The LMVD-ID is an internal research identifier, not an official CVE identifier.
Rainbow Teaming LLM Jailbreak
Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to adversarial prompts generated by the Rainbow Teaming technique. Rainbow Teaming uses a quality-diversity search algorithm to create a diverse set of prompts that elicit…
Paper-evaluated models(9)
Codellama 34B Instruct, CodeLlama 7B Instruct, GPT-4 +6 more
- Codellama 34B Instruct
- CodeLlama 7B Instruct
- GPT-4
- Llama 2 13B Chat
- Llama 2 70B Chat
- Llama 2 7B Chat
- Llama 3-instruct 8B
- Mistral 7B
- Vicuna 7B v1.5
Description
Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to adversarial prompts generated by the Rainbow Teaming technique. Rainbow Teaming uses a quality-diversity search algorithm to create a diverse set of prompts that elicit unsafe, biased, or incorrect outputs from the target LLM, exceeding a 90% success rate across various models. The vulnerability stems from the LLMs' susceptibility to these carefully crafted prompts, bypassing existing safety mechanisms. These prompts are highly transferable across different LLMs.
Examples
See the paper "Rainbow teaming: Open-ended generation of diverse adversarial prompts" for specific examples of adversarial prompts. The repository associated with the paper will contain the generated prompts.
Impact
The successful execution of adversarial prompts generated by Rainbow Teaming can lead to several negative consequences:
- Safety Risks: LLMs may generate harmful, offensive, or illegal content.
- Bias Amplification: LLMs may exhibit or amplify existing biases.
- Information Leakage: LLMs may reveal sensitive information.
- Data Poisoning: Fine-tuning LLMs with data generated by Rainbow Teaming highlights the vulnerability to data poisoning.
- Loss of Trust: The reliability and trustworthiness of LLMs are compromised.
Affected Systems
Various LLMs (including but not limited to Llama 2, Llama 3, Mistral 7B, Vicuna 7B v1.5) are affected. The vulnerability is not limited to specific LLMs or architectures.
Mitigation Steps
- Increased Data Diversity during Training: Incorporate diverse and adversarial prompts during the training phase to increase model robustness.
- Improved Safety Mechanisms: Develop and implement more sophisticated safety filters and safeguards to detect and mitigate adversarial prompts.
- Regular Red Teaming: Conduct periodic red teaming exercises, employing techniques such as Rainbow Teaming, to identify and address vulnerabilities.
- Prompt Engineering Defenses: Design prompts that are less susceptible to manipulation.
- Output Verification Systems: Implement independent verification systems to validate LLM outputs before they are presented to users.
Research context and confidence
- Evidence and verification
- Paper-reported; independent reproduction is not documented.
- Primary research source linked.
- Severity
- Not rated by this catalog.
- Source and publication type
- arXiv · Research preprint.
- Peer-review status is not provided by this source.
- Author and publication status
- Author metadata is not stored; see the primary paper.
- Threat model and attacker access
- Black-box model, service, or application access.
- Related deployment categories
- No related deployment category is classified.
- Taxonomy labels only; paper-specific deployment prerequisites are not inferred.
- Affected systems
- Various LLMs (including but not limited to Llama 2, Llama 3, Mistral 7B, Vicuna 7B v1.5) are affected. The vulnerability is not limited to specific LLMs or architectures.
Research Paper
Rainbow teaming: Open-ended generation of diverse adversarial prompts
Primary source: arXiv. Findings are reported by the cited research and have not been independently verified.
View PaperEvidence
This entry is based on a primary research source. Its findings are paper-reported; independent reproduction and verification are not claimed.
https://arxiv.org/abs/2402.16822Related research
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