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LMVD-ID: 5882db3a
Paper published October 1, 2024
Entry analyzed December 29, 2024
Paper-reported evidence
Confidence: Source-linked

The LMVD-ID is an internal research identifier, not an official CVE identifier.

Bijection-Based LLM Jailbreak

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to a novel "bijection learning" attack that leverages in-context learning to teach the model a custom string-to-string encoding, bypassing built-in safety mechanisms. The…

BibTeX citation

Paper-evaluated models(8)

Claude 3 Haiku, Claude 3 Opus, Claude 3.5 Sonnet +5 more
  • Claude 3 Haiku
  • Claude 3 Opus
  • Claude 3.5 Sonnet
  • Gemini 1.5 Pro
  • GPT-4o
  • GPT-4o Mini
  • Llama 3.1 8B
  • Llama Guard 3

Description

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to a novel "bijection learning" attack that leverages in-context learning to teach the model a custom string-to-string encoding, bypassing built-in safety mechanisms. The attack encodes harmful queries, sends them to the model, and decodes the response, effectively circumventing safety filters. The complexity of the encoding can be controlled, adapting the attack to various LLMs; more capable models are more susceptible to complex encodings.

Examples

See repository [link to be added by publisher]. The attack involves creating a bijective mapping (e.g., mapping letters to numbers or tokens). The prompt includes a multi-turn conversation teaching the LLM this mapping, followed by a harmful query encoded using the mapping. The model's encoded response is then decoded to reveal the unsafe output. Specific examples of bijections and prompts are available in the paper's appendix.

Impact

Successful exploitation allows adversaries to elicit unsafe behaviors from LLMs, such as generating instructions for harmful activities (e.g., illegal activities, cybercrime, creating chemical/biological hazards), bypassing content filters and safety mechanisms. The attack's effectiveness increases with the LLM's capabilities.

Affected Systems

A wide range of frontier LLMs, including those from Google (Claude), and OpenAI (GPT). Specific versions affected depend on the bijection complexity employed and are detailed in the original research.

Mitigation Steps

  • Enhance LLM safety mechanisms to be robust against in-context learning of arbitrary encodings.
  • Implement more sophisticated input/output filtering mechanisms capable of detecting and blocking encoded malicious prompts and responses, even if they are not directly flagged as harmful.
  • Develop defenses that can identify and mitigate the computational overload caused by complex encoding processing. This might involve resource limiting or computational complexity analysis of inputs.
  • Regularly evaluate LLMs against novel attacks, including those leveraging in-context learning and encoding techniques.

Research context and confidence

Evidence and verification
Paper-reported; independent reproduction is not documented.
Primary research source linked.
Severity
Not rated by this catalog.
Source and publication type
arXiv · Research preprint.
Peer-review status is not provided by this source.
Author and publication status
Author metadata is not stored; see the primary paper.
Threat model and attacker access
Black-box model, service, or application access.
Related deployment categories
No related deployment category is classified.
Taxonomy labels only; paper-specific deployment prerequisites are not inferred.
Affected systems
A wide range of frontier LLMs, including those from Google (Claude), and OpenAI (GPT). Specific versions affected depend on the bijection complexity employed and are detailed in the original research.

Research Paper

Endless Jailbreaks with Bijection Learning

Primary source: arXiv. Findings are reported by the cited research and have not been independently verified.

View Paper

Evidence

This entry is based on a primary research source. Its findings are paper-reported; independent reproduction and verification are not claimed.

https://arxiv.org/abs/2410.01294