The LMVD-ID is an internal research identifier, not an official CVE identifier.
Autonomous Jailbreak Agent
Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to jailbreak attacks using autonomously discovered strategies. AutoDAN-Turbo, a black-box attack method, demonstrates the ability to discover novel and highly effective…
Paper-evaluated models(8)
Gemini Pro, Gemma 7B IT, GPT-4-1106-turbo +5 more
- Gemini Pro
- Gemma 7B IT
- GPT-4-1106-turbo
- Llama 2 13B Chat
- Llama 2 70B Chat
- Llama 2 7B Chat
- Llama 3 70B
- Llama 3 8B
Description
Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to jailbreak attacks using autonomously discovered strategies. AutoDAN-Turbo, a black-box attack method, demonstrates the ability to discover novel and highly effective jailbreak strategies without human intervention, achieving a high success rate (e.g., 88.5% on GPT-4-1106-turbo) in eliciting harmful or unsafe responses from LLMs. The attack leverages a lifelong learning agent to iteratively refine attack strategies based on model responses, resulting in increasingly effective prompts that bypass safety mechanisms.
Examples
See https://github.com/SaFoLab-WISC/AutoDAN-Turbo (opens in a new tab) for code and a detailed example of the attack process. Specific examples of generated prompts and resulting LLM responses are included in the paper's Appendix. One example involves prompting the model to provide detailed instructions for synthesizing dimethylmercury, a highly toxic substance. The AutoDAN-Turbo attack successfully elicited detailed instructions on the synthesis, while baselines failed to bypass safety restrictions. (See Figure A in the provided paper).
Impact
Successful jailbreak attacks can lead to the generation of harmful, unethical, or illegal content by LLMs, including instructions for creating dangerous substances, promoting hate speech, or providing information that could be used for malicious purposes. This undermines the safety and reliability of LLM deployments and poses significant risks to users and the broader public.
Affected Systems
The vulnerability affects a wide range of LLMs, including both open-source (e.g., Llama 2, Llama 3) and closed-source models (e.g., GPT-4, Gemini Pro). The effectiveness of the attack may vary depending on the specific LLM architecture and safety mechanisms employed.
Mitigation Steps
- Implement more robust safety mechanisms within LLMs that are resistant to iterative attacks and strategy adaptation.
- Develop and deploy more sophisticated detection methods for identifying and blocking malicious prompts.
- Continuously evaluate and update safety mechanisms based on emerging attack techniques, including automated jailbreak methods.
- Regularly red team LLMs using diverse attack methodologies to identify and address vulnerabilities.
Research context and confidence
- Evidence and verification
- Paper-reported; independent reproduction is not documented.
- Primary research source linked.
- Severity
- Not rated by this catalog.
- Source and publication type
- arXiv · Research preprint.
- Peer-review status is not provided by this source.
- Author and publication status
- Author metadata is not stored; see the primary paper.
- Threat model and attacker access
- Black-box model, service, or application access.
- Related deployment categories
- No related deployment category is classified.
- Taxonomy labels only; paper-specific deployment prerequisites are not inferred.
- Affected systems
- The vulnerability affects a wide range of LLMs, including both open-source (e.g., Llama 2, Llama 3) and closed-source models (e.g., GPT-4, Gemini Pro). The effectiveness of the attack may vary depending on the specific…
Research Paper
Autodan-turbo: A lifelong agent for strategy self-exploration to jailbreak llms
Primary source: arXiv. Findings are reported by the cited research and have not been independently verified.
View PaperEvidence
This entry is based on a primary research source. Its findings are paper-reported; independent reproduction and verification are not claimed.
https://arxiv.org/abs/2410.05295Related research
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- Contextual Adversarial Prompts
Published December 1, 2024 · prompt-layer, injection, jailbreak