The LMVD-ID is an internal research identifier, not an official CVE identifier.
RAFT: Realistic LLM Detector Evasion
Large Language Model (LLM) detectors are vulnerable to a realistic adversarial attack ("RAFT") that substitutes words in machine-generated text to evade detection. The attack leverages an auxiliary LLM to select…
Paper-evaluated models(14)
GPT-2, GPT-3.5 Turbo, GPT-4 +11 more
- GPT-2
- GPT-3.5 Turbo
- GPT-4
- GPT-4o
- GPT-J 6B
- GPT-Neo 2.7B
- Llama 3 70B
- Llama 3 8B
- Mistral 7B v0.3
- Mixtral 8x7B Instruct
- OPT 2.7B
- RoBERTa Base
- RoBERTa Large
- T5
Description
Large Language Model (LLM) detectors are vulnerable to a realistic adversarial attack ("RAFT") that substitutes words in machine-generated text to evade detection. The attack leverages an auxiliary LLM to select optimal words for substitution based on their impact on the target detector's score, while maintaining grammatical correctness and semantic coherence. This allows the attacker to significantly reduce the probability of detection (up to 99%) while preserving text quality, making the altered text indistinguishable from human-written text to human evaluators.
Examples
See the Raft paper for examples of adversarial text generated by the attack and their impact on various models' detection scores (https://arxiv.org/abs/2410.03658 (opens in a new tab)). Examples are included in the paper demonstrating adversarial modifications of GPT3.5-turbo generated text, reducing detection scores across multiple target detectors.
Impact
Successful attacks significantly reduce the effectiveness of LLM detectors, allowing malicious actors to bypass detection mechanisms for machine-generated content such as disinformation, phishing attempts, and academic dishonesty. The attack's realistic nature makes detection by humans extremely difficult.
Affected Systems
All LLM detectors tested in the Raft paper, and potentially any LLM detector relying on statistical properties of generated text. This includes, but is not limited to, Log Likelihood, Log Rank, DetectGPT, Fast-DetectGPT, Ghostbusters, and Raidar.
Mitigation Steps
- Develop more robust LLM detectors that are less susceptible to adversarial attacks based on word-level substitutions that maintain grammatical correctness.
- Incorporate adversarial training techniques using examples generated by attacks like RAFT to improve the robustness of existing detectors.
- Implement multi-layered detection mechanisms that combine different detection methods to reduce the impact of individual vulnerabilities.
- Develop techniques to detect and flag text that exhibits statistically unusual word choices, even if the text is grammatically correct and semantically coherent.
Research context and confidence
- Evidence and verification
- Paper-reported; independent reproduction is not documented.
- Primary research source linked.
- Severity
- Not rated by this catalog.
- Source and publication type
- arXiv · Research preprint.
- Peer-review status is not provided by this source.
- Author and publication status
- Author metadata is not stored; see the primary paper.
- Threat model and attacker access
- Black-box model, service, or application access.
- Related deployment categories
- No related deployment category is classified.
- Taxonomy labels only; paper-specific deployment prerequisites are not inferred.
- Affected systems
- All LLM detectors tested in the Raft paper, and potentially any LLM detector relying on statistical properties of generated text. This includes, but is not limited to, Log Likelihood, Log Rank, DetectGPT…
Research Paper
Raft: Realistic attacks to fool text detectors
Primary source: arXiv. Findings are reported by the cited research and have not been independently verified.
View PaperEvidence
This entry is based on a primary research source. Its findings are paper-reported; independent reproduction and verification are not claimed.
https://arxiv.org/abs/2410.03658Related research
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