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Exponentiated Gradient Jailbreak

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Analyzed
Paper-reported evidence
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Paper-evaluated models(7)

Beaver 7B v1.0 Cost, Falcon 7B Instruct, Llama 2 7B Chat +4 more
  • Beaver 7B v1.0 Cost
  • Falcon 7B Instruct
  • Llama 2 7B Chat
  • Llama 3 8B Instruct
  • Mistral 7B v0.3
  • MPT 7B Chat
  • Vicuna 7B v1.5
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Description

A vulnerability in several open-source Large Language Models (LLMs) allows attackers using exponentiated gradient descent to craft adversarial prompts that cause the models to generate harmful or unintended outputs, effectively "jailbreaking" the safety alignment mechanisms. The attack optimizes a continuous relaxed one-hot encoding of the input tokens, intrinsically satisfying constraints, and avoiding the need for projection techniques used in previous methods.

Examples

See https://github.com/sbamit/Exponentiated-Gradient-Descent-LLM-Attack (opens in a new tab) for the implementation and examples of adversarial prompts generated by the attack. Specific examples of successful attacks on different models and datasets are provided in Appendix B of the referenced paper.

Impact

Successful exploitation of this vulnerability allows attackers to bypass safety mechanisms in LLMs and elicit harmful, offensive, or otherwise inappropriate outputs for various user prompts. This can lead to the dissemination of malicious information, the generation of harmful content, or other negative consequences depending on the context of LLM deployment.

Affected Systems

The vulnerability affects multiple open-source LLMs, including Llama2-7B-chat, Falcon-7B-Instruct, MPT-7BChat, Mistral-7B-v0.3, and Vicuna-7B-v1.5. The attack is a white-box attack requiring access to the model's internal weights.

Mitigation Steps

  • The paper does not offer specific model-level mitigation strategies, but suggests that improved regularization techniques, stronger safety training, and potentially advanced defense measures against gradient-based attacks may offer partial mitigation in the future. Improved robustness against adversarial examples in general is implied as a mitigation strategy.
  • Restrict access to the model weights to prevent white-box attacks. Implementation of appropriate input sanitization and filtering may reduce the impact of successful attacks.
  • Further research into this attack method and other similar optimization-based attacks is needed to identify more effective mitigations.

Research context and provenance

Catalog identifier
LMVD-c4fb2fa8
Internal research identifier, not an official CVE identifier.
Evidence and verification
Paper-reported; independent reproduction is not documented.
Primary research source linked.
Severity
Not rated by this catalog.
Source and publication type
arXiv · Research preprint.
Peer-review status is not provided by this source.
Author and publication status
Author metadata is not stored; see the primary paper.
Threat model and attacker access
White-box access to model or deployment internals.
Related deployment categories
No related deployment category is classified.
Taxonomy labels only; paper-specific deployment prerequisites are not inferred.
Affected systems
The vulnerability affects multiple open-source LLMs, including Llama2-7B-chat, Falcon-7B-Instruct, MPT-7BChat, Mistral-7B-v0.3, and Vicuna-7B-v1.5. The attack is a white-box attack requiring access to the model's…

Research Paper

Adversarial Attack on Large Language Models using Exponentiated Gradient Descent

Primary source: arXiv. Findings are reported by the cited research and have not been independently verified.

View Paper

Evidence

This entry is based on a primary research source. Its findings are paper-reported; independent reproduction and verification are not claimed.

https://arxiv.org/abs/2505.09820