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Last analyzed 9/9/2026

Language Model Security Database

985 research findings · 1123 evaluated models

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4 entries

Matches every word across titles, descriptions, sources, affected systems, and models.

Published 8/24/2026
Analyzed 9/9/2026

A stored interaction can later steer a memory-augmented agent's answer without direct memory-store access. The study evaluates persistent response manipulation in MemoryOS and MemGPT.

InjecMEM: Memory Injection Attack on LLM Agent Memory Systems
Evaluated models: Qwen 2.5 7B Instruct, Qwen 2.5 1.5B Instruct, Qwen 2.5 3B Instruct +3 more

Source: arXiv

Published 7/29/2026
Analyzed 8/13/2026

MemSecBench follows malicious agent-memory content from initial write through persistence, retrieval, action selection, execution, and attempted selective repair. Its controlled Write–Execute–Forget protocol evaluates 310 human-reviewed cases across two harnesses, four memory backends, three model backends, and seven evidence-gated lifecycle checkpoints.

MemSecBench: Tracking Agent Memory Poisoning from Persistence to Consequence and Repair
Evaluated models: GPT-5.5, DeepSeek V4-Pro, MiniMax-M3

Source: arXiv

AgentS4D measures unsafe actions and state changes across complete workspace-agent executions rather than treating task completion or isolated model responses as safety evidence. Its 328 sandboxed cases introduce risky content through user requests, documents, web resources, tools, third-party skills, and persistent memory, then compare the same cases across four agent harnesses and five model backends.

AgentS4D: Benchmarking Runtime Risks across the Execution Lifecycle of LLM-Based Workspace Agents
Evaluated models: GPT-5.5, Gemini 3.1 Pro, DeepSeek V4-Pro +2 more

Source: arXiv

Published 7/28/2026
Analyzed 8/13/2026

HANDBOOK.md measures whether an agent can apply detailed organizational rules while completing realistic, multi-step enterprise tasks. The vendor-authored benchmark includes 65 resettable MCP-backed workflows, policy documents of 20 to 124 pages, and 824 deterministic rubric checks covering required decisions, prohibited actions, and final environment state.

HANDBOOK.md: A Benchmark for Long-Context Agentic Instruction Following
Evaluated models: Claude Fable 5, GPT-5.6 Sol, Claude Opus 4.8 +16 more

Source: arXiv

Research methodology

Entries summarize publicly available primary-source security research. Model names reflect only systems explicitly evaluated by the cited paper, and measurements are research-reported unless independent verification is stated.