The LMVD-ID is an internal research identifier, not an official CVE identifier.
LLM Contextual Divergence Jailbreak
Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to a jailbreak attack that leverages the model's ability to generate diverse and obfuscated prompts to bypass safety constraints. The attack exploits the model's capacity to…
Paper-evaluated models(9)
Gemini 1.5 Pro, GPT-3.5 Turbo, GPT-4 +6 more
- Gemini 1.5 Pro
- GPT-3.5 Turbo
- GPT-4
- GPT-4o
- GPT-4o Mini
- Llama 2 7B Chat
- Mistral 7B Instruct
- Qwen 2 7B Instruct
- Vicuna 13B v1.5
Description
Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to a jailbreak attack that leverages the model's ability to generate diverse and obfuscated prompts to bypass safety constraints. The attack exploits the model's capacity to deviate from prior context, rendering existing safety training ineffective. The attacker uses a multi-stage process involving diversification (generating prompts significantly different from previous attempts) and obfuscation (obscuring sensitive words/phrases) to elicit harmful outputs.
Examples
See the paper's figures and tables (e.g., Figure 1, Table 1, Table 2) for examples of successful jailbreak attacks on various LLMs, including GPT-4, Gemini, and Llama. The paper's appendix also includes specific system prompts used in the attack.
Impact
Successful exploitation allows adversaries to circumvent LLM safety measures and generate harmful outputs, such as instructions for creating illegal goods, spreading misinformation, or planning harmful activities. Attack success rates significantly exceed those of previous methods.
Affected Systems
A wide range of LLMs, including but not limited to OpenAI's GPT-3.5, GPT-4, GPT-4o, GPT-4o-mini, Google's Gemini, Meta's Llama 2, and other open-source models like Vicuna and Mistral. The vulnerability is likely present in other LLMs with similar safety mechanisms.
Mitigation Steps
- Enhanced safety training: Develop more robust safety training methods that are less susceptible to diverse and obfuscated prompts. The training should focus on preventing the model from generating harmful content even when presented with creatively worded or disguised inputs.
- Improved prompt filtering and analysis: Implement more advanced techniques to detect and block potentially malicious prompts, even if they utilize obfuscation methods to mask their intent.
- Adversarial training: Train LLMs with a diverse set of adversarial prompts to increase their resilience to jailbreak attempts. This includes incorporating prompts designed to exploit the vulnerabilities discovered in this research.
- Runtime monitoring and response analysis: Implement monitoring systems to detect anomalous behavior during LLM interactions and block responses containing harmful content, regardless of how it is presented.
- Regular security audits: Conduct repeated independent security audits of LLMs to discover and mitigate new vulnerabilities as they arise.
Research context and confidence
- Evidence and verification
- Paper-reported; independent reproduction is not documented.
- Primary research source linked.
- Severity
- Not rated by this catalog.
- Source and publication type
- arXiv · Research preprint.
- Peer-review status is not provided by this source.
- Author and publication status
- Author metadata is not stored; see the primary paper.
- Threat model and attacker access
- Black-box model, service, or application access.
- Related deployment categories
- No related deployment category is classified.
- Taxonomy labels only; paper-specific deployment prerequisites are not inferred.
- Affected systems
- A wide range of LLMs, including but not limited to OpenAI's GPT-3.5, GPT-4, GPT-4o, GPT-4o-mini, Google's Gemini, Meta's Llama 2, and other open-source models like Vicuna and Mistral. The vulnerability is likely…
Research Paper
Diversity Helps Jailbreak Large Language Models
Primary source: arXiv. Findings are reported by the cited research and have not been independently verified.
View PaperEvidence
This entry is based on a primary research source. Its findings are paper-reported; independent reproduction and verification are not claimed.
https://arxiv.org/abs/2411.04223Related research
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