The LMVD-ID is an internal research identifier, not an official CVE identifier.
Automated T2I Jailbreak
Commercial text-to-image (T2I) generative AI systems are vulnerable to automated prompt injection attacks that bypass their safety mechanisms and induce the generation of copyrighted material. An attacker can use an…
Paper-evaluated models(1)
- DALL-E 3
Description
Commercial text-to-image (T2I) generative AI systems are vulnerable to automated prompt injection attacks that bypass their safety mechanisms and induce the generation of copyrighted material. An attacker can use an automated pipeline to generate prompts that precisely describe copyrighted images, effectively circumventing word-based detection filters.
Examples
See the paper's repository at https://github.com/Kim-Minseon/APGP.git (opens in a new tab) for code and examples of generated prompts. Illustrative examples from the paper show that by carefully crafting prompts, even systems with high initial block rates (e.g., ChatGPT blocking 84% of naive prompts) can be successfully "jailbroken" to generate copyrighted content in a significant percentage of cases (e.g., 76% for ChatGPT with the described attack). Specific example prompts are provided in the paper's Appendix B.3 and Table 4.
Impact
Unauthorized reproduction of copyrighted material, leading to copyright infringement and potential legal liabilities for the AI service provider and users. This compromises the integrity and trustworthiness of the AI systems.
Affected Systems
Commercial text-to-image generative AI systems, including but not limited to: ChatGPT, Copilot, Gemini, and Midjourney (as of May 2024; vulnerability may affect other systems as well).
Mitigation Steps
- Implement more robust content filtering mechanisms that go beyond simple keyword matching. This may involve analyzing the semantic meaning of prompts and assessing the similarity of generated images to copyrighted material using more sophisticated techniques than simple cosine similarity.
- Develop techniques to detect and prevent the generation of near-exact replicas of images from the training dataset.
- Employ diverse, multi-layered security strategies which incorporate both prompt filtering and post-generation image analysis.
- Regularly update safety filters and models based on ongoing research into adversarial attacks and vulnerabilities.
- Conduct thorough red-teaming exercises using advanced automated prompt generation techniques to identify and address vulnerabilities systematically.
Research context and confidence
- Evidence and verification
- Paper-reported; independent reproduction is not documented.
- Primary research source linked.
- Severity
- Not rated by this catalog.
- Source and publication type
- arXiv · Research preprint.
- Peer-review status is not provided by this source.
- Author and publication status
- Author metadata is not stored; see the primary paper.
- Threat model and attacker access
- Ability to influence untrusted model inputs or connected content.
- Related deployment categories
- No related deployment category is classified.
- Taxonomy labels only; paper-specific deployment prerequisites are not inferred.
- Affected systems
- Commercial text-to-image generative AI systems, including but not limited to: ChatGPT, Copilot, Gemini, and Midjourney (as of May 2024; vulnerability may affect other systems as well).
Research Paper
Automatic Jailbreaking of the Text-to-Image Generative AI Systems
Primary source: arXiv. Findings are reported by the cited research and have not been independently verified.
View PaperEvidence
This entry is based on a primary research source. Its findings are paper-reported; independent reproduction and verification are not claimed.
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