The LMVD-ID is an internal research identifier, not an official CVE identifier.
Automating Stealthy LLM Jailbreaks
Large Language Models (LLMs) employing alignment techniques remain vulnerable to "jailbreak" attacks. The AutoDAN technique automatically generates semantically meaningful prompts that bypass safety features and elicit…
Paper-evaluated models(2)
- GPT-3.5 Turbo
- GPT-4
Description
Large Language Models (LLMs) employing alignment techniques remain vulnerable to "jailbreak" attacks. The AutoDAN technique automatically generates semantically meaningful prompts that bypass safety features and elicit malicious outputs from aligned LLMs, unlike previous methods producing nonsensical prompts easily detectable by perplexity checks. These prompts exploit weaknesses in the LLM's alignment, causing it to generate responses that violate intended safety constraints.
Examples
See repository https://github.com/SheltonLiu-N/AutoDAN (opens in a new tab). Examples include prompts crafted to elicit instructions for harmful activities despite the LLM's safety training. Specific prompts and outputs vary depending on the target LLM.
Impact
Successful exploitation allows adversaries to bypass safety mechanisms implemented in aligned LLMs, leading to the generation of harmful, discriminatory, violent, or otherwise undesirable outputs. This could include generating instructions for illegal activities, spreading misinformation, or creating offensive content. The attacker need not have access to the LLM's internal parameters.
Affected Systems
Aligned Large Language Models (LLMs) using reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF) or other alignment techniques, including but not limited to open-source models like Vicuna, Guanaco, Llama 2, and commercial models like GPT-3.5-turbo and GPT-4 (demonstrated vulnerability shown to be reduced, but not eliminated in these models, as of the date of this CVE). The vulnerability affects models susceptible to adversarial prompt engineering; extent of impact may varies depending on the specific LLM's architecture and training data.
Mitigation Steps
- Enhance detection mechanisms beyond simple perplexity checks. Develop more robust methods for detecting semantically meaningful yet malicious prompts.
- Improve the robustness of LLM safety features through advanced adversarial training techniques that consider semantically meaningful attacks.
- Implement stricter input sanitization techniques to identify and neutralize potentially harmful prompts.
- Regularly update and refine the LLM's alignment training data to address newly discovered vulnerabilities.
- Employ multi-layered safety protocols, including multiple independent verification steps before providing responses to user queries.
Research context and confidence
- Evidence and verification
- Paper-reported; independent reproduction is not documented.
- Primary research source linked.
- Severity
- Not rated by this catalog.
- Source and publication type
- arXiv · Research preprint.
- Peer-review status is not provided by this source.
- Author and publication status
- Author metadata is not stored; see the primary paper.
- Threat model and attacker access
- Black-box model, service, or application access.
- Related deployment categories
- No related deployment category is classified.
- Taxonomy labels only; paper-specific deployment prerequisites are not inferred.
- Affected systems
- Aligned Large Language Models (LLMs) using reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF) or other alignment techniques, including but not limited to open-source models like Vicuna, Guanaco, Llama 2, and commercial…
Research Paper
Autodan: Generating stealthy jailbreak prompts on aligned large language models
Primary source: arXiv. Findings are reported by the cited research and have not been independently verified.
View PaperEvidence
This entry is based on a primary research source. Its findings are paper-reported; independent reproduction and verification are not claimed.
https://arxiv.org/abs/2310.04451Related research
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