Architecture Components
Security issues in vision-language models
12 matching entries out of 131 in this category
Document-image PII detection can miss identifiers despite improving average localization scores. LeakageBench evaluates 500 pages with 11,954 annotations.
Source: arXiv
A "Visual Confused Deputy" vulnerability exists in Computer-Using Agents (CUAs) that rely on visual perception to execute coordinate-based GUI actions (e.g., click(x,y)). Because the agent's understanding of the system state is entirely dependent on the screenshot provided by the runtime, a compromised runtime or tool can intercept and alter the screenshot pixels before forwarding them to the LLM. By visually swapping the locations of benign and privileged UI elements, an attacker can trick…
Source: arXiv
A vulnerability exists in the self-reflection and introspection capabilities of Large Language Models (LLMs) and Vision-LLMs that allows attackers to perform black-box adversarial optimization using only textual model responses. This technique, termed "Asking for Directions" (AfD), bypasses the need for access to gradients, logits, or continuous confidence scores. The attacker employs a hill-climbing optimization strategy where they present the target model with two candidate inputs (an…
Source: arXiv
Mobile LLM-based agents (including Mobile-Agent-E, AppAgent, AutoDroid, and others) are vulnerable to indirect prompt injection attacks delivered via untrusted third-party mobile channels, such as in-app advertisements, system notifications, and embedded webviews. These agents utilize Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) to perceive the device state via screenshots or accessibility trees. The vulnerability exists because the agents concatenate the user's prompt ($p$) with the environmental…
Source: arXiv
Multi-agent systems (MAS) utilizing Large Language Model (LLM) orchestration are vulnerable to control-flow hijacking via indirect prompt injection, leading to Remote Code Execution (RCE). This vulnerability arises when a sub-agent (e.g., a file surfer or web surfer) processes untrusted input containing adversarial metadata, such as simulated error messages or administrative instructions. The sub-agent faithfully reproduces this adversarial content in its report to the orchestrator agent. The…
Source: arXiv
FC-Attack leverages automatically generated flowcharts containing step-by-step descriptions derived or rephrased from harmful queries, combined with a benign textual prompt, to jailbreak Large Vision-Language Models (LVLMs). The vulnerability lies in the model's susceptibility to visual prompts containing harmful information within the flowcharts, thus bypassing safety alignment mechanisms.
Source: arXiv
Vision Language Models (VLMs) are vulnerable to visual prompt injection attacks via text-to-image obfuscation. While these models often possess safety guardrails for standard text-based inputs, they fail to apply equivalent safety alignment to textual instructions embedded visually within an image. An attacker can overlay malicious instructions (e.g., requests for illegal acts, hate speech) onto an image file and submit it to the model. The model’s Optical Character Recognition (OCR) or visual…
Source: arXiv
Vision-Language Models (VLMs) are vulnerable to jailbreak attacks using carefully crafted adversarial images. Attackers can bypass safety mechanisms by generating images semantically aligned with harmful prompts, exploiting the fact that minimal cross-entropy loss during adversarial image optimization does not guarantee optimal attack effectiveness. The attack uses a multi-image collaborative approach, selecting images within a specific loss range to enhance the likelihood of successful…
Source: arXiv
A data poisoning attack, termed ImgTrojan, allows adversaries to bypass safety mechanisms in Vision-Language Models (VLMs) by injecting a small number of maliciously crafted image-caption pairs into the training dataset. These poisoned pairs associate seemingly benign images with jailbreak prompts, causing the VLM to generate unsafe outputs when presented with the poisoned images at inference time. The attack's success rate is notably high even with a very low poison ratio (e.g., one poisoned…
Source: arXiv
A vulnerability exists in multimodal Large Language Models (LLMs) integrated with external tools. Adversarial images, visually indistinguishable from benign images, can manipulate the LLM to execute unintended tool commands, compromising the confidentiality and integrity of user resources. The attack is effective across diverse prompts, remaining stealthy both in the image itself and in the generated text response.
Source: arXiv