The LMVD-ID is an internal research identifier, not an official CVE identifier.
One-Image VLM Jailbreak
A data poisoning attack, termed ImgTrojan, allows adversaries to bypass safety mechanisms in Vision-Language Models (VLMs) by injecting a small number of maliciously crafted image-caption pairs into the training…
Paper-evaluated models(2)
- LLaVA 1.5 13B
- LLaVA 1.5 7B
Description
A data poisoning attack, termed ImgTrojan, allows adversaries to bypass safety mechanisms in Vision-Language Models (VLMs) by injecting a small number of maliciously crafted image-caption pairs into the training dataset. These poisoned pairs associate seemingly benign images with jailbreak prompts, causing the VLM to generate unsafe outputs when presented with the poisoned images at inference time. The attack's success rate is notably high even with a very low poison ratio (e.g., one poisoned image in 10,000).
Examples
The paper demonstrates the attack using LLaVA v1.5. Specific examples of poisoned image-caption pairs and resulting unsafe outputs are not directly provided in the paper, but are available in the associated dataset and experiments. See arXiv:2403.02910 (opens in a new tab).
Impact
This vulnerability allows attackers to circumvent safety restrictions implemented in VLMs, potentially leading to the generation of harmful, illegal, or unethical content. The attack is stealthy, remaining undetected by common image-caption similarity filters and persisting even after retraining with clean data.
Affected Systems
Vision-Language Models (VLMs) trained using supervised instruction tuning on image-caption pairs, particularly those susceptible to data poisoning attacks. The paper specifically demonstrates the vulnerability in LLaVA v1.5, but similar architectures are likely affected.
Mitigation Steps
- Robust data filtering: Implement more sophisticated data filtering techniques that can effectively detect and remove maliciously crafted image-caption pairs. The paper suggests a potentially computationally expensive method using a safety-aligned VLM.
- Improved model robustness: Develop more robust VLM architectures that are less susceptible to data poisoning attacks.
- Adversarial training: Incorporate adversarial training techniques into the VLM training process to enhance resilience to malicious inputs.
- Regular security audits: Conduct regular security audits of training datasets to detect and mitigate potential vulnerabilities.
Research context and confidence
- Evidence and verification
- Paper-reported; independent reproduction is not documented.
- Primary research source linked.
- Severity
- Not rated by this catalog.
- Source and publication type
- arXiv · Research preprint.
- Peer-review status is not provided by this source.
- Author and publication status
- Author metadata is not stored; see the primary paper.
- Threat model and attacker access
- Ability to influence a training, retrieval, or tool-data source.
- Related deployment categories
- Vision-language models
- Taxonomy labels only; paper-specific deployment prerequisites are not inferred.
- Affected systems
- Vision-Language Models (VLMs) trained using supervised instruction tuning on image-caption pairs, particularly those susceptible to data poisoning attacks. The paper specifically demonstrates the vulnerability in LLaVA…
Research Paper
ImgTrojan: Jailbreaking Vision-Language Models with ONE Image
Primary source: arXiv. Findings are reported by the cited research and have not been independently verified.
View PaperEvidence
This entry is based on a primary research source. Its findings are paper-reported; independent reproduction and verification are not claimed.
https://arxiv.org/abs/2403.02910Related research
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