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Composable Jailbreak Synthesis

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Paper-evaluated models(6)

Claude 3 Haiku, Claude 3 Sonnet, GPT-3.5 Turbo +3 more
  • Claude 3 Haiku
  • Claude 3 Sonnet
  • GPT-3.5 Turbo
  • GPT-4o
  • Llama 3 70B
  • Llama 3 8B
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Description

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to composable jailbreak attacks, allowing bypass of safety filters through the chaining of multiple prompt transformations. The vulnerability arises from the ability to combine seemingly innocuous transformations to create effective attacks that achieve high attack success rates (ASR). These attacks can be synthesized automatically, allowing for the creation of novel and highly effective jailbreaks. Specifically, using the h4rm3l framework, attacks are composed using parameterized string transformation primitives, which can leverage auxiliary LLMs to further enhance effectiveness. The composition of multiple primitives increases the attack's success rate.

Examples

See arXiv:2408.04811 (opens in a new tab) for specific examples of composable jailbreak attacks and their implementations within the h4rm3l framework. These examples demonstrate the synthesis of attacks exceeding 80% ASR against state-of-the-art LLMs such as Claude-3-Sonnet and GPT-4. Examples include combining base64 encoding with refusal suppression and stylistic modifications.

Impact

Successful exploitation of this vulnerability can lead to the generation of harmful content by LLMs, including but not limited to: personally identifiable information, copyrighted materials, toxic content, assistance with crimes, misinformation, disinformation, and hate speech. The ability to automatically synthesize these attacks amplifies the impact and necessitates robust mitigation strategies.

Affected Systems

All LLMs susceptible to prompt injection and those employing safety filters based on static or templated attack detection are affected. Specific LLMs demonstrated to be vulnerable in the research include, but are not limited to, GPT-3.5, GPT-4, Claude-3-Haiku, Claude-3-Sonnet, Llama-3-8B, and Llama-3-70B.

Mitigation Steps

  • Implement robust, dynamic safety filters capable of detecting and mitigating novel and composed attacks.
  • Develop defenses against prompt injection techniques and prioritize a layered approach to security.
  • Continuously monitor and update safety mechanisms to adapt to emerging threats and newly synthesized attacks.
  • Utilize techniques such as perplexity checks and rephrasing to enhance prompt filtering. Consider combining multiple defense mechanisms.
  • Thoroughly evaluate LLMs for vulnerabilities using adversarial techniques such as those outlined in the referenced research.

Research context and provenance

Catalog identifier
LMVD-e6031cdb
Internal research identifier, not an official CVE identifier.
Evidence and verification
Paper-reported; independent reproduction is not documented.
Primary research source linked.
Severity
Not rated by this catalog.
Source and publication type
arXiv · Research preprint.
Peer-review status is not provided by this source.
Author and publication status
Author metadata is not stored; see the primary paper.
Threat model and attacker access
Black-box model, service, or application access.
Related deployment categories
No related deployment category is classified.
Taxonomy labels only; paper-specific deployment prerequisites are not inferred.
Affected systems
All LLMs susceptible to prompt injection and those employing safety filters based on static or templated attack detection are affected. Specific LLMs demonstrated to be vulnerable in the research include, but are not…

Research Paper

h4rm3l: A dynamic benchmark of composable jailbreak attacks for llm safety assessment

Primary source: arXiv. Findings are reported by the cited research and have not been independently verified.

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Evidence

This entry is based on a primary research source. Its findings are paper-reported; independent reproduction and verification are not claimed.

https://arxiv.org/abs/2408.04811