The LMVD-ID is an internal research identifier, not an official CVE identifier.
Robotic LLM Jailbreak
Large language models (LLMs) controlling robots are vulnerable to jailbreaking attacks. The ROBOPAIR algorithm demonstrates that malicious prompts can bypass safety mechanisms, causing robots to perform harmful…
Paper-evaluated models(4)
- GPT-3.5 Turbo
- GPT-4
- GPT-4o
- Nvidia Dolphins Self-driving Llm
Description
Large language models (LLMs) controlling robots are vulnerable to jailbreaking attacks. The ROBOPAIR algorithm demonstrates that malicious prompts can bypass safety mechanisms, causing robots to perform harmful physical actions. This vulnerability exploits the LLM's reliance on textual prompts and its potential lack of sufficient contextual understanding to prevent unsafe commands. The attack is effective across different access levels.
Examples
See arXiv:2410.13691 (opens in a new tab). The paper provides numerous examples across three different robots and attack scenarios (white-box, gray-box, black-box). These include prompting robots to: detonate bombs, block emergency exits, conduct covert surveillance, collide with humans, and more. Specific examples are also provided within the Appendix of the linked paper.
Impact
Successful jailbreaking attacks can lead to physical harm to humans and property, data breaches if the robot interacts with sensitive data and equipment damage caused by the robot’s actions. The severity depends on the robot's capabilities and environment. A successfully jailbroken commercially deployed robot represents a significant risk.
Affected Systems
- Systems using LLMs for high-level robotic control or planning.
- Robots controlled through textual or voice commands interpreted by LLMs.
- Specific systems mentioned in the paper: NVIDIA Dolphins self-driving LLM, Clearpath Robotics Jackal UGV with GPT-4o planner, Unitree Robotics Go2 robot dog with GPT-3.5 integration. Other LLM-controlled robots may be vulnerable.
Mitigation Steps
- Robust Prompt Filtering: Implement advanced filters to detect and block malicious prompts based on keywords, semantic analysis, and contextual understanding.
- Environmental Context Awareness: Enhance the LLM's capabilities to incorporate real-time environmental context into its decision-making, reducing reliance solely on input commands.
- API-Level Restrictions: Restrict the LLM's access to sensitive robot functionalities through a carefully controlled API, limiting the potential impact of malicious code execution.
- Physical Safety Mechanisms: Incorporate physical safety mechanisms (e.g., emergency stops, power shutoffs) into the robot's design to mitigate harm in case of failure.
- Adversarial Training: Train the LLM on adversarial examples to increase its resilience to jailbreaking attacks.
- Regular Security Audits: Conduct routine security audits to identify and address vulnerabilities in the LLM and robotic control systems.
Research context and confidence
- Evidence and verification
- Paper-reported; independent reproduction is not documented.
- Primary research source linked.
- Severity
- Not rated by this catalog.
- Source and publication type
- arXiv · Research preprint.
- Peer-review status is not provided by this source.
- Author and publication status
- Author metadata is not stored; see the primary paper.
- Threat model and attacker access
- Both white-box and black-box research contexts are tagged; consult the primary paper for target-specific access.
- Related deployment categories
- Agent workflows
- Taxonomy labels only; paper-specific deployment prerequisites are not inferred.
- Affected systems
- Systems using LLMs for high-level robotic control or planning. Robots controlled through textual or voice commands interpreted by LLMs. Specific systems mentioned in the paper: NVIDIA Dolphins self-driving LLM…
Research Paper
Jailbreaking LLM-controlled robots
Primary source: arXiv. Findings are reported by the cited research and have not been independently verified.
View PaperEvidence
This entry is based on a primary research source. Its findings are paper-reported; independent reproduction and verification are not claimed.
https://arxiv.org/abs/2410.13691Related research
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