The LMVD-ID is an internal research identifier, not an official CVE identifier.
Tool-response state corruption through unauthorized source claims
Lower-trust tool content can assert facts beyond its authority and distort an agent's decisions. PIPES screens response units against source provenance and expected field meaning.
Paper-evaluated models(2)
- Gemma 4 31B IT
- GPT-5.6 Luna
Description
Lower-trust tool content can assert facts beyond its authority and distort an agent's decisions. PIPES screens response units against source provenance and expected field meaning.
Examples
See the primary evaluation (opens in a new tab).
Impact
Across six author-evaluated benchmark splits, mean attack success falls from 84.7% to 2.3% for Gemma 4 31B IT and from 21.6% to 1.1% for GPT-5.6 Luna. Aggregate benign utility does not decline. Results depend on trusted provenance and accurate contracts; they cover two models and one changed response unit per attack.
Affected Systems
- VitaBench and AgentDyn tool-using agent configurations.
Mitigation Steps
- Preserve source authority when assembling tool responses.
- Validate structured fields and quarantine unsupported claims.
- Retain authorization checks for consequential actions.
Evidence
Research context and confidence
- Evidence and verification
- Paper-reported; independent reproduction is not documented.
- Primary source plus a dedicated evidence section.
- Severity
- Not rated by this catalog.
- Source and publication type
- arXiv · Research preprint.
- Peer-review status is not provided by this source.
- Author and publication status
- Author metadata is not stored; see the primary paper.
- Threat model and attacker access
- Ability to influence untrusted model inputs or connected content.
- Related deployment categories
- Agent workflows; Model APIs
- Taxonomy labels only; paper-specific deployment prerequisites are not inferred.
- Affected systems
- VitaBench and AgentDyn tool-using agent configurations.
Research Paper
PIPES: Securing Agent Perception with Provenance and Priors
Primary source: arXiv. Findings are reported by the cited research and have not been independently verified.
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