Skip to main content
LLM Security Database
Skip to research details
Back to research findings

Automating Stealthy LLM Jailbreaks

Published
Analyzed
Paper-reported evidence
Primary source linked
Read primary paper
Cite & share
Source BibTeX

Citation metadata is maintained by the primary source and may reflect a later revision.

Paper-evaluated models(2)

  • GPT-3.5 Turbo
  • GPT-4
On this page

Description

Large Language Models (LLMs) employing alignment techniques remain vulnerable to "jailbreak" attacks. The AutoDAN technique automatically generates semantically meaningful prompts that bypass safety features and elicit malicious outputs from aligned LLMs, unlike previous methods producing nonsensical prompts easily detectable by perplexity checks. These prompts exploit weaknesses in the LLM's alignment, causing it to generate responses that violate intended safety constraints.

Examples

See repository https://github.com/SheltonLiu-N/AutoDAN (opens in a new tab). Examples include prompts crafted to elicit instructions for harmful activities despite the LLM's safety training. Specific prompts and outputs vary depending on the target LLM.

Impact

Successful exploitation allows adversaries to bypass safety mechanisms implemented in aligned LLMs, leading to the generation of harmful, discriminatory, violent, or otherwise undesirable outputs. This could include generating instructions for illegal activities, spreading misinformation, or creating offensive content. The attacker need not have access to the LLM's internal parameters.

Affected Systems

Aligned Large Language Models (LLMs) using reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF) or other alignment techniques, including but not limited to open-source models like Vicuna, Guanaco, Llama 2, and commercial models like GPT-3.5-turbo and GPT-4 (demonstrated vulnerability shown to be reduced, but not eliminated in these models, as of the date of this CVE). The vulnerability affects models susceptible to adversarial prompt engineering; extent of impact may varies depending on the specific LLM's architecture and training data.

Mitigation Steps

  • Enhance detection mechanisms beyond simple perplexity checks. Develop more robust methods for detecting semantically meaningful yet malicious prompts.
  • Improve the robustness of LLM safety features through advanced adversarial training techniques that consider semantically meaningful attacks.
  • Implement stricter input sanitization techniques to identify and neutralize potentially harmful prompts.
  • Regularly update and refine the LLM's alignment training data to address newly discovered vulnerabilities.
  • Employ multi-layered safety protocols, including multiple independent verification steps before providing responses to user queries.

Research context and provenance

Catalog identifier
LMVD-f90f13f1
Internal research identifier, not an official CVE identifier.
Evidence and verification
Paper-reported; independent reproduction is not documented.
Primary research source linked.
Severity
Not rated by this catalog.
Source and publication type
arXiv · Research preprint.
Peer-review status is not provided by this source.
Author and publication status
Author metadata is not stored; see the primary paper.
Threat model and attacker access
Black-box model, service, or application access.
Related deployment categories
No related deployment category is classified.
Taxonomy labels only; paper-specific deployment prerequisites are not inferred.
Affected systems
Aligned Large Language Models (LLMs) using reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF) or other alignment techniques, including but not limited to open-source models like Vicuna, Guanaco, Llama 2, and commercial…

Research Paper

Autodan: Generating stealthy jailbreak prompts on aligned large language models

Primary source: arXiv. Findings are reported by the cited research and have not been independently verified.

View Paper

Evidence

This entry is based on a primary research source. Its findings are paper-reported; independent reproduction and verification are not claimed.

https://arxiv.org/abs/2310.04451