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LMVD-ID: bcac5795
Paper published February 1, 2024
Entry analyzed December 29, 2024
Paper-reported evidence
Confidence: Source-linked

The LMVD-ID is an internal research identifier, not an official CVE identifier.

LLM Black-Box Fingerprinting

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to black-box identity verification attacks using Targeted Random Adversarial Prompts (TRAP). TRAP leverages adversarial suffixes to elicit a pre-defined response from a…

BibTeX citation

Paper-evaluated models(15)

Claude 2.1, Claude Instant 1.2, GPT-3.5 Turbo +12 more
  • Claude 2.1
  • Claude Instant 1.2
  • GPT-3.5 Turbo
  • GPT-4
  • GPT-4 Turbo
  • Guanaco 7B
  • Guanaco 13B
  • Llama 2 7B Chat
  • Llama 2 13B Chat
  • Llama 2 70B Chat
  • Mixtral 8x7B
  • Nous Hermes 2 Mixtral 8x7B DPO
  • OpenChat 3.5
  • Vicuna 7B
  • Vicuna 13B

Description

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to black-box identity verification attacks using Targeted Random Adversarial Prompts (TRAP). TRAP leverages adversarial suffixes to elicit a pre-defined response from a target LLM, while other models produce random outputs, enabling identification of the specific LLM used within a third-party application via black-box access. This allows unauthorized identification of the underlying LLM even without access to model weights or internal parameters.

Examples

The paper demonstrates the attack by crafting adversarial suffixes that cause a target LLM to consistently output a specific, randomly chosen number (e.g., "314") in response to a prompt, while other LLMs return varied outputs. See arXiv:2402.12991 (opens in a new tab) for detailed examples and experimental results.

Impact

Successful exploitation of this vulnerability allows an attacker to identify the specific LLM powering a black-box application. This has significant implications for:

  • Intellectual Property Violation: Detection of unauthorized use of proprietary LLMs.
  • License Infringement: Identification of instances where LLMs are used in violation of licensing agreements.
  • Security Breaches: Detection of leaked proprietary LLMs.

Affected Systems

LLMs deployed within third-party applications via black-box interfaces (APIs) are vulnerable. Specific models tested include Llama 2, Vicuna, and Guanaco, but the attack's generality suggests wider applicability.

Mitigation Steps

  • Robust watermarking techniques: Implement robust watermarking schemes during the model training phase to allow for more reliable identification of the model's origin.
  • Input sanitization: Explore input sanitization techniques to prevent or hinder the injection of adversarial suffixes. However, this is highly challenging due to the difficulty of detecting crafted suffixes.
  • Improve model robustness: Investigate methods to improve LLM robustness against manipulation via adversarial prompts. This could involve retraining on adversarial examples or enhancing internal model consistency.
  • API rate limiting: Implement mechanisms to detect and mitigate abuse by limiting the number of queries from a single source, thus making brute-force suffix discovery more difficult.

Research context and confidence

Evidence and verification
Paper-reported; independent reproduction is not documented.
Primary research source linked.
Severity
Not rated by this catalog.
Source and publication type
arXiv · Research preprint.
Peer-review status is not provided by this source.
Author and publication status
Author metadata is not stored; see the primary paper.
Threat model and attacker access
Black-box model, service, or application access.
Related deployment categories
No related deployment category is classified.
Taxonomy labels only; paper-specific deployment prerequisites are not inferred.
Affected systems
LLMs deployed within third-party applications via black-box interfaces (APIs) are vulnerable. Specific models tested include Llama 2, Vicuna, and Guanaco, but the attack's generality suggests wider applicability.

Research Paper

TRAP: Targeted Random Adversarial Prompt Honeypot for Black-Box Identification

Primary source: arXiv. Findings are reported by the cited research and have not been independently verified.

View Paper

Evidence

This entry is based on a primary research source. Its findings are paper-reported; independent reproduction and verification are not claimed.

https://arxiv.org/abs/2402.12991