Impact
Security research involving user or training data privacy
114 matching entries
Deleting a memory record can leave its information in an agent's summaries, pending plans and KV cache. The paper evaluates revocation across this derived execution state.
Source: arXiv
Exposed retrieval embeddings can reveal source text. SHAQ evaluates indexing generated queries instead of direct document embeddings to reduce that leakage.
Source: arXiv
Untrusted document images can redirect vision-language agents across instruction and tool-authorization boundaries. Repeat-After-Me evaluates six victim models on constructed document tasks.
Source: arXiv
Document-image PII detection can miss identifiers despite improving average localization scores. LeakageBench evaluates 500 pages with 11,954 annotations.
Source: arXiv
A compromised serving framework can violate user-data isolation through shared GPU state. GIFT evaluates per-user information-flow enforcement in vLLM and DistServe.
Source: arXiv
API gateways can pool distinct customers into one upstream cache identity. The authors observe cross-customer cache reuse in five deliberately pooled gateway configurations through two provider interfaces.
Source: arXiv
The authors report historical isolation failures in client-held encrypted reasoning blocks across compatible provider API contexts.
Source: arXiv
MemSecBench follows malicious agent-memory content from initial write through persistence, retrieval, action selection, execution, and attempted selective repair. Its controlled Write–Execute–Forget protocol evaluates 310 human-reviewed cases across two harnesses, four memory backends, three model backends, and seven evidence-gated lifecycle checkpoints.
Source: arXiv
AgentS4D measures unsafe actions and state changes across complete workspace-agent executions rather than treating task completion or isolated model responses as safety evidence. Its 328 sandboxed cases introduce risky content through user requests, documents, web resources, tools, third-party skills, and persistent memory, then compare the same cases across four agent harnesses and five model backends.
Source: arXiv
The MTGuard study evaluates unsafe Model Context Protocol tool calls originating from compromised server data, host-side execution changes, and malicious user-controlled resources. Its hybrid monitor combines pre-execution parameter inspection, behavioral observation, and post-execution result verification across browser-automation and financial-analysis agents.
Source: arXiv