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LMVD-ID: 67e68f7d
Paper published August 11, 2026
Entry analyzed August 13, 2026
Paper-reported evidence
Confidence: Source-linked

The LMVD-ID is an internal research identifier, not an official CVE identifier.

Agentic Binary Reverse-Engineering Capability Gaps

SRE-Bench evaluates whether cybersecurity agents can recover the behavior of realistic binary-only software without relying on source-code memorization. The authors construct 19 private programs, 44 anti-analysis…

Read primary paperBibTeX citation

Paper-evaluated models(5)

GPT-5.6 Sol, Claude-Opus-5, GPT-5.5 +2 more
  • GPT-5.6 Sol
  • Claude-Opus-5
  • GPT-5.5
  • Grok 4.5
  • GLM 5.2

Description

SRE-Bench evaluates whether cybersecurity agents can recover the behavior of realistic binary-only software without relying on source-code memorization. The authors construct 19 private programs, 44 anti-analysis primitives, 262 binary instances, and 1,572 deterministic grading tasks covering security-relevant reverse-engineering scenarios.

Examples

Use the authors’ controlled private-program benchmark, isolated binary-analysis environments, deterministic grading, fixed tool budgets, and nonproduction artifacts; see https://arxiv.org/html/2608.11469 (opens in a new tab).

Impact

GPT-5.6-sol achieves 61.4% mean rubric credit and fully solves 80 of 254 gradeable instances (31.5%); Claude-Opus-5 achieves 31.8% and fully solves 32 of 256 gradeable instances (12.5%). Those denominators exclude refusals and context-window failures, and every run is limited to 500 agent steps and six hours. The study measures benchmark capability gaps, not an exploitable production vulnerability or compromise rate.

Affected Systems

  • mini-SWE-agent reverse-engineering harness with the paper’s restricted binary-analysis environment
  • Automated malware-analysis, firmware-inspection, binary triage, and proprietary-software investigation workflows
  • Security-analysis agents processing compiled programs without access to their original source code

Mitigation Steps

  • Evaluate binary-analysis agents on withheld, independently authored programs with deterministic graders rather than relying solely on public-source benchmarks.
  • Report refusal, context-exhaustion, and timeout rates separately from gradeable-instance scores.
  • Use defense-in-depth and expert human review for security conclusions drawn from incomplete binary analysis.
  • Isolate untrusted binaries, constrain execution privileges, and retain inspectable tool and grading traces.
  • Measure performance across anti-analysis protections, program domains, and realistic execution budgets before extrapolating to production incidents.

Evidence

Research context and confidence

Evidence and verification
Paper-reported; independent reproduction is not documented.
Primary source plus a dedicated evidence section.
Severity
Not rated by this catalog.
Source and publication type
arXiv · Research preprint.
Peer-review status is not provided by this source.
Author and publication status
Author metadata is not stored; see the primary paper.
Threat model and attacker access
Not explicitly classified; consult the primary paper..
Related deployment categories
Agent workflows; Coding agents
Taxonomy labels only; paper-specific deployment prerequisites are not inferred.
Affected systems
mini-SWE-agent reverse-engineering harness with the paper’s restricted binary-analysis environment Automated malware-analysis, firmware-inspection, binary triage, and proprietary-software investigation workflows…

Research Paper

The Next Challenge for Agentic Cybersecurity: A Realistic, Contamination-Free Reverse Engineering Benchmark

Primary source: arXiv. Findings are reported by the cited research and have not been independently verified.

View Paper