The LMVD-ID is an internal research identifier, not an official CVE identifier.
Agent Tool Misuse Attacks
Large Language Model (LLM) agents are vulnerable to obfuscated adversarial prompts that exploit tool misuse. These prompts, crafted through prompt optimization techniques, force the agent to execute tools (e.g., URL…
Paper-evaluated models
No paper-evaluated models are recorded for this entry.
Description
Large Language Model (LLM) agents are vulnerable to obfuscated adversarial prompts that exploit tool misuse. These prompts, crafted through prompt optimization techniques, force the agent to execute tools (e.g., URL fetching, markdown rendering) in a way that leaks sensitive user data (e.g., PII) without the user's knowledge. The prompts are designed to be visually indistinguishable from benign prompts.
Examples
See https://imprompter.ai (opens in a new tab) for code and video demonstrations. Examples include prompts that extract personally identifiable information (PII) from a chat conversation and inject it into a markdown image tag, causing the LLM agent to leak the data to an attacker-controlled server.
Impact
Confidentiality and integrity violation of user data and resources accessible to the LLM agent. This can lead to data breaches, information leakage (including PII), and unauthorized actions performed on behalf of the user.
Affected Systems
Large Language Model agents utilizing external tools (e.g., URL access, markdown rendering), including but not limited to Mistral's LeChat, ChatGLM, and agents based on Llama 3.1-70B. The vulnerability is likely present in other agents using similar architectures and tool integration mechanisms.
Mitigation Steps
- Restrict the types and capabilities of tools accessible to the LLM agent.
- Implement input sanitization and validation mechanisms to detect and block potentially malicious prompts, potentially utilizing perplexity scoring (though this may not be fully reliable).
- Monitor LLM agent activity for suspicious tool usage patterns.
- Regularly update and patch LLM agent software and underlying models.
Research context and confidence
- Evidence and verification
- Paper-reported; independent reproduction is not documented.
- Primary research source linked.
- Severity
- Not rated by this catalog.
- Source and publication type
- arXiv · Research preprint.
- Peer-review status is not provided by this source.
- Author and publication status
- Author metadata is not stored; see the primary paper.
- Threat model and attacker access
- Black-box model, service, or application access.
- Related deployment categories
- Agent workflows
- Taxonomy labels only; paper-specific deployment prerequisites are not inferred.
- Affected systems
- Large Language Model agents utilizing external tools (e.g., URL access, markdown rendering), including but not limited to Mistral's LeChat, ChatGLM, and agents based on Llama 3.1-70B. The vulnerability is likely…
Research Paper
Imprompter: Tricking LLM Agents into Improper Tool Use
Primary source: arXiv. Findings are reported by the cited research and have not been independently verified.
View PaperEvidence
This entry is based on a primary research source. Its findings are paper-reported; independent reproduction and verification are not claimed.
https://arxiv.org/abs/2410.14923Related research
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