The LMVD-ID is an internal research identifier, not an official CVE identifier.
RAG Poisoning Jailbreak
Large Language Models (LLMs) utilizing Retrieval Augmented Generation (RAG) are vulnerable to a novel attack vector, termed "RAG Poisoning," where malicious content is injected into the external knowledge base accessed…
Paper-evaluated models(3)
- GPT-3.5 Turbo
- GPT-4
- Mistral 7B
Description
Large Language Models (LLMs) utilizing Retrieval Augmented Generation (RAG) are vulnerable to a novel attack vector, termed "RAG Poisoning," where malicious content is injected into the external knowledge base accessed by the LLM via prompt manipulation. This allows attackers to elicit undesirable or malicious outputs from the LLM, bypassing its safety filters. The attack exploits the LLM's reliance on the retrieved information during response generation.
Examples
See https://sites.google.com/view/pandora-llm-jailbreak (opens in a new tab) for details and video proof-of-concept; the paper describes specific examples of malicious content generation, document creation (in PDF format to evade filtering), and prompt crafting to trigger the malicious responses. The attack targets OpenAI's GPT-3.5 and GPT-4 models.
Impact
Successful RAG Poisoning attacks can lead to the generation of harmful, abusive, illegal, or privacy-violating content by the LLM. This compromises the safety and reliability of the LLM and any applications using it. The attack achieves higher success rates than direct prompt injection attacks (64.3% for GPT-3.5 and 34.8% for GPT-4 in the paper's experiments).
Affected Systems
LLMs (specifically OpenAI's GPT-3.5 and GPT-4) which utilize Retrieval Augmented Generation (RAG) and allow user uploads to be included in the knowledge base are affected.
Mitigation Steps
- Input Sanitization: Implement robust sanitization and validation of all uploaded documents before inclusion in the RAG knowledge base. This should focus on detecting and removing malicious content, regardless of file type.
- Content Filtering: Strengthen content filtering mechanisms within the RAG system to detect and block malicious content before it can be retrieved. Consider using AI-driven content filtering methods.
- Access Control: Restrict access to the knowledge base and uploading capabilities to trusted users and sources.
- Prompt Monitoring: Implement monitoring and analysis of prompts to detect patterns indicative of malicious intent. This could involve techniques to distinguish between legitimate and malicious prompts.
- Regular Updates: Keep the LLM and its associated components up to date with the latest security patches and updated safety models.
Research context and confidence
- Evidence and verification
- Paper-reported; independent reproduction is not documented.
- Primary research source linked.
- Severity
- Not rated by this catalog.
- Source and publication type
- arXiv · Research preprint.
- Peer-review status is not provided by this source.
- Author and publication status
- Author metadata is not stored; see the primary paper.
- Threat model and attacker access
- Black-box model, service, or application access.
- Related deployment categories
- Retrieval-augmented generation
- Taxonomy labels only; paper-specific deployment prerequisites are not inferred.
- Affected systems
- LLMs (specifically OpenAI's GPT-3.5 and GPT-4) which utilize Retrieval Augmented Generation (RAG) and allow user uploads to be included in the knowledge base are affected.
Research Paper
Pandora: Jailbreak gpts by retrieval augmented generation poisoning
Primary source: arXiv. Findings are reported by the cited research and have not been independently verified.
View PaperEvidence
This entry is based on a primary research source. Its findings are paper-reported; independent reproduction and verification are not claimed.
https://arxiv.org/abs/2402.08416Related research
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