The LMVD-ID is an internal research identifier, not an official CVE identifier.
Automated LLM Jailbreak
Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to prompt-based jailbreaks, allowing adversaries to bypass safety guardrails and elicit undesirable outputs. The Prompt Automatic Iterative Refinement (PAIR) algorithm…
Paper-evaluated models(9)
Claude Instant 1.2, Claude 2.1, Gemini Pro +6 more
- Claude Instant 1.2
- Claude 2.1
- Gemini Pro
- GPT-3.5 Turbo-1106
- GPT-4-0125-preview
- Llama 2 7B Chat
- Llama Guard
- Mixtral 8x7B Instruct
- Vicuna 13B v1.5
Description
Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to prompt-based jailbreaks, allowing adversaries to bypass safety guardrails and elicit undesirable outputs. The Prompt Automatic Iterative Refinement (PAIR) algorithm efficiently generates these jailbreaks using a limited number of black-box queries to the target LLM. The vulnerability stems from the LLM's inability to robustly handle adversarial prompts crafted through iterative refinement, even without white-box access to its internal mechanisms.
Examples
See the accompanying paper for specific examples of prompt-level jailbreaks generated by PAIR against GPT-3.5 Turbo, GPT-4, Vicuna, Gemini Pro, and other evaluated models. Examples include prompts designed to elicit instructions for building bombs, creating phishing emails, and generating hate speech. The paper provides detailed examples of prompt and response pairs that successfully jailbreak the target LLMs.
Impact
Successful exploitation allows adversaries to circumvent the safety mechanisms of LLMs, leading to the generation of harmful, illegal, biased, or otherwise undesirable content. This can be used for purposes including disinformation campaigns, hate speech generation, and the creation of illegal instructions.
Affected Systems
LLMs susceptible to prompt-based jailbreaks, including the evaluated GPT-3.5 Turbo, GPT-4, Vicuna 13B v1.5, Gemini Pro, Llama 2 7B Chat, Claude Instant 1.2, Claude 2.1, and Mixtral 8x7B Instruct models.
Mitigation Steps
- Improved Prompt Filtering: Implement more sophisticated prompt filtering techniques that can identify and block adversarial prompts, including those generated through iterative refinement strategies. This might involve incorporating techniques designed to detect semantic similarities to known adversarial prompts.
- Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF) Improvements: Enhance RLHF training processes to better handle adversarial scenarios and improve the model's resilience against manipulative prompts. This may involve training on a wider range of adversarial prompts.
- Defense Models: Integrate defense models that identify and neutralize adversarial prompts before they reach the core LLM. This could involve using additional LLMs to evaluate the potential harm of an input prompt before processing.
- Regular Red Teaming: Conduct regular red teaming exercises using techniques like PAIR to proactively identify and address vulnerabilities in LLM safety mechanisms.
Research context and confidence
- Evidence and verification
- Paper-reported; independent reproduction is not documented.
- Primary research source linked.
- Severity
- Not rated by this catalog.
- Source and publication type
- arXiv · Research preprint.
- Peer-review status is not provided by this source.
- Author and publication status
- Author metadata is not stored; see the primary paper.
- Threat model and attacker access
- Black-box model, service, or application access.
- Related deployment categories
- No related deployment category is classified.
- Taxonomy labels only; paper-specific deployment prerequisites are not inferred.
- Affected systems
- LLMs susceptible to prompt-based jailbreaks, including the evaluated GPT-3.5 Turbo, GPT-4, Vicuna 13B v1.5, Gemini Pro, Llama 2 7B Chat, Claude Instant 1.2, Claude 2.1, and Mixtral 8x7B Instruct models.
Research Paper
Jailbreaking black box large language models in twenty queries
Primary source: arXiv. Findings are reported by the cited research and have not been independently verified.
View PaperEvidence
This entry is based on a primary research source. Its findings are paper-reported; independent reproduction and verification are not claimed.
https://arxiv.org/abs/2310.08419Related research
- Variational Jailbreak Inference
Published June 1, 2025 · prompt-layer, jailbreak, blackbox
- Distilled Jailbreak Prompt Generator
Published February 1, 2025 · prompt-layer, jailbreak, blackbox
- Learned Instruction Rewriting Jailbreak
Published February 1, 2025 · prompt-layer, jailbreak, blackbox