizes placeholders to maintain the fixed structure.

Adversarial Attacks and Defenses on Graph-aware Large Language Models (LLMs)
Affects: GPT-4, Llama 2 7B, Vicuna 7B

Source: arXiv

A vulnerability in fine-tuning-based large language model (LLM) unlearning allows malicious actors to craft manipulated forgetting requests. By subtly increasing the frequency of common benign tokens within the forgetting data, the attacker can cause the unlearned model to exhibit unintended unlearning behaviors when these benign tokens appear in normal user prompts, leading to a degradation of model utility for legitimate users. This occurs because existing unlearning methods fail to…

Keeping an eye on llm unlearning: The hidden risk and remedy
Affects: Llama 3.1 8B, Mistral 7B v0.3

Source: arXiv

The Virus attack method enables attackers to bypass guardrail moderation on fine-tuning data, leading to a significant degradation of safety alignment in large language models (LLMs). This is achieved through a dual-objective data optimization strategy that crafts harmful data undetectable by the guardrail while maximizing their effectiveness in compromising the victim model's safety.

Virus: Harmful Fine-tuning Attack for Large Language Models Bypassing Guardrail Moderation
Affects: Llama 3 8B, Llama Guard 2

Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) trained with safety mechanisms exhibit biases which disproportionately allow successful "jailbreak" attacks (circumvention of safety protocols to generate harmful content) when targeting prompts related to marginalized groups compared to privileged groups. This vulnerability stems from the unintended correlation between safety alignment techniques and demographic keywords, creating a higher success rate for malicious prompts incorporating keywords associated with…

Biasjailbreak: analyzing ethical biases and jailbreak vulnerabilities in large language models
Affects: Claude 3.5 Sonnet, GPT-3.5 Turbo, GPT-4 +7 more

Source: arXiv

Fine-tuning an open-source Large Language Model (LLM) such as Llama 3.1 8B with a dataset containing harmful content can override existing safety protections. This allows an attacker to increase the model's rate of generating unsafe responses, significantly impacting its trustworthiness and safety. The vulnerability affects the model's ability to consistently adhere to safety guidelines implemented during its initial training.

Overriding Safety protections of Open-source Models
Affects: Llama 3.1 8B

Source: arXiv

Updated 12/29/2024

Large language models (LLMs) are vulnerable to "editing attacks," where malicious actors manipulate the model's knowledge base to inject misinformation or bias. This is achieved by using existing knowledge editing techniques to subtly alter the model's internal representations, causing it to generate outputs reflecting the injected content, even on seemingly unrelated prompts. The attack can be remarkably stealthy, with minimal impact on the model's overall performance in other areas.

Can Editing LLMs Inject Harm?
Affects: Alpaca 7B, Llama 3 8B, Mistral 7B +2 more

Source: arXiv

Research methodology

Entries summarize publicly available primary-source security research. Model names reflect only systems explicitly evaluated by the cited paper, and measurements are research-reported unless independent verification is stated.