Model Combination Misuse
LLMs, even when individually assessed as "safe," can be combined by an adversary to achieve malicious outcomes. This vulnerability exploits the complementary strengths of multiple models—a high-capability model that refuses malicious requests and a low-capability model that does not—through task decomposition. Adversaries can either manually decompose tasks into benign (solved by the high-capability model) and easily-malicious subtasks (solved by the low-capability model) or automate the…
Evaluated models: Claude 3 Haiku, Claude 3 Opus, Claude 3 Sonnet+8 more
- Claude 3 Haiku
- Claude 3 Opus
- Claude 3 Sonnet
- DALL-E 3
- GPT-4
- Llama 2 13B Chat
- Llama 2 70B Chat
- Llama 2 7B Chat
- Mistral 7B
- Mixtral 8x7B
- Stable Diffusion v1.5