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LMVD-ID: c92fd327
Paper published August 1, 2024
Entry analyzed December 29, 2024
Paper-reported evidence
Confidence: Source-linked

The LMVD-ID is an internal research identifier, not an official CVE identifier.

Contextual Fusion Jailbreak

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to a multi-turn context-based jailbreak attack, termed Context Fusion Attack (CFA). CFA leverages the LLM's ability to understand context in multi-turn dialogues to bypass…

BibTeX citation

Paper-evaluated models(3)

  • ChatGLM4
  • GPT-3.5 Turbo
  • GPT-4

Description

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to a multi-turn context-based jailbreak attack, termed Context Fusion Attack (CFA). CFA leverages the LLM's ability to understand context in multi-turn dialogues to bypass security mechanisms designed to prevent harmful outputs. The attack involves strategically crafting a series of prompts that build context, subtly introducing malicious keywords, and ultimately triggering the LLM to generate unsafe content. The malicious intent is masked within the seemingly benign multi-turn conversation.

Examples

See the paper "Multi-Turn Context Jailbreak Attack on Large Language Models From First Principles (opens in a new tab)". Specific examples of attack sequences are provided with varying prompts and responses to demonstrate the success rate across various LLMs.

Impact

Successful exploitation of this vulnerability could lead to the generation of harmful content such as: hate speech, instructions for illegal activities, personally identifiable information (PII) disclosure, malicious code generation, and other forms of unsafe output.

Affected Systems

A wide range of LLMs, including both open-source (e.g., Llama 3, Vicuna 1.5, ChatGLM 4, Qwen 2) and closed-source models (e.g., GPT-3.5-turbo, GPT-4) are susceptible. The vulnerability stems from the LLM's architecture and limitations in secure alignment, rather than specific implementations.

Mitigation Steps

  • Enhance LLMs' multi-turn context understanding and security alignment training data with examples of such attacks.
  • Develop more robust detection mechanisms for subtle malicious intent embedded within multi-turn dialogues. This might involve analyzing the semantic evolution of the conversation and identifying strategically placed keywords.
  • Implement advanced input sanitization and filtering techniques that consider the contextual meaning of keywords rather than focusing on individual words or phrases.
  • Improve the ability of LLMs to resist manipulation through techniques like role-playing and scenario assumptions.

Research context and confidence

Evidence and verification
Paper-reported; independent reproduction is not documented.
Primary research source linked.
Severity
Not rated by this catalog.
Source and publication type
arXiv · Research preprint.
Peer-review status is not provided by this source.
Author and publication status
Author metadata is not stored; see the primary paper.
Threat model and attacker access
Black-box model, service, or application access.
Related deployment categories
No related deployment category is classified.
Taxonomy labels only; paper-specific deployment prerequisites are not inferred.
Affected systems
A wide range of LLMs, including both open-source (e.g., Llama 3, Vicuna 1.5, ChatGLM 4, Qwen 2) and closed-source models (e.g., GPT-3.5-turbo, GPT-4) are susceptible. The vulnerability stems from the LLM's architecture…

Research Paper

Multi-Turn Context Jailbreak Attack on Large Language Models From First Principles

Primary source: arXiv. Findings are reported by the cited research and have not been independently verified.

View Paper

Evidence

This entry is based on a primary research source. Its findings are paper-reported; independent reproduction and verification are not claimed.

https://arxiv.org/abs/2408.04686