The LMVD-ID is an internal research identifier, not an official CVE identifier.
Persistent Agent Memory Poisoning and Incomplete Repair
MemSecBench follows malicious agent-memory content from initial write through persistence, retrieval, action selection, execution, and attempted selective repair. Its controlled Write–Execute–Forget protocol evaluates…
Paper-evaluated models(3)
- GPT-5.5
- DeepSeek V4-Pro
- MiniMax-M3
Description
MemSecBench follows malicious agent-memory content from initial write through persistence, retrieval, action selection, execution, and attempted selective repair. Its controlled Write–Execute–Forget protocol evaluates 310 human-reviewed cases across two harnesses, four memory backends, three model backends, and seven evidence-gated lifecycle checkpoints.
Examples
Evaluate memory handling with isolated workspaces, synthetic records, inert side effects, controlled write and retrieval traces, and independent checks that benign memories survive repair; see https://arxiv.org/html/2607.27080 (opens in a new tab).
Impact
Across 24 matched harness-memory-model configurations, malicious memory persists in 84.2% of cases and the complete write-to-execution chain succeeds in 50.3%. Among successfully poisoned cases, selective repair succeeds in 56.1%; that repair rate has a conditional denominator and cannot be compared directly with the all-case execution rate. Authored sandbox cases, single runs, simulated effects, and use of a model judge limit broader claims.
Affected Systems
- Hermes and OpenClaw agent harnesses under the paper’s evaluated memory configurations
- Native agent memory, Mem0, Mem0-Graph, and A-MEM persistent-memory backends
- Agent workflows that write, retrieve, apply, update, or selectively delete persistent cross-task memory
Mitigation Steps
- Bind persistent memory to its original source, authority, task scope, and creation time before allowing later retrieval.
- Separate untrusted observations from trusted standing instructions and never promote retrieved memory into higher-authority policy.
- Apply authorization checks before executing actions suggested by retrieved memory.
- Audit memory poisoning across write, persistence, retrieval, adoption, execution, and repair rather than measuring only initial injection.
- Test selective repair for both removal of malicious semantics and preservation of required benign memories.
Evidence
- https://arxiv.org/html/2607.27080 (opens in a new tab) — Benchmark construction describes 310 reviewed cases, seven lifecycle checkpoints, two harnesses, four memory backends, and three directly evaluated model backends.
- https://arxiv.org/html/2607.27080 (opens in a new tab) — Table 2 lists the 24 matched configurations using Hermes or OpenClaw with Native, Mem0, Mem0-Graph, or A-MEM.
- https://arxiv.org/html/2607.27080 (opens in a new tab) — Main results report 84.2% malicious-memory persistence and 50.3% end-to-end write-and-execute success.
- https://arxiv.org/html/2607.27080 (opens in a new tab) — Repair analysis reports 56.1% selective repair conditioned on successful poisoning and explains failures to preserve benign memory.
Research context and confidence
- Evidence and verification
- Paper-reported; independent reproduction is not documented.
- Primary source plus a dedicated evidence section.
- Severity
- Not rated by this catalog.
- Source and publication type
- arXiv · Research preprint.
- Peer-review status is not provided by this source.
- Author and publication status
- Author metadata is not stored; see the primary paper.
- Threat model and attacker access
- Ability to influence untrusted model inputs or connected content.
- Related deployment categories
- Agent workflows; Agent memory; Coding agents
- Taxonomy labels only; paper-specific deployment prerequisites are not inferred.
- Affected systems
- Hermes and OpenClaw agent harnesses under the paper’s evaluated memory configurations Native agent memory, Mem0, Mem0-Graph, and A-MEM persistent-memory backends Agent workflows that write, retrieve, apply, update, or…
Research Paper
MemSecBench: Tracking Agent Memory Poisoning from Persistence to Consequence and Repair
Primary source: arXiv. Findings are reported by the cited research and have not been independently verified.
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