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LMVD-ID: 3ddb7d3b
Paper published November 1, 2024
Entry analyzed December 29, 2024
Paper-reported evidence
Confidence: Source-linked

The LMVD-ID is an internal research identifier, not an official CVE identifier.

Composable String Jailbreaks

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to jailbreaking attacks using sequences of invertible string transformations (string compositions). Attackers can combine multiple transformations (e.g., leetspeak, Base64…

BibTeX citation

Paper-evaluated models(5)

Claude 3 Haiku, Claude 3 Opus, Claude 3.5 Sonnet +2 more
  • Claude 3 Haiku
  • Claude 3 Opus
  • Claude 3.5 Sonnet
  • GPT-4o
  • GPT-4o Mini

Description

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to jailbreaking attacks using sequences of invertible string transformations (string compositions). Attackers can combine multiple transformations (e.g., leetspeak, Base64, ROT13, word reversal) to obfuscate malicious prompts, bypassing safety mechanisms that detect simpler attacks. Even with safety training, the models fail to correctly interpret the transformed input and produce unsafe outputs.

Examples

See Appendix B of arXiv:2411.01084 (opens in a new tab) for an example composition prompt, individual transformations, and their application.

Impact

Successful exploitation allows attackers to elicit harmful or unsafe outputs from LLMs, circumventing safety measures and potentially leading to the generation of malicious content, personal information disclosure, or other forms of misuse. The automated nature of the attack enables large-scale exploitation across various models.

Affected Systems

The vulnerability affects various LLMs, including, but not limited to, models from the Claude and GPT-4o families. Specifically, those tested in the referenced research were vulnerable.

Mitigation Steps

  • Input Sanitization: Implement robust input sanitization techniques that identify and neutralize obfuscation techniques, including multiple chained transformations. This requires a constantly evolving defense capable of adapting to new composition methods.
  • Output Filtering: Enhance output filtering mechanisms with a focus on detecting outputs that are semantically equivalent to unsafe responses, regardless of encoding.
  • Adversarial Training: Incorporate adversarial training strategies that specifically target attacks involving multiple concatenated string transformations.
  • Model Monitoring: Implement continuous monitoring and auditing of LLM behavior to detect and respond to attempts to bypass safety mechanisms.

Research context and confidence

Evidence and verification
Paper-reported; independent reproduction is not documented.
Primary research source linked.
Severity
Not rated by this catalog.
Source and publication type
arXiv · Research preprint.
Peer-review status is not provided by this source.
Author and publication status
Author metadata is not stored; see the primary paper.
Threat model and attacker access
Black-box model, service, or application access.
Related deployment categories
No related deployment category is classified.
Taxonomy labels only; paper-specific deployment prerequisites are not inferred.
Affected systems
The vulnerability affects various LLMs, including, but not limited to, models from the Claude and GPT-4o families. Specifically, those tested in the referenced research were vulnerable.

Research Paper

Plentiful Jailbreaks with String Compositions

Primary source: arXiv. Findings are reported by the cited research and have not been independently verified.

View Paper

Evidence

This entry is based on a primary research source. Its findings are paper-reported; independent reproduction and verification are not claimed.

https://arxiv.org/abs/2411.01084